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This dissertation argues that the creation of a theoretical model able systematically to distinguish 
and categorize the different types of statements made during international forums can help 
answering certain fundamental questions related to the functioning of inter-state negotiations; and 
that this would lead to a greater understanding of international relations in general. The existing 
literature has not yet been able to build such a systematic process of categorization, and the main 
reason for this is that they attempted to distinguish different types of forum statements by looking at 
indiscernible objects: the true dispositions of forum participants. Trying to build and to initially test 
such a systematic, valid and reliable method of classification of forum statements, able to lead to the 
formulation of empirically testable hypotheses, is the objective of this research. This with the 
objective of providing to future research the tools to analyse international forums on sounder 
conceptual and methodological bases. 
The theoretical model in this dissertation presents a reviewed version of Jennifer Mitzen’s theory of 
collective intention, and it argues that forum types of statement can be distinguished on the basis of 
the intention they address. It is argued that forum types of statement can be classified in collectivist, 
particularistic and procedural ones. Furthermore, it is argued that greater frequency of collectivist 
statements in international forums is likely to be correlated with a greater legitimacy of the forums’ 
outputs. To test the plausibility of this hypothesis, two most-similar cases are compared through the 
lens of qualitative content analysis: the two Antarctic meetings which respectively led to the 









International forums are the main instrument by which states collectively address issues of 
global politics, and to study them means to study the unfolding and the development of 
international relations. Above all, they are moments of dialogue, “interactive processes” (Kotzian, 
2007, 80) in which delegates meet and communicate through language – both verbal and non-verbal 
– conveying their concerns, sharing their views and, eventually, attempting to reach an agreement. 
All concerns, hopes, promises, threats, appeals made during the forum are expressed by single 
statements, which can be very different from each other: a delegate can persuade another that one 
choice is the fairest one, one can coerce others to take a certain decision by threatening them, and so 
on. Different statements convey different types of behaviour, and the way participants choose to 
behave influences the output of the negotiations. Researchers can approach the study of 
international forums in many different ways, depending on the questions they want to answer; 
however, some questions can be answered only if the vast sea encompassing everything uttered 
during the forum is separated, delimited into single statements, and if those statements are 
systematically classified according to the type of behaviour they convey. 
How can decision-making procedures influence the way delegates interact during 
negotiations? Does the predominance of a certain type of behaviour influence the output of the 
forum? Is it true that certain political regimes often resort to specific types of behaviour over others 
when they negotiate? These very important questions, and many more, can be answered only by a 
systematic comparison between different types of international forums, and such comparison is 
possible only if one is able systematically to categorize the different types of statement made during 
the negotiation. Being able to categorize in a systematic way each statement according to the 
behaviour it expresses, in fact, would enable one to assess the frequency with which one type of 
behaviour was displayed during a forum, and this in turn would allow researchers to compare the 
frequencies of certain types of behaviours in different forums. This comparative process would then 
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help to assess with greater clarity and reliability whether, for instance, in a forum where delegates 
decide through consensus actors behave differently than in a forum where decisions are taken by 
majority; or whether a forum with higher frequency of threatening types of behaviour delivers a 
different output than a forum with a lower one; or whether democratic countries tend to act 
differently than authoritarian ones during the same international forums. The first step to take in 
order to answer some of the most important questions related to inter-state negotiations is to build a 
method of categorization of forum statements, that can be empirically tested and implemented in a 
reliable and valid way. The objective of this research is to establish such a method; in order to do 
so, the thesis revisits Jennifer Mitzen’s theory of collective intention in international forums, and it 
claims that forum statements can be categorized according to the type of intention they pursue. 
The existing literature has not been able to build a systematic process of categorization of 
forum statements. The main reason for this was that they attempted to distinguish one type of 
statement from another by looking at indiscernible objects: the true dispositions of forum 
participants. The term “disposition” in this research is defined, in accordance with the Cambridge 
Dictionary, as “a person’s usual way of feeling or behaving”.1 In other words, previous authors have 
tried to identify the types of statement delivered during a forum by building theoretical models that 
pre-supposed that negotiating actors approached negotiations with precise dispositions. 
Constructivist authors believed that diplomatic delegates naturally had a norm-observant 
disposition, while rationalists claimed that negotiating parties had a selfish 2  and strategic 
disposition, and these fundamental premises shaped the theoretical models they elaborated. 
Dispositions, however, cannot be detected empirically, and when authors tried to test their 








The most famous example of how the literature failed in isolating and distinguishing different 
types of forum statements while looking at real-world negotiations is the 2005 research conducted 
by Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller. The two authors looked at different international forums 
and tried to isolate moments where the negotiating behaviour of “arguing” – in their words, “an 
interaction in which actors attempt to coordinate actions by reaching an agreement on the definition 
of the situation and the norms to be applied to it”3 (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 168) – was clearly 
present and detectable. Deitelhoff and Müller started from the consideration that one of the most 
important shortcomings of the literature concerning international forum social interactions was “the 
missing empirical record on ‘communicative action’ [meaning: of arguing behaviour] in 
international politics” (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 170). They identified a lack of empirical testing 
as one of the main problems of the theories looking at international negotiations, and, attempting to 
fill this gap, they tried to isolate and identify arguing behaviour within different forums. However, 
at the end of their study they claimed that although they were able to detect the presence of arguing 
in the forums, they could not isolate the precise moments in which arguing was taking place 
(Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 177). 
The main obstacle that they encountered was that arguing was defined and conceived by the 
literature as a type of behaviour in which a subject is open to being persuaded by other people’s 
arguments and is moved by an inner desire to find the truth (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 170). This 
meant that, to detect arguing within real-world negotiations, one needed to assess the open-
mindedness of forum participants and their truth-seeking disposition; however, since “the mind is 
not accessible” (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171), these were indiscernible objects, and the 
impossibility to detect them resulted in the impossibility of clearly isolating arguing moments. 
Their attempt, although unsuccessful, delivered fundamental contributions to the study of 
international forums, because it highlighted one of the most important issues that the discipline 
 




needs to address: the impossibility of empirically verifying the presence of a behaviour by looking 
for invisible evidence. Drawing from their work, this thesis wants to address such an issue, and to 
elaborate a model able systematically and clearly to isolate and to categorize different types of 
behaviour within international forums, and to begin to test whether such a model is able to provide 
plausible and empirically testable hypotheses. For this to be done, however, types of forum 
behaviour have to be re-defined, and this process of re-definition needs to be based on concepts that 
can be at least detectable while looking at the empirical world. 
Despite the courageous attempt made by Deitelhoff and Müller, the creation of a systematic 
procedure of categorization of forum statements has often not been the main objective of the 
discipline, which has mostly developed in two directions. Some authors have decided to focus on 
understanding how delegates think while negotiating, how they take decisions, and what they are 
(Müller, 2004; Kotzian, 2007; Grobe, 2010). Others have decided not to give excessive attention to 
what delegates said during the negotiation process, and tried to explain the output of international 
forums by choosing a more “structural” approach, looking at the way norms and mechanisms of 
governance can lead negotiations to deliver a certain output (Keohane, 1996; Clapp, 2011).4 While 
this thesis does not argue that these approaches are problematic in themselves, it does claim that 
they are unable to provide solid bases for an effective comparison between different forums, and 
that they are therefore unfit to answer any of the previously listed vital questions concerning inter-
state negotiations. Before outlining the theoretical framework at the base of the thesis, this 





“structural” perspective:  the  two approaches often overlap, and  theories are often  influenced by both approaches. 
The division made within this introduction is a mere simplification, in order to show some of the basic concepts that 
the  literature  has  used  in  order  to  interpret  international  forums  and  their  outputs.  Similarly,  when  this  thesis 
discusses  the  clash between  rationalism  and  constructivism within  the  ontological  debate,  it does  not  attempt  to 
suggest that these two approaches are radically different and rigidly separated;  it provides a simplification  in which 




I: How delegates think: the rationalist/constructivist dispute 
 
The strain of the literature trying to assess “how delegates think” has been significantly shaped by 
the clash between rationalism and constructivism. Authors on both sides tried to define what was 
the forum participants’ natural disposition during forum sessions – a disposition that led them to 
behave in a certain way. Rationalist researchers envisioned subjects interacting in a forum as 
rational units with a selfish and strategic disposition: an inclination to strategically maximize their 
own gains (Elster, 1986, 103-105), while constructivist ones conceived them as subjects driven by 
their perceived and historically-shaped identities, as units with an inherently norm-orientated and 
norm-observant disposition (Müller, 2004, 401). 5  Despite their differences, rationalist and 
constructivist works were similar in two ways. First, in almost every case they have attempted to 
identify different types of behaviour that could be displayed during international negotiations, and 
to establish the thinking process that led delegates to display one behaviour over another. Second, 
they have been mainly driven by a deductive approach: starting from either rationalist or 
constructivist premises, they elaborated hypotheses trying to explain how states interacted while 
negotiating. 
Since rationalists and constructivists both followed a deductive approach, the different types 
of forum behaviour they identified were inevitably the result of their philosophical premises. Thus, 
rationalist authors, who considered forum participants to have a self-focused and strategic 
disposition, argued that negotiations were mostly made of bargaining behaviour, defined as 
strategic use of threats and promises (Müller, 2004, 397) in order to reach “compromises based on 
fixed preferences of the actors” (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 172). Constructivist researchers, on 
the other hand, started from the belief that negotiating parties have a norm-observant disposition; 
consequently, they claimed that forum participants were mainly driven by the norms they 
internalized (Müller, 2004, 401), and that, when there were not clear norms to follow, they engaged 
 




in arguing, defined as “truth seeking [behaviour] with the aim of reaching mutual understanding 
based on reasoned consensus” (Risse, 2000, 1-2). 
This rigid division between rationalism and constructivism was very soon challenged 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 911), and authors tried quite early to build theoretical bridges 
between the two approaches (Risse, 2000, 3). These attempts, however, were not able to circumvent 
the ontological dispute: constructivists tried to explain self-focused behaviour without disowning 
their ontological premises, envisioning models where a constructivist ontology could explain the 
presence of bargaining during negotiations (Müller, 2004, 402-405). Rationalists tried to do the 
same but on opposite terms, attempting to explain the existence of norm-driven behaviour and 
arguing on the premises that actors were rational and strategic units (Kotzian, 2007, 84-85). The 
result was that much of the research was focused on resolving the rationalist/constructivist 
ontological dispute, and did not elaborate theoretical models aiming at explaining the features and 
the dynamics of real-world negotiations. 
As already highlighted by describing the research conducted by Deitelhoff and Müller, an 
even greater problem was that when some authors tried empirically to test their theories, they were 
unable to determine whether a certain statement could belong to a certain behavioural category. The 
main reason explaining these hindrances is, once again, that most theoretical models were 
committed to a constructivist or a rationalist framework, and that the ideal-typical categories that 
they conceptualized were the necessary consequence of the very model’s philosophical premises. In 
turn, most of the philosophical premises of both constructivism and rationalism focused on the 
hidden dispositions driving forum participants: their being (or not being) self-focused units driven 
by fixed preferences (Grobe, 2010, 22), their willingness (or unwillingness) to find the truth and to 
be persuaded by other people’s arguments (Risse, 2000, 7-12), their susceptibility (or 
imperviousness) to social norms (Müller, 2004, 401). These features are undetectable observables 
of international life (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 36): objects that do not leave identifiable traces of 
their existence in the empirical world (Jackson, 2016, 97). The fact that most theories considered 
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these hidden dispositions to be the main distinction between different types of forum behaviour was 
the main reason for the impossibility to test those theories empirically. 
To sum up, many authors have identified different types of forum behaviour by relying on 
undetectable features. This is not a problem if the objective of research is to provide an interpretive 
perspective through which to examine real-world international events; however, the conclusions 
reached by a theoretical framework relying on unobservables can be easily contested. An example 
of this can be Thomas Risse’s account of the negotiating process between the USA, USSR, France, 
UK and the two Germanies, which discussed the possibility of German re-unification. In his case 
study Risse considers the attitudes and the “hidden dispositions” of forum participants as 
fundamental to identify the presence of arguing. He argues that the Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev, who started the forum by opposing reunification, eventually changed his mind because 
he was persuaded by other form participants that a united Germany would be in the interest of all 
(Risse, 2000, 23-28) – this entails that Gorbachev approached negotiations by being ready to be 
persuaded, and therefore with an open-minded disposition. Risse’s conclusions were challenged by 
Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson, who argued that Gorbachev’s change of mind could also be the 
consequence of the realization that the Soviet Union was politically, militarily and economically too 
weak to stop reunification, and that the only option for Moscow was to accept it and go along with 
it (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 40) – this would imply that Gorbachev had not an open-minded 
disposition, but a strategical one. The weaknesses of ontological approaches relying on undetectable 
features are even more evident when authors address questions which, to be answered, need a 
systematic and methodologically rigorous approach, often based on a comparison between two or 
more different forums. 
An example of this last claim can be found by looking at Christian Grobe’s article “The 
Power of Words: Argumentative Persuasion in International Negotiations” (2010). Grobe looks at 
the phenomenon of persuasion in international politics, and he argues that forum claims made with 
the attempt to persuade other delegates are successful only if they provide new and reliable 
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knowledge regarding the debated issue (Grobe, 2010, 22) – in his own words, when these claims are 
“informative” (Grobe, 2010, 15). For Grobe, in fact, “the persuader will only be successful if he 
provides the persuadee with new causal knowledge about the problem at hand or the policy options 
available to him” (Grobe, 2010, 12), and causal knowledge is persuasive when it is considered 
impartial and scientifically reliable (Grobe, 2010, 13-14). 
Thus, Grobe’s model argues that forum participants are “persuaded” to change their behaviour 
only when they hear informative claims shedding new light on the debated issue, able to convince 
them that their interest is better pursued by following a different course of action than the one 
previously envisioned (Grobe, 2010, 19-22).6 He tried to test his theoretical model by comparing 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (better known as 
MARPOL) and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) negotiations – respectively, international forums concerning the prevention of pollution 
from ships and the preservation of Antarctic marine resources. Grobe argues that during MARPOL 
negotiations proposals were debated on scientific grounds, but that, “lacking clear scientific 
evidence”, persuasive claims were unsuccessful (Grobe, 2010, 18); he also wrote that as MARPOL 
negotiations progressed “both sides put forward numerous arguments to prove the superiority of 
their preferred solutions but in the absence of new scientific evidence these arguments were purely 
rhetorical in nature” (Grobe, 2010, 19). On the contrary, he argues, persuasive claims made during 
CCAMLR negotiations led to a change of actors’ behaviour, and this was “due to a newly emerging 
scientific consensus” (Grobe, 2010, 21). To sum up, he claims that forum participants tried to 
persuade others both in MARPOL and CCAMLR forums, but that only in the latter persuasive 








Grobe’s theoretical framework, however, bases the whole assessment of the “informativity” 
of forum persuasive statements on undetectable features: it is, in fact, impossible to establish to 
what extent forum participants hearing a scientific explanation are convinced by it, because, once 
again, “the mind is not accessible” (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171). The impossibility to know 
how a claim is actually considered “informative” by forum participants is what makes Grobe’s 
conclusions problematic. Grobe himself, for instance, said that MARPOL proposals were debated 
on scientific bases (Grobe, 2010, 18): on which ground is it possible to claim that the scientific 
arguments made were not good enough to be considered reliable? Furthermore, how can one assess 
whether changes in actors’ behaviour during CCAMLR negotiations happened because actors 
thought the scientific information that they received was reliable? Why is it not possible that they 
changed their behaviour due to other reasons? It seems that the only possible answer provided by 
Grobe is that scientific arguments can be considered reliable only when forum participants claim 
they are. This, however is a dangerous assumption, because it would easily lead to the quite weak 
and unconvincing conclusion that “forum claims are persuasive only when forum participants claim 
to be persuaded by them”. 
This last example shows how reliance on unobservable features is problematic when a 
researcher wants to address certain questions regarding international forums and grasp some of their 
basic features. At this point, one could argue: “If it is impossible to know how delegates think, why 
not then focus on the context in which delegates are, on the inner characteristics of the forum in 
which they negotiate, in order to understand their behaviour?”. This path was chosen by authors 
that, in attempting to explain the output of certain negotiations, decided to focus on the way those 






II: Where delegates are: structure-centred theories 
 
Like many other political phenomena, international forums can be examined through the lens of a 
theoretical framework distinguishing between structure and agency, where the term “structure” 
includes “factors beyond the immediate control of the actors directly involved”, and agency 
indicates the “ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously” (Hay, 2002, 94). In an international 
forum the structure is constituted by its diplomatic framework: climate summits, for instance, are 
organized by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Friman, 
2013, 217), while Antarctic meetings are enclosed within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) 
diplomatic framework. Usually, diplomatic frameworks define the membership and the decision-
making procedures of the forum, the rules disciplining the debate, the legal status of the forum’s 
output, and many other things. Agency, on the other hand, is a concept encompassing all the ways 
in which different actors pursue their goals during the forum: the strategy they choose to follow, the 
concerns they address, the concessions they make to other forum participants and the promises, 
threats, and requests they express. International negotiations are the interplay between structural 
forces and the agency of participating subjects: delegates’ different types of behaviour generate the 
debate which is at the base of international forums, while the diplomatic framework of a specific 
forum is what influences and regulates the debate. 
Most research on international negotiations has examined how structural features could 
influence the agency of negotiating actors – for instance, how institutional arrangements regarding 
decision-making rules or governance mechanisms could influence the output of a certain forum. 
According to them, studying previous forums and institutional arrangements can lead to the 
elaboration of more effective mechanisms of governance (Keohane, 1996, 7), which, in turn, could 
lead to more successful negotiations in the future (Clapp, 2011, 6-7). A structure-centred approach 
to the study of international forums does not necessarily lead to flawed conclusions; however, an 
excessive focus on structure, together with a general disregard of agency, can generate serious flaws 
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in the research process. The limits of structure-centred approaches are shown by an example 
considering two international forums related to the administration and the protection of the 
Antarctic environment. 
In the spring of 1988, the city of Wellington, New Zealand, hosted an international forum 
including all member states of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) – the diplomatic framework 
administering Antarctica. At the end of the forum, participants adopted the Convention on the 
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA) (Verhoeven, 1992, 11), which 
regulated future mining in Antarctica and aimed at safeguarding the three pillars at the base of the 
ATS: maintenance of peace, promotion of scientific research and protection of the environment 
(Joyner, 1998, 57-64). The event was first hailed as a “triumph of legal ingenuity” (Puissochet, 
1988, 8), but less than a year after CRAMRA’s adoption Australia and France refused to sign the 
treaty, causing the Convention’s juridical demise (Joyner, 1996, 162-164) and led national 
governments and international organizations to cast doubts over the legitimacy of the ATS (Vidas, 
2000, 3). Less than two years later, on November 1990, ATS members reconvened in a new forum, 
regulated by the same rules, driven by the same mandate and attended by almost the exact same 
states as the CRAMRA negotiations. This second forum resulted in the Madrid Protocol, which 
banned mining in Antarctica and established that all human activities in the continent needed to be 
subordinated to the protection of the Antarctic scientific, wilderness, aesthetic and intrinsic values 
(Vicuña, 1996, 289). 
The CRAMRA negotiations produced a treaty that allowed mining in Antarctica; the 
Convention, however, never came into force, created fractures amongst negotiating parties and 
dragged the ATS into a legitimacy crisis which endangered its own survival. The Madrid Protocol 
negotiations, instead, led to a treaty which banned mining in the Southern Continent; the Protocol 
was very soon ratified by all parties, it healed divisions between states, and it significantly restored 
the legitimacy of the ATS in the eyes of the international community. How is it possible that forums 
which were structurally so similar delivered such different outputs? The CRAMRA and the Madrid 
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Protocol Antarctic forums are examined in greater depth later in this dissertation, being at the base 
of this research’s case study. However, the brief description provided in this section shows that 
structural features alone cannot provide a clear picture of international forums, and researchers need 
to focus on other elements as well. These other elements are often labelled under the category of 
agency, a term which includes the types of interaction and the types of behaviour that delegates 
adopted during the forum. 
Looking at the negotiating process which ended with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol can 
provide a clear example of how a structure-centred approach may lead not only to incomplete 
understandings, but also to false predictions. When diplomatic delegations started to elaborate a 
climate regime aiming at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the international community had just 
reached, with the coming into force of the Montreal Protocol, a significant achievement for the 
protection of the ozone layer. Inspired by this achievement, delegates started shaping the structure 
of the climate regime in a similar fashion: both policymakers (Baron and Colombier, 2015, 153) 
and IR scholars (Mert, 2013, 31-32) assumed that the protection of the ozone layer and the 
preservation of climate stability were similar issues, and that the structure that worked with the 
former could work with the latter as well (Barrett, 2003, 300). The failure of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Kutney, 2014, 1), however, shows that these types of assumptions are not always safe to make.7 
 
III: What delegates say: the role of language and its unitization into statements 
 
Previous sections have shown that research focusing on how delegates think during international 
forums may be useful in elaborating interpretive conclusions, but is unfit to produce empirically-
testable theories enabling a systematic comparison between different inter-state negotiations, 








which tend to analyse the structure in which delegates are acting and that overlook other 
fundamental, agency-related variables run the risk of generating erroneous interpretations and 
predictions. Drawing from different works that emphasized the fundamental role played by 
language and communication in the context of international forums (Zartman and Berman, 1983, 
27-41; Wendt, 1992, 404-407; Jörke, 2013, 353), some authors have claimed that research should 
instead focus on what delegates say during the negotiations. This conclusion was based on the 
consideration that forums are, as previously said, interactive processes, where actors communicate 
through language, and that studying what participants said during a forum might reveal fundamental 
insights into the forum itself. 
At this point, one might think that to know what happened in a particular forum one simply 
needs to examine what each forum participant said. This seems easy, since anyone can read or listen 
to diplomatic statements, but things are obviously more complex. In fact, to capture the 
fundamental features of international forums one needs to read between the lines, to separate the 
relevant from the irrelevant, to go beyond the words uttered by delegates and to understand why 
those words have been uttered and the underlying aims of the speaker. The only way to do that is 
systematically to examine what delegates said, starting from clear definitions. The term “definition” 
in this research indicates a “description of the features and limits of something”: 8 indeed, to define 
is, in a certain sense, to distinguish, to separate indistinct objects into clearly delimited conceptual 
categories. Examining what forum delegates said starting from clear definitions means that all 
sentences that have been uttered during the negotiating process have to be classified into different 
conceptual categories, each of them representing an ideal-typical behaviour that could take place 
within a forum. The difficulties encountered by authors who tried to do that by assessing “how 
delegates think” led some researchers to claim that the impossibility of assessing “what people 
think” led to the need to “observe what they say” (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 36), and that 





the forum participants, but on the inherent characteristics of the acts of speech uttered during the 
negotiations (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353; Saretzki, 2009, 162-165). 
Most of these authors, however, disagreed on the exact way to distinguish between the 
different types of behaviour that can be encountered. While for some forum behavioural categories 
were mere ideal-types, to be considered as “end-point[s] of a continuum” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 
352), others advocated a model able to draw clear lines, to distinguish one type of behaviour from 
another (Saretzki, 2009, 166). Although this development in the literature looked promising, it did 
not lead to the elaboration of a model able systematically to identify and categorize the different 
types of behaviour which can occur in real-world negotiations.9 This dissertation aims at filling this 
gap in the literature, and by doing so it wants to provide the methodological and theoretical bases on 
which to start comparing different forums in a reliable and valid way, in order more effectively to 
address some of the fundamental questions concerning inter-state negotiations. 
This thesis starts from two considerations. First, since it is impossible to understand how 
delegates think, and since only looking at the structural context in which delegates are is not 
enough, it is necessary to build a theory analysing what delegates said during the negotiation. 
Second, a theory looking at what delegates said without a methodological framework able to unitize 
and categorize data leads to interpretations relying on unstable foundations. 10  It is therefore 
necessary that all things uttered during negotiations are divided into basic units, the “atoms” of 










and  their main  focus  has  remained  the  study  of  the mechanisms  through  which  states  internalize  international 
institutions’ normative frameworks (Johnston, 2001, 487‐488). 
10 With  this  last claim,  this research does not  imply that every previous work examining what delegates said during 
negotiations did not provide significant contributions or relied on unstable foundations. It only argues that they were 




basic unit of the negotiations. A statement is “something that someone says or writes officially, or 
an action done to express an opinion”.11 Within international forums, statements are the units of the 
negotiating process, the sentences, the acts of speech that, if summed, constitute the very fabric of 
the debate taking place in an international forum. They are the very result of the interplay of 
structural forces and the agency of different actors, and being able systematically to examine 
statements made during an international forum means, to a certain extent, systematically to examine 
the forum in itself. 
What statements are to international forums, why they are so important, and how it is so 
difficult to detect them and to examine them, can be further explained by an analogy considering a 
football match. One could imagine a situation where football players belonging to two different 
teams use their respective agency in order to win the game. The two teams face structural 
constraints, represented by the rules of the game: for instance, one team cannot win the match if its 
players grab the ball with their arms and start running. The rules of football, however, allow teams 
to arrive near the opponents’ goal in many different ways: they can, for instance, display a style 
based on slow and patient short passes aiming at retaining ball-possession, or they can launch quick 
counter-attacks, aiming at reaching the other half of the field with a few long passes. Similarly, 
players facing the goalkeeper from the other team can decide to kick a very powerful shot or to 
place the ball with a weak but precise hit, and the defending team can choose to stop the attackers 
through tackles or tight-marking, through pressing or through a more passive type of game; team 
players exercise their agency while making all these choices. 
However, what happens in the field, the very fabric of the game is made by passes, tackles, 
shots, markings and all the other athletic gestures that make the ball move. Facing different teams 
can lead players to change their style of play, while changes to the rules of football would change 
the way athletes act in the field, but those changes can be assessed only by looking at the athletic 





players’ names, nor by the rules of football: it is decided by the sum of all athletic gestures which 
took place. This thesis does not try to say that international forums are similar to football matches – 
indeed, the two things are very different. However, it argues that statements are to international 
forums what athletic gestures are to football matches: the decisive, constitutive features of a 
phenomenon and yet the most elusive object to grasp. 
Looking at an international forum without looking at the statements that took place within it 
would be similar to looking at a football match without paying attention at the passes, the shots and 
all the athletic gestures that constituted the game. How could one examine the way changes in the 
forum’s structural features can influence the way actors behave within a forum, without looking at 
subjects’ actual behaviour? How could one examine the extent to which an actor influenced another 
during the negotiating process without looking at the way they talked to each other? How could one 
identify the negotiating strategy of a certain state during a particular forum without looking at the 
statements its delegates made during negotiations? The dissertation tries to elaborate a model able 
to unitize what delegates said into clear and delimited statements, to examine those statements in 
order to categorize them as examples of different types of behaviour, and to produce a theory that 
can be tested empirically in a reliable and valid way. To do so, however, it is necessary to build 
clear definitions of all the different types of behaviour which can be displayed during international 
forums, and those definitions need to be based on concepts that are detectable empirically. 
 
IV: Formulating a theory  
 
In his seminal work Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz distinguished between “laws” 
and “theories”, by claiming that 
 
Rather than being mere collections of laws, theories are statements that 
explain them. Laws identify invariant or probable associations. Theories 
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show why those associations obtain. Each descriptive term in a law is 
directly tied to observational and laboratory procedures, and laws are 
established only if they pass observational or experimental tests. In addition 
to descriptive terms, theories contain theoretical notions. Theories cannot be 
constructed through induction alone, for theoretical notions can only be 
invented, not discovered (Waltz, 1979, 4). 
 
A theory can therefore be originated, according to Waltz, from a theoretical notion: an 
abstract concept that is only indirectly connected with the empirical world, that does not possess 
explanatory power on its own and that can find validation only through the validation of the theory 
it contributes to create (Waltz, 1979, 4-5). 
Waltz’s need to define theories arose from his desire to formulate a systemic theory of 
international relations (Waltz, 1990, 29-32). Reviewing authors of classical realism, he claimed that 
they were to international politics what physiocrats were to the economy: researchers who 
discovered some fundamental features of their subject of study, without building theories that were 
able to explain them and to produce testable hypotheses (Waltz, 1990, 24-26). This research claims 
something similar while looking at the literature that has hitherto examined international 
negotiations and the types of forum statements which are made within them. As the debate has 
progressed, constructivist and rationalist works have retained their ontological differences, but at 
the same time started describing increasingly similar processes, referring to certain, fundamental 
features of international negotiations. Indeed, almost all the most recent works, from both 
constructivist and rationalist authors, claim that: 
 
 Forum participants decide which statement to make according to the 




 Different types of statement can be made within the same 
international forum (Risse, 2000, 21). 
 Some statements made in forums indicate a certain choice as the best 
thing to do, because it is the fairest or the best choice in objective 
terms (Risse, 2000, 2-4; Kotzian, 2007, 83). 
 Some forum types of statement aim at the realization of a 
compromise addressing the particularistic interests of the people 
striking the deal (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 172; Jörke, 2013, 
253). 
 Some forum types of statement advocate the observance of norms 
which have been previously established and accepted by participants 
in the negotiation (Davies, 2010, 455; Müller, 2004, 401). 
 
Most of these authors, however, have based their explanations on theoretical notions which 
are not even indirectly related to detectable features of international politics: the hidden dispositions 
of forum participants. Because of this, their theories deliver hypotheses that could not be tested – 
and, therefore, validated (Waltz, 1979, 13) – empirically. That is why this research starts with an 
examination of the existing literature, and it tries to filter previous authors’ claims and assumptions 
through a theoretical framework able to produce hypotheses that can be tested empirically through 
valid and reliable methodological procedures. 
To do so, the theoretical framework must be based on a theoretical construct which can at 
least be empirically detected, although not directly. The construct that is used for this purpose is that 
of “intention”: by examining the basic characteristics of the concept of intention, and by revising 
Jennifer Mitzen’s theory of collective intention in international relations (Mitzen, 2013), this study 
argues that different types of forum statement can be distinguished on the basis of which type of 
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intention they are expressing. Starting from this assumption, it claims that there are three types of 
statement that can take place within international forums: 
 
 Collectivism, which aims at the realization of the forum’s collective 
intention. 
 Particularism, which aims at the realization of one or more 
particularistic intentions held by certain forum participants. 
 Proceduralism, which aims at the observance of pre-established 
norms. 
 
Starting from this theoretical model, the research hypothesizes that international forums with 
a higher frequency of collectivist interactions should be correlated with a greater fulfilment of the 
forum’s collective intention – and, consequently, with greater legitimacy. 12  To test such a 
hypothesis, the dissertation looks at two Antarctic international forums, which were extremely 
similar in their structural features but delivered very different outputs in terms of legitimacy: the 
negotiations that led to the elaboration of CRAMRA and those which ended with the adoption of 
the Madrid Protocol. The hypothesis this research formulates is that the difference in the 
legitimacies of these two forums’ outputs can be explained by the fact that the more legitimate 
forum involved more collectivism. The case study is conducted through the method of qualitative 
content analysis, accompanied by procedures designed to assess the validity and the replicability of 









V: Philosophical premises 
It has just been outlined that the goal of this dissertation is to elaborate a theoretical model able to 
formulate a hypothesis that can be tested empirically. It is then possible to conclude that this work 
of research follows what was defined by Patrick Jackson, in his book The Conduct of Inquiry in 
International Relations, as a “neopositivist” path, relying on the philosophical wagers of mind-
world dualism and of phenomenalism. 
Indeed, in 2016 Patrick Jackson examined different approaches to the study of IR, and argued 
that all of them can be categorized and examined by looking at two fundamental “philosophical 
wagers” (Jackson, 2016, 24). The two wagers he identified were: the way the researcher related to 
the object of study; and “the relationship between knowledge and observation” (Jackson, 2016, 37). 
The first wager distinguished between research characterized by mind-world dualism, which 
considers the external world to be independent from the observer’s perspective (Jackson, 2016, 30-
31), and mind-world monism, which argues that the image of the observed “world” is inextricably 
connected with the social and cultural environment in which the researcher is entrenched (Jackson, 
2016, 115-141). The second wager divides research into phenomenalist works, which postulate that 
knowledge can only be limited to “the world that can be empirically grasped and directly 
experienced” (Jackson, 2016, 42) and trans-factualist ones, arguing that knowledge can extend 
beyond the realm of observables (Jackson, 2016, 36-37). Jackson’s distinction was conceived to be 
“ultimately a practical one” (Jackson, 2016, 38), and it is hereby used as a very useful tool through 
which to better locate this research within the discipline. 
The calls for a systematic categorization of different forum statements and for a theoretical 
framework able to provide valid and reliable forms of empirical hypothesis-testing imply that this 
research follows an approach rooted on the concepts of “mind-world dualism and of 
phenomenalism”,13 and that it is therefore what Patrick Jackson would call a “neopositivist” piece 
 




of research (Jackson, 2016, 42). The choice of following a neopositivist approach does not imply 
that other methods of research are considered to be “unscientific”, unreliable or inherently flawed; 
nor does it mean that the questions this research aims to answer are the only questions that matter 
while studying international forums. It only means that the questions examined in this research are 
considered to be important ones to answer if one wants to understand international forums, and that 
these questions can be answered through an approach allowing systematic comparison of different 
empirical cases. While other equally important issues regarding inter-state negotiations might be 
addressed through different approaches, the lack of a systematic, valid and reliable method through 
which to categorize the different types of behaviour that can occur during international forums is 
what hinders the analysis of many fundamental features of inter-state negotiations. This work 
attempts to fill this gap in the literature to provide such a method. 
Another necessary premise to make is what does this dissertation exactly mean when talking 
about states. For this thesis, the state is at the same time a group agent, a corporate actor and a 
person. Members of national governments, diplomatic delegates et cetera are considered to be 
spokespeople of a unitary body, with a unitary agency: the state they represent. Questions on the 
nature of the state as a group or a corporate actor, or on whether the state should be considered as a 
person or not, have been treated by an extensive literature, and the thesis does not want to examine 
the existing debate in detail. However, it is necessary to briefly outline the extent to which claims 
made about the nature of states are held, and the meaning that is given to each of them. 
First of all, states, together with other collective organizations like, for instance, commercial 
corporations and NGOs (Tuomela, 2013), have often been defined as “group agents”. A group agent 
has usually been defined as a collective subject that, “like an individual human being”, has certain 
intentions and preferences, and that pursues those intentions through its actions (List, 2018, 295). 
 
test  the hypothesis”.  Jackson also argues  that “phenomenalism enables covariation‐causality”;  in  fact, a  systematic 
method  of  analysis  implies  that  causal  relationships  must  be  “inferred,  rather  than  abducted”  from  a  set  of 
observations  examined  through  the  lens  of  a  systematic method.  This  is  because  phenomenalism maintains  that 




But states are not just group agents; they are the type of group agent that the literature has often 
defined as “corporate actor”. Indeed, when an intention-driven group agent has the authority and the 
capability of “imposing binding decisions on [… its] members” (Wendt, 2004, 297) – and when 
therefore the group agent has a certain autonomy from the individual parties constituting it (Engel, 
2010, 447) – it is possible to talk about corporate actors. According to Alexander Wendt, there are 
two characteristics that corporate actors necessarily must have to be defined as such. First, they 
need to be composed by people who recognize themselves as parts of a collective body which 
pursues certain preferences and objectives.14 Second, the way individuals are parts of a corporate 
actor is often hierarchical (Wendt, 2004, 297-298). Both conditions are respected by states, whose 
functionaries pursue precise goals and policies while being subjected to a certain “chain of 
command”.  
So, in this dissertation states are considered to be corporate actors; but what does it mean to 
say that the state is a person? Can corporate actors be people? And should they be considered as 
such? Treating the institution of state as a person, and attributing to it preferences and intentions, is 
common practice in the discipline of international relations (Wendt, 2004, 289); but such a practice 
has often been object of a complex and articulated debate. The objective of this thesis is not to 
examine and to intervene in such debate.15 It will therefore be sufficient to explain the definition of 
“personhood” hereby adopted, and the extent to which such a definition of personhood is attributed 
to states. 
In treating the state as a person, this dissertation, in line with the work of Christian List and 
Philip Pettit, adopts a performative account of personhood, according to which “what makes an 
agent a person is not what the agent is but what the agent does; the mark of personhood is the ability 









according to a performative approach, a person must not necessarily have intrinsic physiological or 
psychological properties; a person needs to be able to perform certain actions that are proper of a 
person. Drawing mainly from the Hobbesian and the Lockean tradition (List and Pettit, 2011, 171-
173), List and Pettit formulate the following definition of personhood: 
 
To be a person is to have the capacity to perform as a person. And to 
perform as a person is to be party of a system of accepted conventions, such 
as a system of law, under which one contracts obligations to others and […] 
derives entitlement from the reciprocal obligations to others. In particular, it 
is to be a knowledgeable and competent part to such a system of obligations. 
One knows what is owed to one, and what one owes to others, and one is 
able and willing to pay one’s debts or to recognize that censure or sanctions 
are reasonable in case of failure (List and Pettit, 2011, 173). 
 
In other words, to be a person is to be a subject that is an active participant in a society constituted 
by shared rules, rights and obligations. The fact that this dissertation considers states as people 
according to this definition is the reason why communication during inter-state negotiations are 
often defined as social interactions.16 
One last clarification is needed. The way the state is conceived as a person in this thesis is an 
“ideal-typical” one, and, since “ideal-types are pragmatically useful rather than ‘true’ or ‘false’” 
(Jackson, 2004, 284), the claim that “the state is a person” does not aim to assert an objective 
reality. It is an abstraction made for instrumental reasons, done in the conviction that it could be 
helpful in building a simplified portrait of international relations able to formulate plausible and 
empirically-testable hypotheses that could help understanding some features of real-world 
 




international forums.17 In other words, and similarly to other IR works, this thesis treats the state as 
a person because “it is a matter of convenience and economy to do so” (Gilpin, 1986, 318). 
 
VI: Studying international forums in the age of the “Tragedy of Global Commons”  
 
The beginning of this introduction claimed that studying international forums means to study the 
unfolding and the development of international relations; for this reason, the analysis of inter-state 
negotiations has always been a key objective of many authors. By looking at congresses, summits, 
and forums, researchers have tried to define the negotiating strategy and the top priorities of single 
countries during given historical periods (Bava, 2010, 120; Sargil, 2010, 473-474), to understand 
and track changes occurring within the global order (Schmitt, 2013, 315-318), or to envision ways 
to reform and strengthen the network of international institutions (Keohane, 1996, 7). This thesis 
aims to contribute to the literature by elaborating a theoretical model able to re-define the different 
types of behaviour which can be displayed during international forums; to begin to test whether 
such model can provide plausible and empirically testable hypotheses; to categorize and classify 
forum statements by following a reliable and valid methodology. This effort is justified by the 
conviction that building such a model means providing the discipline with the basic instrument 
through which it may systematically examine and compare international forums. In turn, such a 
process of systematic comparison can allow researchers more effectively to address vital questions 
regarding inter-state negotiations, and to determine, for instance, the role exercised by the forum 
structure in shaping delegates’ behaviour, the situations that encourage actors to choose one type of 
behaviour over another, the conditions that can make one type of interaction more effective, the role 
domestic politics play in shaping states’ behaviour during negotiations, et cetera. To address these 
issues is more necessary than ever in these years, with the international community experiencing 





Many of the new issues of global politics are related to the administration and the 
safeguarding of the “global commons”: natural or human-made entities that produce non-excludable 
(Ostrom, 2015, 30) and non-competitive (Kaul, Grundberg and Stern, 1999, 2-3) public goods that 
benefit all mankind, or at least a large majority of it (Joyner, 1998, 26-27).18 The struggle to 
administer common-pool resources is not new to the various disciplines of the social sciences. 
Already in the 1960s, Garrett Hardin warned that “ruin is the destination towards which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the common” 
(Hardin, 1968, 1244), while Mancur Olson wrote that individuals belonging to a group sharing a 
collective interest are not likely to act in its pursuit (Olson, 1965, 2). However, the increasing 
globalization of world politics and the emergence of new, ominous dangers involving the whole 
planet has made the “tragedy of the commons” an even more pressing concern for policymakers and 
IR researchers (Ostrom, 2015, 1-2).19 
The issue of climate change further confirmed the difficulties that international institutions 
encounter when they need to safeguard global commons (Death, 2014a, 74). The international 
community’s inability to tackle environmental degradation has led many authors to challenge the 
very usefulness of international forums, and to question the ways they are structured and organized 
(Death, 2014b, 251-252; Dryzek and Stevenson, 2013, 232; Okereke and Charlesworth, 2014, 46-
49), while it drove others to examine possible ways to improve the current mechanisms of global 
governance (Clapp, 2011, 6-7). Furthermore, emerging issues such as cyber-security revealed the 
necessity to regulate, at an international level, new phenomena within the realm of politics 
(Broeders and Cristiano, 2020), and the recent COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the frailty of 
existing norms and institutions managing global health. The spread of Coronavirus, and the 
 
18 The  terms  “non‐excludable”  and  “non‐competitive”  indicate  respectively  that nobody  can be  excluded  from  the 
enjoyment of the produced public goods, and that it is not possible to compete in order to obtain higher quantities of 
those goods (Kaul, Grundberg and Stern, 1999, 2‐3). 
19 Many  authors  have  challenged  the  concept  of  the  “tragedy  of  the  commons”  by  questioning  some  of  its  core 
assumptions (Stevenson, 2018, 25‐29). However, there are researchers that highlighted how the concept of “tragedy 





disastrous consequences it implies for the economy worldwide, has forced us to redefine the 
concepts of global security, and entails the need for a stronger, more effective concerted action in 
the international sphere (Ivanov, 2020). Now more than ever it is important to understand how 
international forums work, and to identify the practices and mechanisms that are most effective in 
addressing these new, complex issues of international politics. The renewed interest in the role 
played by dialogue in international negotiations can be observed among policymakers as well. The 
negotiations taking place during the last climate summits, for instance, has been following the rules 
of “Indaba”, the debating method amongst Zulu and Xhosa people. Forum participants believe that 
this particular way to negotiate allows everyone to quickly express their opinions and main 
priorities, while it enables the form to reach consensus more quickly (Zimmer, 2015). The method 
of “Indaba” was significantly helpful in solving some of the most contentious issues during the 
2015 Paris Climate summit (Harvey, 2015), and this perhaps can indicate to what extent new, 
unprecedented issues can only be tackled by new, equally unprecedented ways of discussing them 
To study international forums means to study the way states’ representatives communicate 
with each other; it is therefore important to examine them, to grasp their fundamental features and 
dynamics, to study negotiations of the past in order to assess what worked and what did not, and 
why. In these momentous and confused times, studying international forums could establish what is 
the best negotiating strategy for a certain country in a given context, or which norms and 
mechanisms of governance regulating international negotiations are best suited to address new 
tasks. This thesis wants to contribute to this research effort. Its objective is to elaborate a theoretical 
model that can distinguish the different types of forum statements in a clear and systematic way, so 
that future researchers trying to examine which variables in international negotiations encourage 





VII: Structure of the thesis 
 
This dissertation starts from the assumption that it is essential to study the characteristics and the 
dynamics of international forums in order to address the ominous challenges looming on the 
horizon of world politics. Furthermore, it argues that any attempt to study negotiations between 
state representatives must start from a theoretical model able clearly to define and distinguish the 
different types of statement that can be made during real-world negotiations. 
The first chapter provides a brief outline of the existing literature. It describes the ontological 
premises of both rationalism and constructivism, and it reviews the many attempts, coming from 
both theoretical strains, to reconcile the two ontologies. Furthermore, it examines some of the main 
theoretical and methodological unanswered questions within the debate, focusing especially on the 
many difficulties encountered by authors when they tried empirically to test their hypotheses. 
Finally, it calls for a new approach, able to circumvent the ontological debate between rationalism 
and constructivism and to provide a definition of forum social interactions relying on empirically 
detectable features of international forums. 
The second chapter introduces the concept of “intention”, with particular attention to Jennifer 
Mitzen’s theory of collective intention; it then presents a reviewed version of her theoretical 
framework, envisioning the simultaneous existence, within the forum, of collective and 
particularistic intentions. Furthermore, it claims that forum social interactions can be distinguished 
according to the type of intention they pursue, and it identifies three different types of interaction 
which can take place during international forums: collectivism, particularism and proceduralism. 
Finally, it argues that the elaborated theoretical model implies that a forum with greater frequency 
of collectivism has a higher chance of being correlated with an output with greater fulfilment of the 
forum’s collective intention – and, consequently, an output which is more legitimate. 
The third chapter explains and defends the choice of a most-similar case study of two 
Antarctic forums to test the hypothesis. It then briefly describes the history of the Antarctic regime 
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and its main characteristics, and it claims that the different outputs in terms of legitimacy of the two 
examined forums is due to the fact that in one collectivist interactions were more frequent than in 
another. 
The fourth chapter describes the methodology on which the empirical investigation is based, 
and it explains the reasons behind the choice of qualitative content analysis as the best approach to 
take. Furthermore, it outlines the reasoning behind the coding scheme for the content analysis, and 
it outlines the coding scheme itself. Finally, it explains the different procedures for testing the 
reliability and the validity of research findings. 
Finally, the fifth chapter examines the findings from the content analysis, it interprets them 
and examines their validity and reliability. The dissertation concludes by analysing the implications 
















Chapter One – Social Interactions Within International Forums: The 
Need for a New Approach 
 
This thesis’s introduction has pointed out that the world is facing unprecedented challenges that can 
only be tackled by concerted efforts by all members of the international community, and that 
studying international forums can help identify the variables and the types of negotiating behaviour 
that can foster such concerted action. It also observed that there are vital questions concerning 
international forums that can only be addressed by a process of systematic comparison, and that 
inter-state negotiations are mostly moments of dialogues. Starting from these considerations, it 
argued that researchers should examine “what delegates said” during negotiations, by building a 
system of categorization of the different types of statement that could be made during diplomatic 
meetings. 
Other researchers have previously tried to undertake this task, and to build theoretical models 
aiming at isolating and distinguishing different types of forum social interactions. The literature 
studying the different types of behaviour that can be displayed during international forums has 
mainly been shaped by the debate between rationalism and constructivism (Risse, 2000, 6). While 
in the very early stages these two approaches seemed to be at opposite poles of the debate, later 
developments saw theorists from both the rationalist and the constructivist camps trying to merge 
them, in search for a “theoretical bridge”. This chapter first describes the basic characteristics of 
rationalism and constructivism, in order to present the different types of behaviour that authors 
identified as being displayed during international negotiations. After that, it outlines the evolution 
of the literature and the different attempts authors have made in order to combine rationalist and 
constructivist elements in a single theoretical model. It then analyses the methodological problems 
that authors encountered when they tried empirically to isolate arguing statements from others, and 
it describes how the literature tried to present different solutions in order to overcome such 
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methodological challenges. Finally, it illustrates the existing gaps within the literature, and it 
proposes an alternative approach to the study and categorization of forum statements. 
 
1.1: Rationalism and bargaining 
 
In most rationalist theories, subjects participating in international negotiations are conceived as 
selfish and rational units, focused on the fulfilment of their own preferences and the maximization 
of their gains. Negotiating actors have exogenous and fixed preferences (Elster, 1986, 105), and in 
most rationalist models a state chooses to cooperate with other states when there is a chance to 
maximize a particularistic gain while dealing with a collective issue that involves all actors 
participating in negotiations (Risse, 2000, 3-4). According to orthodox rationalist theories, 
negotiating subjects do not problematize their identities, and they are not interested in (or at least, 
not driven by) social norms (Jörke, 2013, 353). They instead follow what Max Weber would call a 
“teleological rationality”: they find, through rational analysis, the best way to proceed in order to 
realize a selfish goal and act accordingly (Habermas, 1981, 85). In a rationalist perspective, subjects 
interacting in a forum produce something very similar to the type of interaction that could be seen 
in a competitive, strategic game: each of them acts in reaction to and in anticipation of others’ 
behaviour, in order to end up in an advantageous position (Davies, 2010, 455). Since, for rational 
choice theories, “the goal of politics is the optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly 
opposed, private interests” (Elster, 1986, 103), their theories consider bargaining the main type of 
behaviour occurring during negotiations. 
The literature usually defines bargaining as a type of behaviour that attempts to reach a certain 
output through the strategic display of threats, promises and deals (Müller, 2004, 397), and an 
action that “involves search for compromises based on fixed preferences of the actors” (Deitelhoff 
and Müller, 2005, 172). Within a forum, then, actors engage in bargaining by strategically 
displaying promises and threats in order to change others’ behaviour. A successful negotiation is 
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therefore a series of bargaining statements leading to an agreement resulting from a compromise 
between all particularistic interests of the actors involved – a compromise that does not come from 
changes of the actors’ preferences, but through the conciliation of the already existing ones (Jörke, 
2013, 353). Following this logic, most powerful actors necessarily have more influence over 
decisions, since given their higher level of capabilities they are able to deliver more dangerous 
threats, more convenient deals or more attractive promises (Davies, 2010, 455). 
That, however, is not all. Indeed, bargaining is not only characterized by “pragmatic demands 
[…] underpinned by promises, threats and hints to exit-options” (Saretzki, 2009, 162); those 
promises and threats also need to be credible, in order to be convincing (Risse, 2000, 8). Jon Elster 
examines in further depth the way bargaining statements work when he writes that: 
 
Bargainers rely on threats and promises that will have to be executed 
outside the assembly itself […]. Bargaining power does not derive from the 
‘power of the better argument’, but from material resources, manpower and 
the like. Statements asserted in a process of bargaining are made with a 
claim to be credible, in the sense that the bargainers must try to make their 
opponents believe that the threats or promises would actually be carried out 
(Saretzki citing Elster, 2009, 158). 
 
In order for a bargaining statement to be valid, therefore, the proposed deal, promise or threat does 
not just have to seem advantageous or ominous if it were to be realized, it has also to be credible: 






1.2: Constructivism and norm-orientated action 
 
On the other hand, constructivists claim that subjects interacting within the international system are 
influenced by their understanding and representation of reality and by their identities, both of them 
shaped by socially internalized norms; these norms are the result of a series of interactions between 
states and other relevant actors in international negotiations throughout history (Brunée and Toope, 
2000, 28).1 While the international political system is shaped by historically-built norms, actors 
have “multiple and overlapping” identities that they assume according to the context in which they 
are acting (Brunée and Toope, 2000, 31). Hence, constructivists claim that international subjects are 
most of the time driven by their identities, their adherence to certain norms and rules and by their 
acceptance of the values at the base of international institutions (Barkin, 2003, 338). 
The natural consequence of constructivist premises is that the interests and priorities of 
subjects participating in an international forum, alongside their preferences and behaviour, are 
influenced by their social context, and the social norms that regulate that particular context 
contribute in turn to shape actors’ preferences (Risse, 2000, 4-5). The type of behaviour that best 
sums up the basic assumption of constructivism is the norm-regulated action (Risse, 2000, 3), 
which can be described in the following way: given a certain context, regulated by certain social 
norms, actors will internalize those norms and act accordingly (Müller, 2004, 401). Thus, norm-
regulated behaviour translates into interactions which remark the need to observe shared norms and 
previously established agreements. 
For constructivism, subjects participating in a negotiation are influenced by their identities 
and the social context they are in (Risse, 2000, 4). This theoretical approach rejects the concept of 
pure rational individualism and claims that structure and agents are reciprocally. As they claim, 
agents are shaped by their culture, their families, their social environments, their personal history – 






behaviour of agents, and norms can be re-shaped in the long term by changes in actors’ behaviour. 
The same happens in the realm of international relations (Risse, 2000, 5): the relationship between 
structure and agency is then seen by constructivist as reciprocal, because one influences the other 
and vice versa (Brunée and Toope, 2000, 30). 
 
1.3: The social interaction of arguing 
 
The English-speaking debate focusing on social interactions within international forums has been 
characterized, until the early 2000s, by the debate between rational-choice and constructivist 
approaches (Risse, 2000, 1). While the former envisions interacting subjects as rational, selfish and 
strategic units driven by a “logic of consequences” and engaging in strategic bargaining, the latter 
claims that they follow a “logic of appropriateness”, engaging in norm-orientated behaviour 
complying with their internalized norms.2 Quite soon, however, this duality between bargaining and 
norm-orientated action was shaken by the conceptualization of a new, alternative mode of 
communication that can occur in international negotiations: arguing. 
While the concept of arguing was first elaborated in the 1990s by German researchers (Risse, 
2000, 1), Thomas Risse has been one of the first authors to introduce it in the English-speaking 
world. The initial description he gives of arguing is the following: a “process of argumentation, 
deliberation and persuasion” (Risse, 2000, 2), which is not driven by the consequentialist logic of 
bargaining, nor by the “logic of appropriateness” of norm-orientated behaviour, but that is instead 
relying on a different form of logic: that of “communicative action” (Risse, 2000, 4). Even from this 
first definition, it is possible to see how the concept of arguing draws extensively from the work of 
Jürgen Habermas. 
Jürgen Habermas’ ideal and normative theory of communicative action portrays a situation in 
which two or more subjects “capable of speech and action” interact, aiming to reach a common 
 




understanding over an issue, and consequently to elaborate a shared and coordinated plan of action 
in order to deal with it. The elaboration of such a shared plan is the result of a synthesis of different 
and conflicting interpretations of reality into a single, collective one (Habermas, 1981, 86). By 
engaging in communicative action, therefore, actors pursue their particularistic interests while 
recognizing, at the same time, the necessity to understand and to fulfil the interests of other actors 
(Habermas, 1981, 286). During communicative action subjects are mainly focused on the strength 
of the arguments made, while hierarchy of power is put temporarily aside. Jon Elster offers a very 
effective description of how this “ideal speech situation” would work, portraying a situation where 
“the private and idiosyncratic wants have been shaped and purged in public discussion about the 
public good”, and where, as a consequence, “uniquely determined rational desires would emerge. 
Not optimal compromise, but unanimous agreement is the goal of politics in this view” (Elster, 
1986, 112). 
Risse started from Habermas’ theory of communicative action and defined arguing as “truth 
seeking [behaviour] with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned 
consensus” (Risse, 2000, 1-2). Risse considers arguing to be a type of interaction that is often 
displayed within international forums in order to create a shared set of “rules of the game”, to 
elaborate a common normative framework and to try to solve a problem that interests all actors 
participating in the debate (Risse, 2000, 2). Thus, arguing is different both from strategic bargaining 
and from rule-guided behaviour, and it should be seen as a type of interaction occurring when 
grounds are divided, ideas are conflicting and norms are contested. This is in order to establish what 
is the “right”, “most appropriate” thing to do in a certain situation (Risse, 2000, 7).  
 In other words, when subjects are not certain of what is the most “appropriate” thing to do, 
they argue in order to find out. It is possible to see from this consideration that the theoretical 
approach of social constructivism is able to explain both norm-orientated and arguing statements 
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(Risse, 2000, 6):3 actors are driven by their historically shaped identities, and will usually comply 
with already existing, consolidated norms. However, in the absence of those norms, they will 
engage in arguing in order to build them. Another consequence spreading from this idea of arguing 
is that it can be considered as a type of behaviour most likely to occur at the early stages of the 
negotiations, with the aim of elaborating the shared set of norms and definitions within which to 
enact other types of interaction (Risse, 2000, 21). 
Risse also writes that arguing can happen only if certain preconditions are applicable. These 
preconditions are many, from the ability of negotiating actors to empathize with others to the 
existence of a “common lifeworld” – namely, a shared interpretation of reality, based on a common 
history, culture and/or a common language (Risse, 2000, 10). Another fundamental precondition of 
arguing is that “communication is motivated by the desire to find out the ‘truth’ with regard to the 
facts in the world or to figure out ‘the right thing to do’ in a commonly defined situation […] [In 
order to do so, actors] should be open to being persuaded and changing their minds” (Risse, 2000, 
12). 
Indeed, Risse claims that a discussion in which subjects are open to be persuaded by the 
“better argument” is a situation where “relationships of power and social hierarchies recede in the 
background” (Risse, 2000, 7). Starting from these assumptions, it is possible to see that the concept 
of arguing shares some similarities with that of deliberative action presented in democracy studies, 
since two of the fundamental prerequisites of both deliberation and arguing are that actors must 
maintain an open-minded attitude towards others’ arguments and be ready to change their minds at 
any point of the debate (Barabas, 2004, 489). Finally, arguing can only take place in the presence of 
a “public sphere”, with a public witnessing the negotiating process and towards which actors are 
accountable; this will in fact force negotiating subjects to legitimize their actions to a wider 
 
3 This  does  not mean  that,  according  to  Risse,  arguing  and  norm‐orientated  action  are  driven  by  the  same  logic. 






audience, and it will impede efforts to justify their choices on purely selfish bases (Risse, 2000, 22). 
Such “public spheres” can be many things, from public opinion in general to NGOs, scientific 
communities or the mass media. 
Arguing can be defined as a type of statement that aims to change the way a subject considers 
and conceives of an issue; it aims, therefore, to change actors’ preferences and to persuade them 
through the “logic of the better argument”. In order to do so, arguing needs to rely on certain types 
of validity: Müller writes that arguing claims need to be validated by assessing their morality or 
truthfulness (Müller, 2004, 397). Cornelia Ulbert and Thomas Risse say something very similar 
when they explain that, in order for an arguing claim to be valid, it has to be based on “the 
truthfulness of speakers, the truth of empirical assertion, or the rightness of normative claims” 
(Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). This threefold legitimacy is directly derived from Habermas’ theory, 
according to which there are three types of “validity claims” that can be made in order to assert the 
legitimacy of an argument in an “ideal speech situation” (Habermas, 1981): 
 
 Are the empirical assertions made true? 
 Is the claim made morally justified? 
 Does the statement reflect the speaker’s true intent? 
 
While the truth of the empirical assertion can be demonstrated by displaying reliable 
knowledge proving that the information conveyed is true, and the morality of the claim is assessed 
by proving that in making a normative claim the speaker is being impartial and consistent (Ulbert 
and Risse, 2005, 353), the third validity claim “ultimately relies on trust”, but it can be partly 
evaluated by assessing the coherence of someone’s claims and behaviour, or the correspondence 




1.4: The need to bridge rationalism and constructivism 
 
To sum up, previous sections of this chapter have said that for rationalist authors subjects 
interacting during a negotiation strategically display sets of promises and threats in order to 
influence each other’s behaviour and to find a compromise between conflicting interests. 
Constructivist theorists, on the other hand, claim that actors participating in a forum often abide by 
the norms they have previously internalized, and, when there are no internalized norms, they engage 
in arguing in order to build a shared normative framework. Although this description is an ideal-
typical simplification of rationalism and constructivism, it provides the main points of the two 
approaches, and it offers an outline on how the literature studying social interactions within 
international forums looked in its earliest stages. 
Starting from this outline, it is possible to see how both rationalist and constructivist authors 
have followed what could be defined as a deductive method: starting from a certain perspective, 
they elaborated theories attempting to explain how states interact while negotiating. Consequently, 
the types of forum behaviour they identified were inextricably shaped by their theoretical premises. 
Rationalists saw in bargaining the most frequent type of interaction within inter-state negotiations 
because it was the necessary consequence of self-focused behaviour. Constructivists conceptualized 
theories of arguing and norm-driven types of behaviour because they were the most obvious ways 
subjects would interact, postulating that they were driven by their identities and by the norms they 
internalized. The very fact that the concept of arguing is directly inspired by an ideal, normative 
theory is clear evidence of this deductive process of conceptualization of the kind of statement that 
take place in international forums. 
This rigid division between rationalist and constructivist theories, however, was almost 
immediately challenged. Authors started to elaborate theoretical models in which arguing, 
bargaining and norm-driven types of statement could coexist (Risse, 2000, 21), and their efforts 
were backed by empirical evidence suggesting that, while certain characteristics of international 
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negotiations were best understood through a rationalist lens, others could best be explained through 
a constructivist approach. Indeed, while rationalist orthodoxy had proven extremely useful in 
describing some processes of international forums, and in elaborating mechanisms that could 
facilitate cooperation in difficult negotiation rounds (Grobe, 2010, 5), it also showed its limitations 
in explaining why certain forums led to the birth of binding international norms that contradicted 
the will of the most powerful states (Jörke, 2013, 353). Similarly, constructivist approaches had 
been highly effective in addressing situations where a different “framing” of the situation 
influenced actors’ attitudes (Stein, 1989, 244; Grobe, 2010, 6), but they too often seemed to 
undervalue the role that power asymmetries and strategic considerations had in influencing 
negotiations’ outputs (Hanrieder, 2011, 401). 
Many researchers, therefore, attempted to build “theoretical bridges” between rationalism and 
constructivism, in order better to portray the reality of international negotiations (Risse, 2000, 3). 
This resolution is detectable, for instance, in some works of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink, who wrote that “[…] the current tendency to oppose norms against rationality or rational 
choice is not helpful in explaining many of the most politically salient processes we see in empirical 
research” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 888). Furthermore, John Odell highlighted how in other 
branches of political science such as, for instance, negotiations studies, many authors had already 
created a theoretical framework that partially reconciled bargaining and strategic action with 
persuasion and normative action: 
 
Walton and McKersie, Iklé and their successors have long blended certain 
insights from simple rationalist premises with an emphasis on perception, 
biases, framing and persuasion. This tradition introduced the ideational 
dimension of negotiation a decade before game theorists began 
incorporating incomplete information, and a generation before IR 




Here, Odell refers, amongst other works, to research published by Richard Walton and Robert 
McKersie in 1965. The two authors focused their research on labour negotiations and, drawing from 
the work of previous authors (Walton and McKersie, 1991, 8), they identified four types of 
interaction that can take place in this particular type of forum: 
 
 Distributive bargaining, defined as a term comprehending “the 
complex system of activities instrumental to the attainment of one 
party’s goals when they are in basic conflict with those of the other 
party”, and further classified as “bargaining in the strictest sense of 
the word” (Walton and McKersie, 1991, 4). 
 Integrative bargaining, which refers to all the activities focused on 
achieving goals that are not in conflict with those of other parties. 
 Attitudinal structuring, including activities that aim to influence “the 
relationships between parties, in particular such attitudes as 
friendliness-hostility, trust, respect and the motivational orientation 
to competitiveness-cooperativeness” (Walton and McKersie, 1991, 
5). 
 Intraorganizational bargaining, encompassing all types of interaction 
that aim to achieve internal consensus amongst members of a party 





Although Walton and McKersie focused on labour negotiations,4 and did so by starting from a 
clearly rationalist perspective, these authors had already identified, in the mid-1960s, types of 
interaction that would take into consideration features that could not be accommodated by the most 
orthodox rationalist views, such as perceptions of trustworthiness and friendliness. Odell and other 
authors, therefore, argued that the discipline of International Relations needed to quickly update and 
follow the examples of other disciplines, and try to integrate elements of constructivism within 
rationalist theories, and vice-versa. 
These attempts often started from the realization that, as demonstrated by empirical evidence, 
different types of interaction can coexist in the same negotiation round, and that rigid versions of 
rationalism and constructivism could be problematic in explaining the functioning of real-world 
international politics. Furthermore, many authors pointed out that “arguing and bargaining have to 
be seen as two ideal-typical modes of communication, which are rarely instantiated in their pure 
form” (Saretzki quoting Elster, 2009, 159) and that, in reality, actions are usually a mixture between 
these two types of interaction; this led part of the literature to advocate a synthesis between the two 
conflicting approaches (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 911; Risse, 2000, 3). However, since both 
rationalist and constructivist theories were deductive ones, most of the theories aiming to explain 
their coexistence during the same round of negotiation started from an attempt to reconcile their 
opposed philosophical standpoints. 
 
1.5: Rationalist arguing 
 
On the rationalist side Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn claimed that arguing interactions are 









claimed that, since it is possible to conceive of a situation where “searching for the truth is 
motivated by the desire to change the situation in such a way as to solve or at least mitigate social 
dilemmas”, there is no reason why rational and selfish actors should not use arguing when it is 
convenient to them (Risse, 2000, 12).5 Katharina Holzinger says something similar when claiming 
that arguing is an act of speech that is strategically displayed during negotiations, when it provides 
the best chances to maximize a subject’s gain, and that therefore it does not contradict the basic 
principles of rationalism (Müller, 2004, 407). 
Harmut Esser develops these assumptions and elaborates a rationalist model of social 
interactions based on the concept of “frame”. For Esser, a frame is “a package of several 
components, telling the actor what the situation is about and what to do in a given situation” 
(Kotzian, 2007, 83). A frame is, in other words, a certain way to represent a situation; a portrait of 
reality that at the same time interprets it, “defining what the situation is all about” (Kotzian, 2007, 
83). A frame not only provides a contextualization of an empirical situation; it also proposes norms 
and solutions that, given the conceptual framework provided, are applicable. Starting from this 
assumption, Esser argues that “both the arguing and bargaining mode of behaviour can be seen as 
frames” (Kotzian, 2007, 83). Subjects participating in a negotiation examine both the situation and 
the behaviour of other actors, and this analysis leads them to determine how effective an arguing or 
a bargaining frame would be, given the context (Kotzian, 2007, 84-85). After that, “the actor will 
[…] choose the frame which grants the highest subjective expected utility […] and behave 
accordingly” (Kotzian, 2007, 85). 
Finally, Christian Grobe presents a theory of functional persuasion where he claims that 
arguing in international negotiations is effective only when it is able to introduce new, reliable 








fixed and exogenous, and the reason some actors might change their behaviour as a result of 
arguing is explained in the following way: a moment of effective arguing leads to a new round of 
bargaining negotiations in which, in light of the new information provided by arguing, actors pursue 
the same set of preferences in different and more effective ways (Grobe, 2010, 22). Grobe 
conceives, therefore, a rationalist model in which arguing can exist without challenging the fixed 
and exogenous nature of preferences, and where arguing interactions are just a way to introduce 
new information in order to allow actors to perfect the calculation of every choice’s payoffs. 
 
1.6: Constructivist bargaining 
 
On the constructivist side, Nicole Deitelhoff tried to build a model where subjects choose between 
different types of interaction by taking into consideration two main variables: the levels of norm 
internalization and of institutionalization. The former indicates the presence of a set of already 
shared and accepted norms amongst negotiators (dense norms) or their absence (weak norms); the 
latter indicates the presence of precise, structured institutional mechanisms of debate and decision-
making within the forum (dense institutions) or their absence (weak institutions). Starting from 
these premises, she claims that: 
 
 In situations of dense norms and institutions, subjects engage in norm-
regulated behaviour. 
 Dense norms and weak institutions lead to strategic actions 
(bargaining). 
 Contexts of weak norms and dense institutions promote arguing. 
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 Weak norms and weak institutions usually result in a higher frequency 
of rhetorical actions.6 












Figure 1: Nicole Deitelhoff’s model of forum social interactions 
 
In this theory, bargaining would not be incompatible with a constructivist ontology, since it would 
simply be an act of speech that it is appropriate to enact given certain structural conditions (dense 
norms and weak institutions). 
In attempting to “bridge” rationalism and constructivism, Harald Müller started from 
Deitelhoff’s theory. However, while recognizing the potential and significance of her model, he 
claimed that it was necessary to develop it further, since Deitelhoff did not yet provide an effective 
reconciliation between the rationalist and the constructivist philosophical standpoints, able to justify 
the coexistence of arguing and bargaining within international negotiations (Müller, 2004, 402). 
According to Müller “theories based on contradictory ontologies are incoherent”, and “coherence is 
a prime element of quality of any theory” (Müller, 2004, 396). Thus, a theory trying to explain how 
arguing and bargaining can coexist should start from a process of philosophical reconciliation. 





logic) can coexist only if one presupposes the existence of a predominant, superior logic, able to 
encompass both of these acts of speech (Müller, 2004, 402-405). 
In his article “Arguing, Bargaining and All That” (2004), Müller calls into question claims 
that arguing could be implemented in a strategic way in order to maximize selfish preferences. He 
writes that whoever postulated rationalism as the dominating logic in international negotiations, the 
one almost always driving actors’ behaviour, would immediately meet two unanswerable questions 
(Müller, 2004, 407): if so, why do actors argue? And why is arguing effective? Indeed, “arguing 
makes sense only if […] [an actor] assumes that among his interlocutors some may be guided by the 
logic of appropriateness”;7 this would imply that the receivers of the arguing interaction would be 
focused on “what it is appropriate” rather than “what it is advantageous”, and that they could be 
persuaded by the force of the “better argument”, since, otherwise, persuasion would not be effective 
(Müller, 2004, 406). However, he continues, rationalist authors expect actors participating in 
negotiations “to behave rationally”. 8  Effective arguing would imply that, within international 
forums, “rationalism is mixed with an orientation of appropriateness”, and this “is a logical 
contradiction” (Müller, 2004, 406-407).9 Even adopting a “natural selection theory”, according to 
which behaviour is a product of natural selection, and if certain behaviours do not lead to good 
output those enacting them will eventually perish, would not explain this paradox. Indeed, such a 
statement would assume that in a system privileging rational logics arguing would very soon 
disappear, and “it is very hard to explain why, after 350 years of competition in international 
anarchy, we should still observe this phenotype in international negotiations” (Müller, 2004, 409). 
 













As an alternative, Müller proposes a theory that considers both the logic of rational choice and 
the logic of communicative action as encompassed by an overarching logic; by following this 
argument, arguing and bargaining are simply considered “two different types of speech acts”, two 
different types of statement rather than two types of behaviour driven by different rationalities 
justified by conflicting philosophical standpoints (Müller, 2004, 396-397). In order to envision a 
theoretical framework under which both arguing and bargaining can coexist within the same 
negotiations and under the same logic, he claims that “[...] the logic of communication and the logic 
of consequences can be integrated if we assume a superior logic of appropriateness” (Müller, 2004, 
411). Bargaining behaviour, therefore, can be justified through a “logic of appropriateness”, and 
does not need to rely on a rationalist ontology. As he argues: “Bargaining [...] is [...] a norm-
regulated, fully legitimate and sanctioned mode of behaviour under the right circumstances” 
(Müller, 2004, 414). 
Müller’s model, similarly to the one elaborated by Deitelhoff, claims that the two main 
variables determining which type of interaction subjects will choose in the course of negotiations 
are the levels of norm internalization and of institutionalization. His theory identifies these possible 
outputs (Müller, 2004, 411-412): 
 
 In conditions of dense norms and institutions actors display a norm-
orientated behaviour. 
 In a situation of weak norms and dense institutions “[subjects] 
pursue self-interest according to the institutional procedure until and 
unless severe coordination problems emerge” (Müller, 2004, 412). 
 Dense norms and weak institutions lead to norm-orientated 
behaviour based on informal conventions “unless severe 
coordination problems emerge” (Müller, 2004, 412). 
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 Weak norms and weak institutions lead subjects to “pursue self-
interest unless coordination problems emerge” (Müller, 2004, 412) 
 
Furthermore, he argues that, in the presence of “severe coordination problems”, or if forum 
participants are confronted with “undesirable outcomes”, they engage in a process of norm-building 
through arguing (Müller, 2004, 412). For Müller, then, arguing is an action that can always happen, 
except in situations of dense norms and institutions, since it is the instrument through which 
negotiating actors attempt to build new guiding norms in times when they face “undesired 
outcomes” or encounter “severe coordination problems”, in order to re-establish cohesion, 
effectiveness and an overarching normative framework (Müller, 2004, 412). 
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Figure 2: Harald Müller’s model of social interactions 
 
1.7: Ontological disputes and lack of empirical record 
 
To sum up, the study of social interactions within international negotiations was, in its very early 
stages, characterized by the opposition between rationalist and constructivist scholars. Very soon, 
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however, the debate started to go in two main directions. Some scholars tried to integrate elements 
of the two approaches into a single one; others examined arguing and bargaining types of statement 
in greater depth, in order to better distinguish one from the other and to better understand how they 
could coexist within the same negotiation.10 As the debate evolved, the line separating the two 
approaches became thin and blurred, and while authors kept trying to define the precise boundaries 
of this thin and blurred line, their theories became increasingly similar. Risse effectively sums up 
this state of the debate by writing that both the constructivist and the rationalist approaches are 
fundamental in order to understand the “real world” of international negotiations, and that each 
approach cannot ever be fully encompassed by the other (Risse, 2000, 12). Rationalist authors had 
to include some constructivist elements in their theory, and vice versa, leading to a situation where 
“the methodological, epistemological, and ontological differences between […] sophisticated 
rational choice and moderate social constructivism are usually vastly overstated” (Risse, 2000, 3). 
Looking once again at two of the most important theories or the rationalist and constructivist 
sides could help understanding how the two fronts started converging. Müller argues that actors 
assess the levels of internalization of norms and of institutionalization of decision-making 
procedures, in order to assess what is the most appropriate type of statement to make (Müller, 2004, 
411-412). On the rationalist side, Esser, who has been described by Peter Kotzian as “the rationalist 
counterpart to Müller” (Kotzian, 2007, 80), claims that subjects rationally analyse the structural 
characteristics of a negotiation in order to decide the most advantageous type of behaviour 
(Kotzian, 2007, 85). The only difference between the two models is that Müller’s actors have a 
norm-orientated and norm-observant disposition while approaching to negotiations, and decide 
which type of statement to make by answering the question “what is most appropriate?”. Esser’s 
ones instead have a strategic and self-focused disposition, and decide by asking themselves: “what 
 







is most advantageous for me?”. Despite these two theories describing very different thinking 
processes, the phenomenology the two authors describe is very similar: subjects decide which type 
of statement to make by analysing the structural characteristics of the context. In both cases, 
rational calculations are necessary in order to choose, because the structural conditions need to be 
interpreted; in both cases, the subject is not free to act as he/she pleases, because there are structural 
constraints that make a certain interaction more or less effective. The comparison between these 
two theories shows how, while the two approaches started describing increasingly similar 
phenomena, authors kept focusing on their reciprocal philosophical differences, drifting away from 
an empirical study of international negotiations and moving increasingly towards an abstract and 
conceptual dispute. 
The debate, that once tried to explain the internal dynamics of international negotiations in 
order better to understand their functioning, showed increasing interest in answering the question: 
“which is the prevalent logic driving actors’ behaviour – that of the consequentialist-rationalist 
approach or the norm-driven constructivist one?”. While there is nothing wrong with this type of 
research question, an excessive focus on them meant that the theories born from these works of 
“theoretical bridging” did not sufficiently examine how arguing, bargaining and norm-orientated 
action could be detected and could be performed empirically, and this in turn led the existing debate 
to be perceived as detached from the very subject it wanted to examine: that of international forums. 
Driven by these concerns, Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller embarked on an ambitious research 
project, aiming at producing clear evidence of the empirical existence of arguing behaviour within 
real-world negotiations. 
 
1.8: Arguing as an “empirically lost” concept 
 
In the middle of this process of “bridging” the two alternative approaches to negotiations, in the 
year 2005 Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller observed that, although the conceptualization of 
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arguing was able to provide a more insightful analysis of forum dynamics, one of the problems of 
the arguing/bargaining debate was the lack of works which empirically isolated and detected 
arguing within real-world international negotiations (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 170). In the same 
article, the two authors aimed to fill this theoretical gap by analysing a certain number of 
international forums covering a range of issues. They looked for arguing, focusing on those 
situations where, in the course of negotiations, actors changed their positions or preferences, and on 
times where less powerful actors were able to make their voice heard because they were promoters 
of a “better argument”. Their objectives were: to identify factors that would promote arguing within 
negotiations, to assess which types of arguing behaviour would prove more effective and to analyse 
how arguing was able to influence the outputs of international forums. In their article, arguing 
actions were described as a mode of interaction in which participants were driven by a truth-
seeking, open-minded and persuasive-oriented disposition (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 170). 
However, they immediately encountered many difficulties in assessing actors’ true dispositions 
towards negotiations, and in defining the extent to which another actor was genuinely convinced by 
an arguing claim, since “the mind is not accessible, and the orientation behind speech acts remains 
private information” (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171).11 These were the reasons that led them to 
modify their definition of arguing, departing from the Habermasian “ideal speech situation” and 
beginning to define it as an action that “implies reason-giving, and the search for reasoned 
consensus, irrespective of actors’ initial motivations”. Bargaining, on the other hand, was described 
as “searching for compromise based under fixed preferences of the actors” (Deitelhoff and Müller, 
2005, 172). 
Deitelhoff and Müller claimed that, in the course of their study, they were able to identify 
moments where positions of negotiating actors radically changed, moments when non-state actors 
 
11 When writing that “the mind is not accessible”, Deitelhoff and Müller are not referring, in their paper, to the mind 
of  a  general  individual,  but  to  the  mind  of  diplomatic  personnel  participating  in  negotiations  (i.e.,  states’ 
representatives).  Since  this  dissertation  defines  states  as  persons  and  as  unitary  actors,  whose  delegates  are 




were able to influence the debate despite powerful actors’ opposition, and numerous examples that 
underlined the importance, within forums, of ethical statements (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 170-
171). Despite these important findings, they were not able empirically to distinguish arguing and 
bargaining actions in the course of diplomatic debate (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171). One of the 
main problems was that the two modes of communication were inevitably intertwined: every 
bargaining action contained some degree of reason-giving and validation, and every arguing action 
focused, to some extent, on the maximization of selfish gains. Their analysis concluded that in 
international negotiations: 
 
[...] utilitarian12 actors cannot avoid using arguments […]; others may enter 
negotiations with a communicative orientation, but we cannot tell one from 
the other. However, our findings suggest that authentic persuasion did take 
place, and we argue that actors changed their orientations during the process 
of argumentation. At this stage, we are unable to methodologically and 
empirically prove this assumption; it is a theoretical paradise that is 
empirically lost! (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 177). 
 
The difficulties encountered by Deitelhoff and Müller represented a turning point in the 
literature, which, from that moment onwards, evolved in three different directions. Some argued 
that the difficulties the authors found in empirically isolating arguing meant that it was a 
“methodologically intractable” concept (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 36), and presented the concept of 
rhetorical coercion as an alternative to the theory of communicative action. Other authors attempted 
to re-conceptualize arguing and bargaining, in order to find definitions that would enable 






scholars abandoned any attempt to try to solve the rationalist/constructivist dichotomy and started to 
focus on the situations, within forums, that could indicate the presence of arguing, and the structural 
conditions that could promote it and increase its effectiveness. 
 
1.9: Arguing and rhetoric: Ronald Krebs’s and Patrick Jackson’s model of “rhetorical coercion” 
 
In 2007, Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson published an article that claimed that in order to classify 
a claim uttered in an international forum as an arguing type of interaction, a researcher should know 
the personal and subjective attitudes and feelings (the dispositions) of the party who is making that 
claim – for instance, an arguing actor says certain while having a truth-seeking, open-minded and 
persuasion-oriented disposition. However, these “true dispositions” cannot be clearly known and 
identified by researchers analysing diplomatic negotiations. Hence, they conclude that “although 
persuasion undoubtedly does occur in the political arena, it is also rare. Moreover, such mechanisms 
rest on a strong specification of the subjective motivations 13  of actors, and these are 
methodologically intractable” (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 36). 
Other than challenging the empirical verifiability of arguing, the two authors also criticized 
attempts made by previous constructivist researchers to detect arguing and to explain its function. 
One of the cases they analysed was, for instance, that described in Neta Crawford’s 2002 book, 
which argued that the process of decolonization was triggered by successful persuasion that 
convinced European countries of the illegitimacy of their colonial conquests (Crawford, 2002). 
Krebs and Jackson argued that the behaviour displayed by European countries during the process of 
decolonization could be explained in other ways: they, for instance, may have realized that the 
maintenance costs of colonial empires were excessive (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 40). They also 
 
13 When Krebs and Jackson talk about “motives” and “motivations”, they refer to something almost identical to what 
this  dissertation  calls  “dispositions”.  The  reason  why,  in  this  research,  “dispositions”  are  not  simply  defined  as 






examined the work of Thomas Risse, who studied the process of German reunification; while 
acknowledging that parties negotiating for this particular issue were deeply divided, Risse also 
argues that they were able to overcome their differences by engaging in “a true dialogue of mutual 
persuasion” (Risse, 2000, 23). For Risse, Gorbachev was initially against the reunification of 
Germany and the membership of the new, united German state in NATO, and he eventually 
changed his mind because he was effectively persuaded that it was the best possible solution (Risse, 
2000, 23-28). Risse points out how negotiations focusing on German reunification 
 
probably constituted one of the most extraordinary cases of arguing in 
international relations. The two leaders [i.e., Mikhail Gorbachev and George 
H. W. Bush] were engaged in a discourse about norms. Bush apparently 
persuaded Gorbachev by reframing the NATO issue from realist terms 
linked to Soviet security and stability in Europe to a liberal argument 
emphasizing democracy and self-determination (Risse, 2000, 27). 
 
However, Krebs and Jackson pointed out how Gorbachev’s decision finally to accept a united 
Germany under NATO membership could also have come from the fact that he considered the 
USSR politically too weak to oppose it (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 40). This alternative explanation 
is for instance supported by the works of Peter Caldwell and Karrin Hanshew, which wrote that the 
breakthrough in negotiations focused on German reunification 
 
came at the end of May, when he [i.e., Gorbachev] accepted the conditions 
of Germany’s membership to NATO. On the surface, he was accepting the 
principle that a nation-state had the right to choose its own alliance system, 
which under the leadership of Kohl meant NATO. What really changed his 
mind was a growing internal crisis within the Soviet Union, which faced not 
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only the inability to provide basic goods by Soviet citizens but also the 
beginnings of its own collapse, as the Baltic states declared their 
independence from the Soviet Union. Under pressure from all sides, 
Gorbachev gave in […] (Caldwell and Hanshew, 2018, 258). 
 
Finally, Krebs and Jackson challenged another method of empirical analysis that 
constructivist authors often used to identify arguing: the analysis of private correspondence and 
informal interactions, in order to find better indications of the “true dispositions” of actors. The two 
authors argued that this method does not take into account that private statements could be used 
strategically as much as the public ones (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 40).14  In highlighting the 
conceptual and methodological problems behind the theories of arguing, their attempt was not to 
assert that actors do not have dispositions when they negotiate, but simply that, those dispositions 
being impossible to be clearly detected, a theorist should instead focus on more visible, identifiable 
features of international negotiations (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 41). That is why the two authors 
claimed that “at the level of methodology, […] [their article] calls on mainstream scholarship to 
avoid centring causal accounts on unanswerable questions about actors’ true motives [i.e., true 
dispositions] and to focus instead on what actors say, in what context, and to what audiences” 
(Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 36). 
This conclusion led them to elaborate a model of “rhetorical coercion”, in which they claimed 
that, since it is impossible to “observe directly what people think”, it is necessary to “observe what 
they say and how they respond to claims and counter-claims” (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 36).  In 
other words, given the “intractability” of arguing, the only possible strategy for the researcher is to 
 
14 Indeed,  subjects  could dissimulate  their  true dispositions  and objectives  in private  correspondence  as well. One 
could not  know with  sufficient  clarity  the disposition of  an  ambassador  from  a  report  to his/her  foreign minister, 
because  such  disposition  could  be  dissimulated.  Similarly,  a  situation  in  which  a  diplomat  A  engages  in  private 
correspondence with another diplomat B, who is from another country, cannot lead to the conclusion that A is in that 
context showing its true disposition. There is the possibility that while writing A is strategically trying to manipulate B 





focus on the strategic, instrumental use that subjects make of what seems like arguing claims 
(Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 40-41). For them, “it does not matter whether actors believe what they 
say, whether they are motivated by crass material interest or sincere commitment. What is important 
is that they can be rhetorically manoeuvred into a corner” (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 42). 
The concept of rhetorical action was not new. Seven years before, Thomas Risse had defined 
rhetorical action as a concept standing between arguing and bargaining behaviour; a type of 
statement in which a subject promoted a position in an argumentative way, attempting to persuade 
others, without being ready to be persuaded (Risse, 2000, 9). A definition of rhetorical action was 
also presented by Deitelhoff and Müller in their empirical study of arguing in international forums; 
rhetorical types of statement were described as situations where the subject’s selfish preferences 
were justified and promoted through the strategic and instrumental use of an ethical discourse 
relying on shared values, aiming to influence public perceptions of the debate (Deitelhoff and 
Müller, 2005, 170). However, Krebs’s and Jackson’s model draws most of its features from Frank 
Schimmelfennig’s attempt to adapt Erving Goffman’s theory of “dramaturgical action” to the 
context of IR. In his 2002 article, Schimmelfennig argued that, in a situation of shared norms 
between participants in a negotiation, an actor presents a definition of the issue and a “declaration 
of intent” that refers to a common set of norms. The actor does that in a purely instrumental way, 
with the only attempt to justify and legitimize their strategic action orientated towards the defence 
of their own interests and to influence public perceptions of the negotiation. Public perception is 
thus used as an instrument of pressure in order to coerce other forum participants (Schimmelfennig, 
2002, 420). 
Starting from Schimmelfennig’s premises, Krebs and Jackson elaborated a model in which a 
claimant C presents a claim – composed of a framing (rhetorical discourse legitimizing the claim) 
and of an implication (proposed policy change); this claim is presented in front of an opponent O 




 O accepts both framing and implication, and changes its behaviour. 
 O accepts the implication, but claims to have changed its behaviour for 
reasons other than the framing proposed by C. 
 O accepts the framing but rejects the implication, proposing a different 
way to solve the same problem. 
 O rejects both the framing and the implication. 
 
Both C and O will attempt to convince the public by presenting competing frames, engaging 
in rhetorical behaviour (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 43-44). In this model, arguing becomes a 
rhetorical coercive technique: actors do not use rational, ethical, normative and scientific discourse 
in order to convince each other; instead, they try to reach and convince a public. 
In their article, Krebs and Jackson raised a fundamental point: it is impossible to study 
arguing as something that can only be identified by assessing actors’ true, hidden dispositions. 
Their research tried to focus on what a researcher can control and clearly assess: the speech acts in 
the course of international negotiations. Their conclusions, however, were based on two basic 
assumptions: first, “scepticism” over the possibility of encountering genuine persuasion in politics 
(Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 39); second: that coercion and strategic, self-focused behaviour are the 
much more likely to be encountered in world politics than truth-seeking, deliberative attitudes 
(Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 42). These two assumptions are the main presuppositions behind their 
theory, and inevitably shape it; thus, although they claim that in their theory “neither the motives 
[read: the dispositions] nor the sincerity of the parties is particularly relevant” (Krebs and Jackson, 
2007, 45), they call their model one of “rhetorical coercion” – where coercion means “the use of 
force to persuade someone to do something that they are unwilling to do”15 – and they tend to 
describe negotiations as situations where arms are twisted by “twisting tongues” (Krebs and 





where an actor compels another through rhetoric, forgetting that their analytical framework, which 
looks exclusively at the act of speech, would also be able to identify acts of genuine persuasion. 
Indeed, if a claimant C presents an argument to an opponent O, how can the researchers know 
whether C is trying to carry out a strategic act or if C is trying genuinely to persuade O? To know 
that, one needs to know C’s true disposition. How can researchers know that C is trying to mobilize 
the P against O – as they argue (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 44) – and not actually attempting to 
change O’s mind? While Krebs and Jackson claim that they are not interested in actors’ 
dispositions, their coercive model of rhetorical action pre-supposes that actors’ dispositions are 
always (or almost always) self-focused and strategic ones.16 Indeed, their explanation for a change 
of attitude resulting from a negotiation is that the subject behaving differently has been coerced and 
“manoeuvred into a corner” (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 42). In doing so, however, they presuppose 
the true dispositions of both the subject displaying rhetorical behaviour and the subject that is 
influenced by it. Their conclusion seems even more contradictory since, in the beginning of their 
article, the authors claimed that “persuasion undoubtedly does occur” within international 
negotiations (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 36), and this contradiction is further highlighted in a 
passage of their article, in which they describe the functioning of their model. In examining a 
situation where a claimant C displays a rhetorical argument to an opponent O, they write: “While C 
might ideally prefer to persuade O, it must design a political strategy that can attain its desired ends 
even if persuasion proves impossible” (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 44). This means that, even in 
cases where efforts at persuasion fail, they are in theory possible, since actors might try to achieve 
it. Why, then, build a model of rhetorical coercion that seems to postulate the marginality or the 
 
16 This  is pointed out by Krebs and  Jackson as well, which argue  that, although  they  “make no  strong assumptions 
regarding the context of the actors’ motives, the model does rely on the thin, almost trivial, assumption that actors 
are fundamentally strategic – that they pursue policies that they believe will further their goals” (Krebs and Jackson, 






impossibility of persuasion, especially considering the methodological problems in recognising 
actors’ true dispositions? 
Krebs and Jackson sought both to challenge the current conceptualization and study of 
arguing and to present an alternative model. In doing so, they pointed out some key issues in the IR 
debate on social interactions, and highlighted the problems caused by the attempts to identify 
political phenomena by relying on unobservable features. This thesis endorses their argument, and 
participates in the attempt to build a theoretical framework aiming at studying international 
negotiations while focusing on what people “say” and not on what people “think” (Krebs and 
Jackson, 2007, 36). However, the model that Krebs and Jackson presented contained internal 
contradictions that prevented them from solving the methodological and theoretical conundrums in 
a fully satisfactory way. 
 
1.10: Relying on the unobservable 
 
Krebs’s and Jackson’s work effectively pointed out one of the main reasons why attempts to isolate 
moments of arguing and bargaining while looking at international forums failed: the literature 
distinguished the two different types of behaviour on the basis of the “true dispositions” of actors 
taking part to an international forum. Bargaining statements are the strategic use of promises and 
threats, aiming at the maximization of selfish gains on the basis of certain fixed preferences; to 
make a bargaining statement, a subject needs to have a self-focused and strategic disposition while 
approaching to negotiations. Norm-driven behaviour is an action oriented towards the pursuit and/or 
the observance of pre-established and international norms; to engage in norm-driven behaviour, one 
has to have a norm-observant disposition. Arguing types of behaviour aim to build a shared 
understanding of reality through the exchange of truth-seeking, persuasive-oriented claims in a 
context in which participants are open-minded and ready to be persuaded by the better argument; to 
engage in arguing behaviour, both listener and speaker need to have a truth-seeking, open-minded 
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and persuasion-oriented disposition. This is problematic because, since “the mind is not accessible” 
(Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171), true dispositions need to be considered as unobservable objects 
of international relations. The issue of unobservables is an often-debated topic within the 
philosophy of science, and it arose from the consideration that natural science has often been able to 
progress and to deliver valid theories able effectively to explain natural phenomena by relying on 
unobservable objects (Jackson, 2016, 88). For instance, the “Standard Model” of modern physics is 
based on the principle according to which subatomic particles are constituted by even smaller ones, 
defined as “quarks”; these particles, however, “never appear singly, only in combination, so they 
cannot ever be directly detected” (Jackson, 2016, 94). From these considerations it is then possible 
to conclude that the simple fact that a theory is relying on “unobservables” should not necessarily 
mean that it is a flawed theory. 
However, the existence of unobservables has constituted a strong challenge against 
“phenomenalist” approaches, which rely on the assumption that valid research can only be based on 
the examination and the observation of empirically detectable data. As Patrick Jackson writes, “the 
problem, from a phenomenalist perspective, was that all of these evidently useful scientific theories 
contained terms that seemed to refer to things that could not be directly perceived, and therefore 
could not be known as directly as the objects of everyday experience” (Jackson, 2016, 89). Jackson, 
however, goes further in analysing the “unobservables”, and draws a distinction between detectable 
and undetectable ones. Detectable unobservables are defined as entities that cannot be perceived, 
but that produce effects that can be empirically detected; conversely, undetectable unobservables 
are entities that cannot be perceived and that do not leave empirically identifiable traces (Jackson, 
2016, 97). Which of these two categories describes subjects’ “true dispositions”? Are they 
detectable or undetectable unobservables?  
Research coming from both the rationalist and the constructivist spectrum of the debate have 
highlighted the difficulties of detecting subjects’ true dispositions, and most of them focused on the 
impossibility of accessing someone’s mind (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171). Yet, someone could 
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argue that such an impossibility would only mean that true dispositions are unobservable, not that 
they are undetectable, and there still could be empirically perceivable processes that would help 
detect them. The impossibility of detecting actors’ true dispositions does not come from the 
inaccessibility of the mind, but rather from the problematic nature of any attempt indirectly to 
assess them through empirical investigation. Indeed, relying, as some have done, on private 
correspondence as a possible indicator of actors’ true dispositions might be controversial, since 
there is no guarantee that private correspondence should reflect the real attitudes and feelings of a 
subject (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 40). Using interviews as a way to address the question might not 
be a satisfactory course of action as well, since those interviewed might have their own agenda, 
might be interested in omitting particular events and details, or might be consciously or 
unconsciously biased in narrating events (Berry, 2002, 679-680; Morrissey, 2006, 93-99). Even 
most recent attempts to explain negotiation outputs by the presence of true persuasion cannot 
overcome the fundamental methodological obstacle that alternative explanations cannot be excluded 
(Saretzki, 2009, 174). 
The fact that subjects’ true dispositions have to be considered empirically undetectable, 
however, does not mean that they are insignificant in determining the output of international 
negotiations; indeed, it would be ludicrous to claim that actors’ dispositions while approaching to 
negotiations is irrelevant in influencing the results of a forum. At the same time, it would be wrong 
to assume that theories relying on undetectable unobservables are necessarily erroneous or 
methodologically flawed: undetectable unobservables can be used instrumentally as theoretical 
constructs, ideal-types through which to examine and to explain empirical phenomena, and an 
approach of this sort can deliver perfectly acceptable interpretive conclusions, as it already has done 
(Risse, 2000; Müller, 2004). However, this research starts from the conviction that building a model 
able empirically to isolate types of statement in forums, and systematically distinguish one from the 
other, could bring significant contributions to the literature and provide a better understanding of 
the dynamics regulating international forums and international relations in general. Given this, it is 
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safe to claim that this research needs to get away from a definition of forum types of statement 
relying on actors’ true dispositions, and to find other concepts on which to base its classification of 
forum types of behaviour. This attempt of re-defining forum types of statement follows the 
consideration that if, on the one hand, “limiting oneself to observables and detectables does not 
guarantee the avoidance of error”, on the other “it might be a more risk-averse strategy” (Jackson, 
2016, 101), especially when empirical detectability is the key issue the research project wants to 
address. There were many authors that, driven by similar considerations, have started in recent 
years a process of re-definition of arguing and bargaining, looking for ways to distinguish them on 
empirically detectable bases. 
 
1.11: Arguing as an act of speech 
 
While Krebs and Jackson tried to challenge the very concept of arguing and to propose a model of 
rhetorical coercion, other authors have tried to elaborate an alternative distinction between arguing 
and bargaining statements able to produce empirically reliable results. Often, these attempts started 
from the two fundamental findings that Deitelhoff’s and Müller’s empirical investigation outlined. 
The first is the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of assessing the “true dispositions” of 
negotiating actors (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171). The second is that arguing seemed to be 
almost “omnipresent” within international negotiations, and very difficult to isolate: they indeed 
claimed that “arguing could not be isolated empirically from bargaining”; at the same time, 
however, they also argued that their research “resulted in an unexpected finding: we found that 
arguing was ubiquitous in international relations. Pure bargaining was the exception”. (Deitelhoff 
and Müller, 2005, 171). 
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This last consideration led Cornelia Ulbert and Thomas Risse to the conclusion that “arguing 
and reasoning are all-pervasive during all phases of international negotiations”,17 and that “pure 
arguing and pure bargaining represent opposite ends of a continuum whereby most of the actual 
communicative processes takes place somewhere in between” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 352). These 
two authors tried to draw a more precise distinction between arguing and bargaining, and their 
research identified four different areas in which the two types of statement differ (Ulbert and Risse, 
2005, 353): 
 
 Modal Differences 
o Arguing consists in empirical and normative statements that 
claim to be valid; empirical argumentations are supported by 
evidence, while normative ones are validated by providing 
proof of consistency and impartiality of the speaker.  
o Bargaining, on the other hand, consists in “pragmatic 
demands with credibility claims”, and it uniquely relies on 
the credibility of the speaker. 
o Hence, if arguing is based on the validity of the “better 
argument”, bargaining relies on the speaker’s credibility and 
capabilities. 
 Procedural differences 
o Arguing is a reflexive interaction, since “it does not take 
place in distinct sequences”, and “the process […] is rather 








common frame of reference that is adjusted in the course of 
communication” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). 
o Bargaining, instead, is “sequential”, since to a promise or a 
threat immediately follows the reaction of the recipient, and 
no “exchange of arguments” within a shared conceptual 
framework takes place. 
 Possible observable outcomes 
o Arguing would often result in “reasoned consensus”, where 
subjects would submit to the “better argument”. 
o Bargaining, instead, would likely result in a compromise that 
would not imply changes in actors’ existing preferences. 
 Structural differences 
o Arguing’s structure is triadic: speaker and listener assess the 
validity of claims by referring “to some kind of external 
authority”. 
o Bargaining’s structure is dyadic, since “only mutual 
assessment counts” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). 
 
By presenting these four differences between arguing and bargaining, Ulbert and Risse tried 
to elaborate a theory that would be able to distinguish between the two modes of interaction without 
having to assess the “true dispositions” of the speaker. In doing so, they did something quite similar 
to what Thomas Saretzki did in 1996 (Saretzki, 2009, 165), when he argued that authors should not 
try to distinguish between different types of interaction by “the purposes of communication”, since 
they are so difficult to assess, and advocated instead a focus “on the mode […] of communication” 
– namely, on the mere characteristics of the different speech acts (Saretzki, 2009, 162). 
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However, Saretzki criticized Ulbert’s and Risse’s definition of arguing and bargaining as “end 
points of a continuum”, rather than “as distinct modes of communication”, since this would lead to 
methodological and conceptual confusion. In fact, according to Saretzki, if researchers choose to 
consider “the model of a continuum between two poles”, where arguing and bargaining are only 
opposite ideal-typical poles, they “have to ask […] [themselves] according to which criteria […] 
[they] should determine the turning point between the two poles. This point would then (by 
definition) serve as reference to decide whether to speak about arguing or bargaining” (Saretzki, 
2009, 166). In other words, the conception of arguing and bargaining as the two opposite sides of a 
“continuum” is incompatible with any attempt empirically and clearly to distinguish one type of 
statement from the other. Any attempt of the sort, in fact, would end by drawing a line which would 
in fact interrupt such a continuum. 
Moreover, Saretzki argues that speaking of a “continuum” between arguing and bargaining, 
while at the same time relying on four different criteria of distinction between the two, is also 
problematic, since “if we have to conceptualize arguing and bargaining with reference to the four 
characteristics presented […], the question arises whether we end up handling one continuum or 
four” (Saretzki, 2009, 166). Finally, he looks with greater attention at the four criteria identified by 
Ulbert and Risse, and criticizes their choice to rely on “empirical observable outcomes” in order to 
distinguish between arguing and bargaining. In fact, “there is no guarantee that processes of arguing 
or bargaining will lead to a specific outcome that we can previously determine” (Saretzki, 2009, 
166) – in other words, researchers relying on empirically observable outcomes as indicators, for 
instance, of arguing, may end up overlooking all those arguing statements that do not achieve 
persuasion. 
For this reason, Saretzki tries to build an even simpler distinction between arguing and 
bargaining, by considering only the “modal” and “structural” differences between them (Saretzki, 
2009, 163). Modally, Saretzki defines arguing behaviour as a set of empirical and normative 
statements that “are made with the claim of being valid”, while bargaining statements are empirical 
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demands that “claim to be credible”. Structurally, arguing is “triadic” because actors rely on a 
mutually accepted external authority, while bargaining statements are characterized by a dyadic 
structure (Saretzki, 2009, 162). It is difficult, however, to understand how this type of distinction 
between arguing and bargaining could resolve the problems encountered by Deitelhoff and Müller, 
since it was exactly the perceived “omnipresence”, within international forums, of mechanisms of 
reason-giving used as empirical and/or ethical validation which constituted the main obstacle for 
empirical distinction between the two types of interaction (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171).18 
From here, it is possible to draw two conclusions: either almost every type of statement uttered 
during the international forums Deitelhoff and Müller studied was an example of arguing behaviour 
or the current ways to distinguish arguing from bargaining are ineffective. If the former is true, then 
detecting arguing behaviour is useless, because everything in a forum can be considered as such; if 
the latter is true, then researchers need to find new ways to define arguing. 
Saretzki, Deitelhoff, Müller, Risse and Klein shared the view that it was necessary to 
elaborate a new conception of arguing and bargaining, according to which arguing relies on 
empirical and ethical validation and bargaining relies on the credibility of the speaker. Furthermore, 
they claimed that arguing must rely on a triadic structure, since two interlocutors have to appeal to 
an “external authority” in order to assess the validity of their claims, while bargaining follows a 
dyadic structure, since the credibility of the promises and threats made during the interaction is only 
assessed by the receiver (Saretzki, 2009, 163). These developments in the literature showed a 
significant change in the conceptualization of arguing, and a gradual detachment of it from its ideal 
and normative Habermasian roots. In fact, rather than depicting arguing as a type of statement that 
 
18 In  his  article,  Saretzki  contested  Deitelhoff’s  and  Müller’s  conclusion  that  arguing  was  “omnipresent”  within 
international negotiations, claiming that it is impossible to define a type of behaviour as omnipresent while admitting 
at  the same  time  the  inability  to clearly detect  its presence empirically  (Saretzki, 2009, 168). However,  the broader 
implications of Deitelhoff’s and Müller’s work are not challenged by Saretzki’s observation:  for  the  two authors,  in 
fact, arguing  is equated with a type of reason‐giving which relies on empirical and ethical mechanisms of validation, 
and that  is characterized by a triadic nature  in which authors  legitimize their statements by appealing to a mutually 






has to rely on a generalized desire amongst forum participants to tell the truth, to disregard power 
hierarchies and to be open-minded, these authors have started to elaborate definitions focusing only 
on the characters of the speech act. As already shown, however, these attempts were not able to 
deliver shared definitions of arguing and bargaining and shared methods through which to clearly 
distinguish one from another at an empirical level. Because of the obstacles found in clearly 
detecting arguing behaviour, some authors decided to stop looking for unproblematic and shared 
definitions, and started focusing on identifying the structural conditions that incentivize the recourse 
to arguing interactions and that increase their effectiveness (Fearon and Wendt, 2002, 53). 
 
1.12: When and where to find arguing 
 
Already in the year 2000, Risse identified certain conditions under which a researcher could claim, 
despite the existence of a hierarchy of power, that arguing is (or is not) taking place, to a certain 
extent, in international politics (Risse, 2000, 18-19): 
 
 Speech situations in which a state is pointing out its power, its status, 
or its rank in the international order, are not arguing actions, since 
arguing presupposes disregard of power hierarchy. 
 Since arguing requires consistency, actors that change their positions 
depending on the audience are most likely not engaging in arguing 
behaviour, but will instead probably be displaying rhetorical actions. 
 Within negotiations, situations where weaker actors are empowered 
at the expense of more powerful actors are likely to have certain 
elements of arguing, since arguing causes power relations to recede. 
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 Situations where the selfish interests of actors are challenged are the 
ideal ground of which to search for arguing, especially if these 
situations cause actors to change their minds. 
 Moments in which the consistency of actors is challenged are very 
important in order to test whether or not we are in presence of 
arguing: if actors disregard or dismiss criticism, one is probably not 
witnessing arguing, while if actors start justifying their actions or 
apologizing for them, it is likely that one is. 
 High levels of international institutionalization within the concerned 
issue-area or, in case of low institutionalization, clear efforts in pre-
negotiations stages to build a “common lifeworld”, promote arguing. 
 “Uncertainty of interests and/or lack of knowledge” should 
encourage arguing because it makes actors’ preferences subject to 
change in case new information appears. 
 
Risse’s remarks about international institutions were further elaborated in later studies, 
highlighting how “the more the institutional norms and procedures privilege authority based on 
expertise and/or moral competence, the more arguing is likely to lead to persuasion”, and “the more 
institutional norms and procedures require neutral chairs of negotiations, the more leadership is 
conducive to arguing leading to persuasion” (Risse and Klein, 2010, 714).  
According to Katarina Coleman, arguing and persuasion are encouraged by small forums and 
by negotiations where the decision-making process is bounded by a consensus rule (Coleman, 2013, 
169-170); Deitelhoff and Müller claim that arguing seems to be promoted by the presence and 
participation, within the forum, of public opinion and NGOs, since these two factors could help 
overcome, at least partially, the asymmetry between negotiating actors (Deitelhoff and Müller, 
2005, 173-174). Some authors, instead, have argued that surprising and unexpected outcomes of 
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negotiations, unexpectedly fast negotiations, agreements reached very early and/or the surprising 
influence of weak actors within negotiations, subverting power dynamics, may suggest the presence 
of arguing (Risse and Klein, 2010, 712). It is generally accepted that contexts where actors are 
uncertain about their “role identities” lead to a widespread uncertainty about their preferences, since 
different roles and identities within the forum lead to different preferences, providing the ideal 
conditions for arguing effectiveness (Risse and Klein, 2010, 713). 
To sum up, these authors seem to have renounced the attempt to develop an empirically 
detectable definition of arguing, and started looking for moments within international forums in 
which arguing type of statements would occur without defining the hallmarks of this particular type 
of statement. Though this new tendency may seem an interesting and promising development, it is 
problematic that the literature has still been unable to elaborate a definition of “arguing” that could 
clearly isolate arguing statements while empirically and effectively distinguishing them from 
bargaining ones; indeed, as Saretzki says: “it is clear that if we want to distinguish different types or 
forms of action or communication, we need at least some kind of definition that allows us to 
identify what we are looking for ‘in the real world’” (Saretzki, 2009, 154). In the absence of a 
theory that would allow clear detection of arguing on an empirical level, any attempt to look for 
factors encouraging arguing or increasing its effectiveness faces serious theoretical and 
methodological problems. How, in fact, can researchers understand what triggers arguing or what 
makes it effective? How can they claim that arguing is preferable, if they do not exactly know what 
arguing is, how it works and how it can be detected empirically? 
 
1.13: The need for a new approach to the problem 
 
When authors tried to analyse “real world” international negotiations through the lens of their 
theoretical approaches, in order to isolate and distinguish arguing and bargaining types of 
behaviour, they encountered serious, seemingly insurmountable methodological obstacles. This led 
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to different and parallel developments within the literature. Krebs and Jackson highlighted how 
attempts to isolate arguing empirically were trying to assess an unobservable characteristic of 
international negotiations, actors’ “true dispositions”; their reaction was to define arguing as 
methodologically intractable and to propose a new conception of rhetorical coercion. However, 
while their work has been fundamental in pointing out key methodological problems, it was not as 
effective in solving them. The model they proposed, in fact, was based on the fundamental 
assumption that actors were mainly driven by self-focused and strategic logics; by doing that, they 
postulated a certain interpretation of actors’ “true dispositions” in the negotiations, even though 
they had previously defined them as an invisible trait of international forums. 
Rather than deeming arguing “intractable”, other authors tried to redefine it, abandoning any 
assessment of actors’ “true dispositions” and instead focusing on the mere nature of the speech act. 
However, they did not elaborate shared definitions of arguing and bargaining, and were not able to 
produce empirically valid and reliable findings. Finally, other researchers no longer attempted to 
build a comprehensive model of social interactions within international forums, but instead tried to 
identify the structural conditions that promoted arguing or the events in a forum that suggested 
arguing’s presence; however, the lack of a model able clearly to define and empirically to detect 
arguing made their findings problematic. 
A new model of international social interactions should be able to: 
 
 Elaborate a theory in which arguing and bargaining can coexist in 
the same forum, together with other types of statement.  
 Produce a model that is empirically testable, in a reliable and valid 
way, in order to overcome the serious methodological challenges 
that previous authors have encountered. 
 Find a way to distinguish between arguing and rhetoric without 
incurring conceptual contradictions or methodological problems. In 
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case this is not possible, it should conceive a type of social 
interaction that could include both arguing and rhetorical types of 
statement. 
 
This new model of forum social interactions must be able to elaborate a systematic, replicable 
and reliable categorization of forum statements, so that future researchers could use it as a 
methodological tool to determine what are the conditions influencing the way in which delegates 
interact with each other, and to better grasp the dynamics regulating international negotiations. This 
research tries to present a model of international forums’ social interactions able to address all the 



















Chapter Two – A new model of social interactions within international 
forums 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the literature examining social interactions within international 
forums was characterized by the clash between rationalist and constructivist theories. This meant 
that authors envisioned forum participants either as rational actors approaching to negotiations in a 
self-focused ad strategic disposition, or as subjects influenced by their historically-shaped identity, 
with a norm-observant disposition. This entailed that, when authors tried to provide a list of all the 
types of behaviour that subjects could display within a forum, the types of behaviour they conceived 
were the necessary consequence of the philosophical premises they started from. Rationalist 
theorists built models in which subjects would engage in strategic bargaining exactly because they 
had a strategic, selfish disposition. On the other hand, constructivist scholars envisioned subjects 
which interacted through norm-orientated actions or arguing exactly because they had a norm-
observant or a truth-seeking disposition. This situation did not change once the literature developed 
further and researchers attempted to build theoretical bridges between the two strains of the debate: 
rationalist and constructivist authors tried to integrate some elements of the opposite theories, but 
they never departed from their philosophical premises. 
The problem arising from this situation was that the types of behaviour identified by the 
literature were defined on the basis of the true dispositions of forum participants. Actors engaged in 
bargaining, it was said, because they approached to negotiations in a selfish and strategic 
disposition. They engaged in norm-orientated actions because they had a norm-observing 
disposition. Or they engaged in arguing because they had a truth-seeking and open-minded 









other while studying real-world negotiations was to assess which were the true dispositions of 
negotiating actors. Deitelhoff and Müller were able to show the limitations of this approach by 
highlighting how true dispositions dwell in actors’ minds, and their minds are not accessible. 
After Deitelhoff’s and Müller’s article, many researchers attempted to distinguish one type of 
forum behaviour from the other by looking at the formal characteristics of the acts of speech 
delivered during negotiations. While this development in the literature looked promising, authors 
were still not able clearly to distinguish one type of behaviour from the other while applying their 
models empirically. The main problem was that authors did not start their attempts by re-defining 
the types of forum behaviour one could encounter while looking at international forums: while they 
changed focus from actors’ true dispositions, the types of behaviour they were looking for were still 
those of previous theories, and were still defined on the basis of the “true dispositions” driving 
forum participants. This thesis attempts to overcome the problems faced by previous theories, and it 
does so by starting from a process of re-definition of the types of statement that can be made in 
forums.  
This chapter outlines the dissertation’s theoretical framework. To do so, it first examines in 
greater depth the current definitions of arguing and bargaining, and the differences between these 
two types of behaviour, in order to highlight the problems and the contradictions within the current 
literature, and to further explain the need for a new approach to the study of inter-state negotiations. 
Next it engages once again with the debate between rationalist and constructivist authors, and it 
provides a way to circumvent the ontological questions of the discipline in order to avoid excessive 
abstraction and to focus more on the reality of international negotiations. Furthermore, it argues that 
a revised version of Jennifer Mitzen’s theory of collective intention could provide the conceptual 
basis on which to build the theoretical framework and, after examining the structural characteristics 
 






of international forums, it claims that “intentions” can be classified as detectable unobservables of 
negotiations. 
Once all the ontological and epistemological premises have been stated, the chapter elaborates 
a new definition of arguing and bargaining centred on the type of intention these two modes of 
communication aim to express. Finally, it claims that both arguing and bargaining are only 
subcategories of broader types of behaviour – respectively, collectivism and particularism; these 
two, together with proceduralism, are at the base of this research’s model of social interactions 
within international forums. Finally, the last section of the chapter examines the implications of the 
theoretical model. More specifically, it tries to formulate the hypothesis that higher frequencies of 
collectivism during negotiations are correlated with a higher level of legitimacy of the forum’s 
outcome. 
 
2.1: Mechanisms of validations and external authority in arguing and bargaining 
 
Recent contributions in the IR literature indicate that any model of social interactions within 
international forums has to start from two premises. First, different types of behaviour can coexist 
within the same round of negotiation. Second, if a theory aims at distinguishing arguing from 
bargaining on an empirical level, it must be based on concepts which are at least indirectly 
detectable while looking at the real world. Recent studies attempting to re-define arguing and 
bargaining have started from these premises, but their efforts have not resulted in a theoretical 
model able clearly to isolate and categorize different types of behaviour during inter-state 
negotiations. The following two sections try to understand the reasons behind their failure, and they 
do so by analysing in greater depth how arguing and bargaining are currently defined and 
differentiated. 
Despite their differences, attempts to redefine arguing and bargaining seem to agree that they 
are distinguished by some “modal differences”, and that arguing consists in a set of empirical and 
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normative assertions that “are made with the claim of being valid” (Saretzki, 2009, 162). If 
empirical assertions rely on evidence, normative ones claim to be valid by appealing to the 
impartiality and the consistency of the speaker (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). The “modal” 
characteristics of arguing were already identified by previous works: Harald Müller claims 
something similar when writing that arguing claims base their validity on their morality and/or truth 
(Müller, 2004, 397), and a similar reasoning is displayed in some of the early research of Alastair 
Johnston, who envisioned persuasion (successful arguing) as the result of the reception of new, 
reliable information or compelling ethical arguments (Johnston, 2001, 496-498). 
First and foremost, then, arguing is described by the literature as a type of behaviour that, in 
order to validate itself, needs to be backed by some reliable, previously-established knowledge – 
like, for instance, scientific evidence (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 361). If there are doubts concerning 
the truthfulness of the statement, “the validity of empirical-theoretical assertions is to be examined 
according to the criteria of consistency and empirical proof” (Saretzki, 2009, 167). Furthermore, the 
discipline has also pointed out how arguing actors may seek to establish the validity of their 
assertions by demonstrating that they are ethical (Müller, 2004, 397). Saretzki backs this 
assumption by stating that arguing’s validity may also rely on normative assumptions, and that the 
morality of these assumptions can be assessed on the basis of the speaker’s coherence and 
impartiality (Saretzki, 2009, 167). Finally, the last source of arguing’s validity is generally 
identified in the credibility of the speaker: subjects that have proven to be both competent and 
truthful have more chances to deliver an effective arguing statement, because they will be 
considered trustworthy (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 359-360). From this brief overview of the 
literature, it can be agreed that, in spite of the different conceptualizations of arguing, arguing is 
conceived as a type of interaction that, in order to be effective, needs to rely on three pillars of 
validity: a material, an ethical and a consistency one. This is the “modal characteristic” of arguing. 
Indeed, forum participants who provide reliable knowledge in order to prove or disprove the 
truthfulness of an assertion are doing so in order to show that a certain policy would be more 
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effective or advantageous. Similarly, subjects using, for instance, scientific information to disprove 
a policy proposal aim to demonstrate that the claim that a certain proposal is the most advantageous 
to take does not rely on sound foundations. Whether actors are assessing the truth of their claims 
(Risse, 2000, 9-10; Müller, 2004, 397), or basing their claims on “reliable information” (Johnston, 
2001, 498), they are relying on material validity and telling the listener, through empirical 
assertions backed by evidence, that a certain course of action is the most advantageous to take. On 
the other hand, actors promoting a certain policy because it is the most ethical thing to do (Risse, 
2000, 9-10; Müller, 2004, 397), or who base the validity of their claims on “normative 
assumptions” (Saretzki, 2009, 162), are saying that forum participants have the moral responsibility 
to act in a certain way; arguing, therefore, relies on ethical validity too. Finally, the validity of 
arguing statements is assessed also by examining actors’ true intentions (Risse, 2009, 9-10), the 
coherence of a proposed policy (Saretzki, 2009, 162) or the credibility of the actor (Johnston, 2001, 
498). Subjects performing arguing during an international forum, therefore, could promote a certain 
policy on the ground that it is the most coherent thing to do, and could use their past behaviour as 
evidence of their trustworthiness, appealing to consistency validity. The need to validate arguing on 
empirical truthfulness, ethical impartiality and the speaker’s trustworthiness also implies the 
existence of some “structural characteristics” proper to arguing: in order to be validated, arguing 
actors need to appeal “to a mutually-accepted external authority” – an external authority which can 
be “agreed-upon treaties, universally held norms, scientific evidence and other forms of consensual 
knowledge” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353).2 
To sum up, then, arguing subjects validate their statements on the basis that a certain line of 
action is the most advantageous for all (material validity), and/or the most ethical way to act (ethical 








by relying on a certain type of external authority, accepted by all forum participants, that operates as 
a point of reference, a mutually accepted source that can be used to assess the truthfulness, morality 
and coherence of a statement. By contrast, researchers have often claimed that “the truthfulness of 
the speaker, the truth of empirical assertions, or the rightfulness of normative claims […] are 
irrelevant in a bargaining situation” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). Indeed, while arguing has 
usually been depicted as a type of statement containing “claims of factual truth and normative 
validity” (Müller, 2004, 397), bargaining has been defined as a type of statement that contains 
threats and promises and that it “aims to change behaviour” (Müller, 2004, 397). Bargaining’s 
“modal” characteristics are those of a type of statement which legitimizes itself by relying uniquely 
on the credibility of the promises and threats it contains (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). Since, 
according to the literature, bargaining is a type of interaction that does not rely on mechanisms of 
material, ethical and consistency validation, it does not appeal to a mutually accepted external 
authority, but it is instead characterized by a “dyadic” structural hallmark (Saretzki, 2009, 163), in 
which only the “mutual assessment” of the two actors involved in the bargaining interaction 
determines its validity (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). 
Before looking at bargaining in greater depth, it is important to highlight that there are two 
different types of bargaining statement: those based on promises and those based on threats. Indeed, 
at first glance, promising and threatening look, in the context of international relations, like very 
different things. John Odell echoes this feeling while he describes the definition of bargaining in the 
IR literature as problematic, since it merges coercive elements such as threats and reason-giving 
elements such as promises (Odell, 2010, 628). This thesis first examines the promise-based type of 
bargaining, and it later looks at the threat-based type. 
Promise-based bargaining can be depicted by the following, ideal-typical statement:  
 
 




Subject A tells B: “If you do X, I promise I will do Y for you” 
 
For this offer to be well-received by B, the promise made needs to be a credible one (Saretzki, 
2009, 162), and A needs to show that Y is likely to take place in the future (Saretzki, 2009, 158). 
Credibility, however, is not the only attribute that the promise A makes to B needs to have in order 
to be effective. A is promising something to B in order to change B’s behaviour; however, B’s 
behaviour can only be changed if A is able to demonstrate that Y in exchange for X would be an 
advantageous deal for B. This consideration, however, challenges both the modal and the structural 
distinctions between arguing and bargaining. 
First of all, A needs to show B that the proposed deal is advantageous, and A can only do that 
by providing “reliable information”, enacting something very similar to arguing’s mechanism of 
material validation. Furthermore, the literature insists that the truthfulness of an arguing claim can 
only be assessed by relying on a “mutually accepted external authority” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 
353), which can also be science, international treaties or widely accepted knowledge, whereas 
bargaining does not need to refer to anything external to the two speakers (Saretzki, 2009, 163). 
However, in a bargaining situation A can convince B of the convenience of the displayed promise 
only by appealing to sources that both actors recognize as valid; otherwise, the promise would not 
be convincing, B would not change behaviour and the bargaining statement would not be effective. 
What if A uses scientific, reliable knowledge in order to show that Y in exchange for X would be 
advantageous for B? The fact that neither A nor B change their preferences during this interaction4 
indicate that this is an example of bargaining, but A’s promise needs to rely on some form of 




this  type  of  interaction  is  successful,  in  fact,  B  does  not  decide  that  the  intention  X  is more  important  than  the 





that bargaining statements, in order to be effective, need just as do arguing ones, to rely on a form 
of material validity, which is assessed through reference to a commonly accepted external authority. 
There is also another important consideration to make. Earlier sections have shown how the 
literature generally assumes that arguing statements rely on ethical validity by appealing to certain 
moral principles, in order to claim that a certain action is the “right” one to take. However, 
empirical studies have shown that, during international forums, actors who blatantly admit to acting 
in order to maximize their own gains are most likely to be isolated and marginalized (Deitelhoff and 
Müller, 2005, 171). This is mostly due to the public nature of the forum: in situations where actors 
debate issues publicly, claims need to be explained and rationalized, presented in a form that could 
be accepted by all forum participants – or, at least by a large majority of them (Mitzen, 2013, 51-
52).5 Starting from this reasoning, this thesis claims that bargaining statements have to rely to some 
kind of ethical validity as well, which usually coincides with the defence of national interest.  
Indeed, actors participating in an international forum are states’ representatives, with the 
mandate of defending and protecting their own government and their people (Frédérick, 1999, 100). 
In democracies, the government or the administration is legitimized by national elections, and the 
first duty of institutions is to represent and defend national and popular sovereignty – in Müller’s 
words, diplomats in democratic countries have “to implement the dutiful role of defending the will 
of the people of their countries” (Müller, 2004, 415). This is true even when they are taking part in 
forums regarding global concerns (Okereke and Charlesworth, 2014, 49). The discourse is not very 
different in the case of authoritarian states: the Chinese Communist Party, for instance, legitimizes 
its power and authority by claiming it is the promoter of China’s wealth and prosperity, and the 
defender of the country’s unity and independence (Yongnian, 2004, 51-56). While some might 









problematic, actors participating in a forum could respond that the protection of national security 
and of the people of their state is an ethical, objective and absolute duty that must be observed by all 
forum participants. To quote Müller once again: “Diplomats are expected by their peers and their 
superiors to represent the interests of their country. Representing faithfully and loyally views and 
interests is the very diplomatic identity […]. There is nothing sinister about this” (Müller, 2004, 
415). 
The previously examined, ideal-typical bargaining statement was the following: 
 
Subject A tells B: “If you do X, I promise I will do Y for you” 
 
In promising Y, A attempts to show that Y is advantageous to B by appealing to some type of 
material validity, and it does so by referring to some mutually accepted external authority. By 
providing reliable evidence that would confirm the advantageousness of Y, A is also trying to 
convince B that sealing this deal would be in B’s national interest. Bargaining interactions, 
therefore, equate the morality of a certain policy with its conformity with the national interest. 
Starting from this assumption, it is possible to claim that bargaining interactions rely on a certain 
type of ethical validity.6 
Finally, it has previously been shown that subjects displaying arguing statements will attempt 
to validate their claims on the basis of consistency, by showing how their proposals are consistent 
with their past behaviour and with the mandate of the forum, in order to appear trustworthy and 
coherent in front of all forum participants. Similarly, this chapter has already explained how, for a 
bargaining claim to be accepted, the promises made in the course of negotiations need to be credible 
and likely to take place in the future. Therefore, when A promises Y to B in exchange for X, A not 
 
6 When  claiming  that bargaining  statements  rely on ethical validity,  this dissertation does not maintain  that actors 
engaging in bargaining types of statement need necessarily to claim they are acting ethically. It only intends that the 




only has to prove that Y is advantageous for B (material validity), and that doing X for Y would 
promote B’s national interest (ethical validity), but also that Y is a credible promise (consistency 
validity).  
Promise-based bargaining, similarly to arguing, needs to rely on material, ethical and 
consistency validities in order to be effective, and it needs to rely on a mutually-accepted external 
authority. Is it possible to claim that threat-based bargaining follows a similar dynamic? Threat-
based bargaining could be described by the following, ideal-typical statement: 
 
A tells B: “If you do not do X, I threaten that I will do Y to you” 
 
A is using a threat in order to change B’s behaviour. A’s threat does not aim to convince B 
that X would lead to a situation preferable to the status quo; it is not an interaction focused on 
finding common gains, but an attempt to coerce B to do something against B’s will. On a closer 
look, however, it is possible to see that, even when performing a threat, A is taking into account B’s 
preference, and performing an interaction relying on material, ethical and consistency validities. 
Indeed, for the threat to be effective, A must convince B that Y is against B’s interests, and 
that it is therefore materially advantageous for B to do X, avoiding the damage that Y represents 
(material validity). Furthermore, A can only show that to B by providing reliable evidence and 
using some kind of external authority as a common point of reference: while threatening B, A could 
use, for instance, scientific knowledge – or any other form of mutually accepted knowledge – to 
prove why the threat is so ominous for B. Similarly, B needs to be convinced that doing X in order 
to avoid Y is in B’s national interest, and that, consequently, B’s moral duty is to do X (ethical 
validity).7 Finally, A’s threat is effective only if clear evidence that the threat will be enacted if 
 
7 When  claiming  that  threatening  statements  rely  on  ethical  validity,  this  dissertation  does  not  argue  that  people 
threatening others are acting ethically, nor it does argue that a speaker A threatening a listener B necessarily needs to 




necessary is provided (consistency validity). Threat-based bargaining, then, is also an interaction 
that relies on material, ethical and consistency validities. This last conclusion can be supported by 
looking at one of the best-known examples of threats in the literature of international relations: the 
dialogue between Melians and Athenians. 
In this text, Thucydides describes a situation where the Athenians ask the Melians to 
surrender and to pledge allegiance to Athens; the Athenian delegation threatens that if Melos 
refuses to surrender it will face total annihilation. During the negotiation, the Melians ask the 
Athenian delegation the following question: “And how could we benefit from being slaves as you 
would from being masters?”. To this, the Athenians respond: “Because submission would save you 
from suffering the most terrible fate, while we would profit from not destroying you” (Thucydides, 
2013, 380). The Athenians based their threat on material validity, trying to show it was 
advantageous for the Melians to surrender, because the consequences of their resistance would be 
extremely disadvantageous. The Athenians relied on ethical validity as well. They not only argued 
that acting in such a repressive way against the Melians was in the interest of Athens’ empire, and 
that the duty of those who represented Athens was to pursue the interest of the polis; they also 
claimed that it was in the interest of the Melian delegation to surrender, that they had the moral duty 
to surrender in order to save their own people’s lives. Indeed, Athenians answered the Melian 
invocation of fairness and rightfulness in the following way: “what we will demonstrate is that we 
are here for the benefit of our own empire and that what we have to say is also for the safety of your 
state. We want to rule you without any trouble to ourselves and we want your safety to benefit us 
both” (Thucydides, 2013, 380). Finally, the Athenian delegation was also concerned to show the 
Melians that their threat was consistent with their past behaviour, and that it was likely to be carried 
out if necessary: “You should be aware”, they said, “that never once the Athenians abandoned any 






The Athenians made threats which relied on material, ethical and consistency validities, and 
did so by appealing to a mutually accepted external authority. As it has been pointed out in section 
11, the external authority constituting the third corner of the “triad” characterizing a type of 
interaction relying on validation mechanisms can also be represented by a shared conviction or 
established knowledge, whatever “allows actors to relate to some intelligible system of reference” 
(Saretzki, 2009, 163) – this can include, for instance, commonly accepted scientific information or 
previously established treaties. In the case of the dialogue between the Melians and Athenians, this 
intelligible system of reference was based on the shared understanding that the ongoing negotiation 
concerned the very survival of the people inhabiting Melos. This is acknowledged by the Melians 
too, who agree that the meeting between the two delegations is “indeed about the question of 
survival” (Thucydides, 2013, 379). 
The Athenians’ threats always refer to that commonly established principle, and imply that, 
given the mutual understanding that the discussion is about the survival of the Melians, the Melian 
delegation should do what is best to ensure their own survival; thus, as already being noted, the 
Athenians argue that submission will spare the Melians “from suffering a most terrible fate” 
(Thucydides, 2013, 380). That the issue at stake is the Melians’ survival is often highlighted by the 
Athenians, for instance, when they advise that “the question you must consider is rather one of self-
preservation – that is, not resisting those who are far stronger than you” (Thucydides, 2013, 381). 
The mutually accepted principle at the base of the discussion is that the Melians are debating about 
their own survival, and every attempt of the Athenians to convince the Melians to submit without 
fighting refers to that mutually accepted principle, and implies that the survival of the Melians can 
best be ensured by submission. 
Although the Athenians’ threat to the Melians did not occur within an international forum, it 
is an ideal-typical example of how threats would work in the context of international negotiations. 
This particular display of threat-based bargaining did not convince the Melians, who were 
exterminated (Thucydides, 2013, 385-386), but it is a good example of how threat-based bargaining 
92 
 
needs to rely on material, ethical and consistency validities, and needs to appeal to some type of 
external authority, similarly to arguing and promise-based bargaining. 
 
2.2: Bargaining as a “reflexive” type of behaviour and the issue of the “better argument” 
 
This chapter has so far questioned the assumption, shared by most of the literature, that arguing and 
bargaining can be differentiated on the basis of modal and structural differences. This is because 
bargaining, exactly like arguing, relies on mechanisms of material, ethical and consistency 
validation, and is characterized by a triadic structure in which claims are referred to an intelligible 
system of reference. Other attempts to differentiate arguing from bargaining have claimed that these 
two types of behaviour could be distinguished on the basis of “procedural differences”: while 
arguing is a “process […] characterized by an exchange of arguments that is based on a common 
frame of reference that is adjusted in the course of communication”, bargaining is described as a 
“sequential” type of communication, in which there are no “exchange of arguments” (Ulbert and 
Risse, 2005, 353). If, however, one accepts that bargaining is a speech act which relies on 
mechanisms of validation and that can be validated by appealing to a mutually accepted external 
authority, there is no reason why actors engaging in bargaining cannot exchange arguments “based 
on a common frame of reference that is adjusted in the course of communication” (Ulbert and 
Risse, 2005, 353). Actors can endlessly debate about whether a certain deal is in their national 
interest, while – as in the case of the Athenians and the Melians – delegations can argue about what 
is the best course of action to ensure their own survival. It therefore seems that even the “procedural 
differences” between arguing and bargaining should be dismissed. 
Ulbert and Risse identified another possible way to distinguish between arguing and 
bargaining, focusing on “possible observable outcomes”: arguing was seen as a type of behaviour 
which would most likely result in “reasoned consensus” – in which participants would submit to the 
“better argument” – while bargaining was portrayed as an interaction often leading to a compromise 
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in which actors’ preferences remained unchanged (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). As said in the 
previous chapter, Saretzki criticized this way of separating arguing and bargaining by claiming that 
“there is no guarantee that processes of arguing or bargaining will lead to a specific outcome that 
we can previously determine” (Saretzki, 2009, 166). That, however, is not the only issue with this 
type of distinction, which is also invalidated by the “problem of the better argument”. 
Tine Hanrieder is one of the authors that highlighted the contradictions behind the assumption 
of a “better argument” on which arguing statements supposedly rely. She claims that to admit the 
existence of a “better argument”, and to represent arguing’s persuasive process as a gradual 
“approximation of truth” leads one to conceive of a negotiating debate no longer as an “open-ended 
process”, but as a process leading to the internalization of pre-established norms (Hanrieder, 2011, 
392). In fact, if there already is a “better argument”, persuasive arguing would lead participants to 
accept it in an almost deterministic way. She also points out how “the solution to base claims about 
the better argument on the seemingly neutral indicator of universality at best camouflages […] 
moral standpoints” (Hanrieder, 2011, 403), since researchers who analyse international negotiations 
are often in danger of identifying “the better argument” on the basis of their own beliefs (Hanrieder, 
2011, 402-403). The concept of the better argument is not only problematic because “genuine 
persuasion and universal truth are neither intelligible nor observable” (Hanrieder, 2011, 404). 
Instead of elaborating definitions of arguing relying on the concept of “the better argument”, which 
is “both methodologically and ontologically tenuous” and an instrument often used “to reify 
particular norms as universal, instead of opening space for deliberation” (Hanrieder, 2011, 408), 
Hanrieder advocates a “pragmatic abstention” from normative claims and from any attempt to 
identify universal truth (Hanrieder, 2011, 409-410). To sum up, looking for moments where forum 
participants reached mutual consensus on the basis of the “better argument” is a problematic 
method of investigation, based on questionable assumptions, which could lead to the equation of the 
researcher’s personal beliefs with an abstract and absolute good. Thus, distinguishing between 
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arguing and bargaining on the basis of observable outcomes seems unfeasible as well, especially 
once all other types of distinction have been discarded. 
This dissertation argues that both arguing and bargaining are characterized by mechanisms of 
material, ethical and consistency validation, and that they are both characterized by a triadic 
structure and a reflexive procedure. Furthermore, it argues that it is impossible to distinguish 
between these two types of behaviour on the basis of observable outcomes, because this would 
create a viciously circular reasoning based on the existence of “a better argument”. At this point, it 
is not difficult to understand why some authors have written that “[a]rguing, understood as reason-
giving, is all-pervasive in international politics” (Risse and Klein, 2010, 708). The present 
distinction between arguing and bargaining is based on the presence or absence of reasoning, 
understood as the presence or absence of mechanisms of material and/or ethical and/or consistency 
validations; however, both these types of statement rely on material, ethical and consistency 
validities. The many difficulties encountered while trying to separate arguing from bargaining, then, 
originate in a problematic distinction between the two types of statement, and a new theoretical 
framework must be built, providing new, more effective definitions of the types of statement which 
can be made during international forums. This theoretical framework, however, has to circumvent 
the ontological dispute between rationalism and constructivism, in order to avoid excessive 
abstraction, and its procedure of categorization of different types of forum statements has to be 
based on empirically detectable features of international forums, in order to allow valid and reliable 
hypothesis testing. 
 
2.3: Outflanking the ontological debate 
 
The previous chapter has stressed how the debate revolving around rationalism and constructivism 
has reached a point in which the two approaches have integrated elements of the other. On the one 
hand, both rationalists and constructivists claim that an actor is constrained by the forum’s 
95 
 
structural features and by the existing international norms constituting the context in which actors 
negotiate; on the other, both claim that a subject chooses what kind of interaction to seek by 
rationally assessing the context. The only difference between the two approaches is the following: 
rationalism claims that what drives such rational assessment of the forum’s context and the 
consequent choice of which statement to make is the question “Which type of statement is most 
advantageous to me?”; constructivists, instead, argue that this process of analysis and choice is 
driven by the question “Which type of statement is most appropriate in this situation?”. 
This chapter does not try to intervene in the rationalist/constructivist debate, nor does it 
attempt to reconcile the two; its objective, in fact, is not to assess whether the “logic of 
consequence” and the “logic of appropriateness” is preeminent. The reason for circumventing the 
ontological debate is the following: even if, within a forum, interacting subjects are always driven 
by a clear, unchanging type of logic while choosing which kind of interaction to seek, defined as X, 
the only possible conclusion is that, currently, the discipline has not yet been able to find it. X is 
similar to what Kant would describe as a noumenon, an object impossible to be clearly identified 
and described. 
Leaving the noumenon X unidentified, however, is not excessively detrimental to the study of 
social interactions empirically occurring in international negotiations. In fact, it has already been 
shown how the differences between “sophisticated rational choice” or “moderate social 
constructivism” are nowadays minimal, and that the most recent explanations provided by the two 
conflicting theoretical strains have presented many approximations to X – all of them describing 
very similar processes. Thus, if X still cannot be clearly identified, research could start from the 
assumption that the current literature has been able to provide a certain approximation to X – in 
mathematical language, ┌X┘. While it is impossible to know with absolute certainty whether 
subjects are pre-eminently driven by strategic thinking or by the logic of appropriateness, one can 
assume that both rational considerations and the structural context of the forum are fundamental in 
making those choices, and that, somewhere between the thin line separating constructivism and 
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rationalism, reality stands. To sum up, rather than attempting to identify a clear answer to the 
rationalist-constructivist debate, this research simply states that participants in a forum choose 
which interaction to seek by taking their social context into account, and that they analyse that 
context through rational calculations. 
 
2.4: Defining “intentions” 
 
This research intends to build a plausible and empirically verifiable model of social interactions 
within international forums. In order to do so, it chooses to follow a methodologically “risk-averse 
strategy” (Jackson, 2016, 101). This means that it has to rely on variables that, if not completely 
observable, are at least detectable, even if only indirectly. A revisited version of Jennifer Mitzen’s 
theory of collective intention might provide such conceptual foundations. The next sections 
examine the concept of “intention”, and discuss the existence of “collective intentions”; 
furthermore, they examine Jennifer Mitzen’s work, which applied the concept of collective 
intention to the study of international forums, and they try to address some theoretical questions that 
her research left unanswered. 
According to most of the literature, intentions are what drives a subject towards the 
achievement of a desired future (Anscombe, 2016, 61). They, however, are not mere inclinations 
and hopes for a particular future, but clear commitments that, in order to be fulfilled, need constant 
and regular application through time, and that are therefore likely to influence subjects’ behaviour 
(Anscombe, 2016, 120-124 and 135; Mitzen, 2013, 35-36).8 Once an intention is formed, it resists 
reconsideration, and it retains a certain inertia: it is revocable given new information or new 
 
8 This  thesis  does  not  aim  to  provide  a  detailed  and  in‐depth  exploration  of  the  concept  of  intention  and  its 
implications. A more articulate study of the topic can be found  in the works of Elizabeth Anscombe (2016), Jennifer 




circumstances, but in case things do not change, it does remain the “default option” of an individual 
(Bratman, 1999, 16-17).9 
Intentions can be very different: one can have the intention of opening a window to get some 
fresh air, or one can have the intention of forming a family. The first intention is a quite simple one, 
while the second implies many other sub-intentions building towards it (marrying or finding a 
companion, having children, raising them etc.); it is therefore necessary to make a distinction 
between simple intentions and plans. Michael Bratman effectively highlights these differences, 
writing that “Intentions are the building blocks of larger plans”, and that: “Plans [...] are intentions 
writ large [that] share the properties of intentions recently noted: they resist reconsideration, and in 
that sense have inertia; they are conduct controllers [...]; and they provide crucial inputs for further 
practical reasoning and planning” (Bratman, 1999, 32). 
By following this reasoning, it is possible to say that plans are particularly “complex 
intentions” (Bratman, 2003, 24), that do not need to be very specific, but can instead be quite 
general, such as, for instance, planning to pursue an academic career or raise a family (Bratman, 
1999, 30)10. Complex intentions (or plans)11 have, however, other characteristics that add further 
 
9 Before  examining  the  concept  of  intention  in  detail,  it  is  necessarily  to  briefly  explain  the  difference  between 












dual meaning. On  the one hand, a plan  is a mental  state “involving an appropriate  sort of commitment  to action” 
(Bratman, 2003, 19), while on the other it can be defined as a set of detailed instructions divided into sequential steps, 
with  the  final goal of achieving something  (Allen, 2003, 72). This research does not  intend  to examine  in detail  the 
philosophical dispute revolving around the definition of plans; a very interesting analysis of it can be found in the work 
of Martha Pollack  (2003).  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  term  “plan”  can  indicate either a mental  state or a  set of 
detailed  instructions, and only the concept of “plan as a mental state”  is useful for the development of this thesis’s 
theoretical  framework. Since  intentions are  something  that  lead actors  to commit  themselves  to constant effort  in 
order to achieve a desired output, and plans as mental states imply commitment to an action composed by different 
intentions, this thesis argues that plans can be considered as a complex intention composed of many sub‐intentions. 
This conclusion  is supported by the  fact that plans retain many of the properties attributed to  intentions  (Bratman, 
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differences between them and simple intentions. First, plans are partial (Bratman, 2003, 19): people 
do not plan every single action that leads to their fulfilment; they instead follow certain main 
guidelines, and organize in-detail behaviour step by step, adjusting their main plan to the 
circumstances and the situation. Secondly, plans have a hierarchical structure, in which general 
intentions are considered to be the priority, and more specific ones spread from them (Bratman, 
1999, 29). If, for instance, a subject A has the general intention of going to watch a movie, he/she 
also has to decide which cinema to go to. If A finds out that the nearest cinema is closed, it does not 
mean that A’s intention of watching a movie is nullified: A is simply going to go to another cinema. 
Complex intentions encounter certain consistency constraints (Bratman, 2003, 19). First, they 
have to be “internally consistent”: one cannot plan to stay home all day and to go to the cinema at 
the same time. Second, they require “means-end coherence” – namely, plans need to be filled out 
with minor plans concerning their practical implementation. Therefore, if A plans to go to the 
cinema, he/she has to think about how to arrive there and take preliminary actions and planning in 
order to fulfil that intention (for instance, checking the bus schedule). A fully-formed and coherent 
plan does not lead to inconsistent behaviour and internal conflict.  
As previously discussed, the commitment produced by an intention has a dual nature: on the 
one hand, there is a volitional characteristic of commitment: an intention is a pro-attitude towards a 
certain action, similarly to a normal desire; however, in contrast to a simple desire, an intention is a 
conduct-controlling pro-attitude (Anscombe, 2016, 120-124; Bratman, 1999, 15-16). There are 
different theories aiming to understand how an intention exactly controls the behaviour, but this 
work does not mean to answer these questions, and it adopts the probabilistic account of Jennifer 
Mitzen. For her an intention does not influence behaviour in a deterministic way, but in a 
probabilistic one: given the existence of an intention, a person will probably act in order to fulfill it, 
 






but he/she may also not do so (Mitzen, 2013, 36). This approach towards the intention’s ability of 
influencing behavior takes into account what Richard Holton calls “the weakness of will” – namely, 
people’s inability to “act on their own intentions” (Holton, 1999, 241).12 
This probabilistic account can be better explained by taking once again the example of a 
subject A that has the intention of pursuing an academic career. The intention of becoming a 
professor does not necessary mean that A will be able to become one: A might be too lazy, not good 
enough or not sufficiently committed; he/she might study too little, or his/her networking skills 
might be ineffective and not sufficiently developed. The only thing that the intention13 implies is 
that, since A intends to be a professor in the future, A will probably consistently work in order to 
become one. 
 
2.5: Collective intentions 
 
While examining the concept of intention, John Searle argued that  
 
It seems obvious that there really is collective intentional behaviour as 
distinct from individual behaviour. You can see this by watching a football 
team executing a pass play or hear it by listening to an orchestra. Better still, 
you can experience it by actually engaging in some group activity in which 
your own actions are a part of a group action (Searle, 2003, 401). 
 
This led researchers to envision theories according to which it was not possible to examine 
collective intentional behaviour with the concepts used to analyse individual behaviour, because the 







singular intentions” (Searle, 2003, 402). Many researchers started therefore to formulate the 
following question: can intentions be collective? This question can only be addressed by first 
answering a previous one: is an intention something that only lingers in individuals’ minds? If the 
answer to the latter is “yes”, the existence of a collective intention would presuppose the existence 
of a collective mind, and that is problematic (Bratman, 1993, 99; Searle, 1993, 406; Gilbert, 2006, 
4-5).14 David Velleman tries to solve this problem by claiming that intentions can dwell in other 
places other than the mind. His argument can be explained by imagining the following situation: a 
subject A has the intention of going for a walk, and he/she decides to send the following text 
message to a friend: “I am going for a walk right now”. In this situation, the message A sent to 
his/her friend becomes a “token intention”: an empirical manifestation, external to A’s mind, in 
which A’s intention resides: 
 
If I can commit myself to a course of action by speaking or writing, then 
there would seem to be a sense in which I am thereby making an oral or 
written decision; and if I can make a decision by speaking or writing, then 
there would seem to be a sense in which I can frame an oral or written 
intention (Velleman, 1997, 37). 
 
Not only that: according to Velleman “lethargy may prevent his [i.e., subject A] initial 
motives from setting his legs in motion, but it won’t prevent them from setting his mouth in motion 
so as to bring additional motives to bear on his leg” (Velleman, 1997, 40). Thus, besides 
introducing the concept of “token intention” and contesting the assumption according to which 
intentions can only be present in people’s minds, he also argues that, when an intention is uttered or 
written down, the commitment to fulfil that intention is reinforced. To sum up, a verbal or written 





Starting from this reasoning, it is possible to envision a situation where an intention is 
expressed through an utterance or writing, and that such an oral or written declaration is shared by 
more than an individual. However, is this enough to talk about a “collective” intention? The fact 
that an oral or written declaration is shared by more than one subject indicates only that some 
people have the same individual intention – which does not necessarily imply that the intention is 
collectively held. In this case, perhaps, it is better to talk about a “shared” intention, rather than a 
collective one. In Searle’s words: 
 
The mere presence of I-intentions to achieve a goal that happens to be 
believed to be the same goal as that of other members of a group does not 
entail the presence of an intention to cooperate to achieve that goal. One can 
have a goal in the knowledge that others also have the same goal, and one 
can have beliefs and even mutual beliefs about the goal that is shared by the 
members of a group, without there being necessary any cooperation among 
the members or any intention to cooperate among the members (Searle, 
2003, 406). 
 
 For an intention to be collective, then, other conditions must be fulfilled. One of these is 
outlined by Margaret Gilbert, who argues that collective intentions are constituted when “each 
person expresses a form of […] commitment such that […] only when everyone has done 
[something] similarly is anyone committed” (Gilbert, 1990, 7). In other words, a necessary 
condition for a collective intention to exist is that of a joint commitment,15 based on the affirmation 
“I’m willing if you’re willing” (Velleman, 1997, 39). 
 




The second necessary condition for collective intention to take place is also identified by 
Gilbert (1990), and it is the existence of a plural subject. Her concept is very effectively described 
by Jennifer Mitzen, one of the authors who has examined in greater detail the characteristics of 
collective intentions and who has applied this concept to the field of International Relations. 
According to her: 
 
The fact that [forum] participants commit explicitly to do something 
together [...] for the purpose of executing the intention, takes us out of the 
realm of strictly individual intentions. As such [...] we could say that these 
are intentions by a plural subject. [...] A plural subject [...] is separate from 
the actors who create it and cannot be reduced or disaggregated to their 
preferences and/or their interactions. At the same time, it does not subsume 
the intentionality of the individual actors (Mitzen, 2013, 37). 
 
She compares the concept of a collective intention with the effort of five basketball team 
players to win a match. The players are individual actors, while the team is a plural subject; single 
players make individual choices, but all of them are bound by the same intention, which is 
collectively shared and which needs a concerted action of all five players to be fulfilled: to win the 
game (Mitzen, 2013, 6). The intention of a plural subject has three characteristics (Mitzen, 2013, 
39): 
 
 Every participant expresses the same shared intention; 
 Since the intention is collective and it needs the concerted action of 
every group member to be fulfilled, each subject feels committed to 
contribute towards its realization; 
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 A subject is responsible towards others only as far as fulfilment of 
the collective intention is concerned. 
 
To sum up, these authors have identified three main characteristics for an intention to be 
collective. First, the intention has to reside outside the subjects’ mind – it has therefore to be uttered 
or written down, and to become a “token intention”. Second, such a “token intention” has to be 
shared by a group of individuals, bound by each other to the statement: “I am willing if you are 
willing”. Third, this group of individuals has to comprise a “plural subject”, which cannot be 
reduced to the individuals who are part of it. 
 
2.6: Collective and particularistic intentions in international forums 
 
A forum is, for Mitzen, a public debate in which different actors aim to cooperate in order to realize 
a common goal (Mitzen, 2013, 50). Such a common goal is what Mitzen calls the collective 
intention of the forum, and it has three fundamental characteristics (Mitzen, 2013, 39): 
 
 It is shared by all participants in the forum; 
 It can only be fulfilled if enough actors work together; 
 It holds every single actor responsible towards other forum 





It is possible to envision how, in international relations, the forum itself can be considered the plural 
subject, held together by a collective intention that makes all participating actors no longer separate 
subjects, but members of a collective body.16 
Starting from this definition of “collective intention”, Mitzen begins to analyze the nature and 
dynamics of international forums. In Mitzen’s theoretical model, interacting subjects in a forum are 
not seen as just a group of single units in the same arena: when they gather in an assembly 
specifically held in order to fulfill a certain mandate, they become part of a plural subject, a net of 
interdependent actors that agree on a coordinated strategy in order to achieve a common objective. 
Furthermore, once the common objective is established, “the individual intentionality that each 
person has is derived from the collective intentionality that they share” (Mitzen, 2013, 5). What she 
tries to present is a “visible hand” approach to global governance, in which international policies are 
the product of the collective action of units focused on promoting not just their own singular 
preferences, but – above all – the interest of the group they constitute (Mitzen, 2013, 13-18).  
Mitzen explains her theory in detail in her work Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century 
Origins of Global Governance. In this book, she applies her theory to the European Concert system, 
and tries to explain the dynamics and the outputs of this diplomatic framework with the existence of 
a collective intention amongst states and of a forum system of public discussion aiming to fulfill 
that intention. More specifically, she studies how the European Concert acted during the Greek 
crises of the 1820s (Mitzen, 2013, 105; 125-126). Her main point can be summarized as follows: 
the European Concert represents a clear example of a forum where different actors shared a 
collective intention: to avoid or at least bracket conflict in Europe (Mitzen, 2013, 86-102). 
 
16 When  examining  how  states  participating  to  an  international  forum  constitute  a  plural  subject,  one  needs  to 
consider that there are two levels of aggregation involved. First, the aggregation in which individuals working for the 
state merge into the state itself, considered in this thesis both as a corporate actor and as a person driven by unitary 
preferences.  Second,  the aggregation  in which  these  corporate actors  constitute  the  collective body of  the  forum. 
These  two  types of aggregation are  considered  to be different. One  the one hand,  the  state‐level aggregation  is a 







Furthermore, she claims that actors were able to solve the Greek crises in a relatively pacific way 
thanks to the existence of such a collective intention (Mitzen, 2013, 104-105; 120; 122; 129-177). A 
forum such as the one described by Mitzen is therefore portrayed as a clear example of “visible 
hand” in global governance (Mitzen, 2013, 50). 
In this impressive work, Mitzen elaborates a refined and coherent theory that examines the 
way actors take decisions within a forum, without trying to assess whether the rationalist or the 
constructivist logics are preeminent in the process of intention-formation. For this reason, Mitzen’s 
concept of collective intention is a good foundation on which to build a study of international 
forums’ social interactions and, at the same time, to circumvent the constructivist/rationalist debate. 
Indeed, without attempting to map the rationalities of negotiating authors, it would be sufficient to 
say that all of them are driven by intentions, and that they gather in an international forum because 
they all share a collective intention – which is the forum’s mandate – that requires the cooperation 
of all forum participants in order to be fulfilled. However, there are, in her work, some theoretical 
problems and unanswered questions, that immediately reveal themselves when the case study that 
Mitzen chose in order to apply her hypothesis is examined in detail.  
The main problem is the following: Mitzen argues that subjects interact within a forum driven 
by their shared collective intention. However, while she portrays and tracks the European Concert 
negotiation processes during the Greek crises, she cannot help showing how actors negotiated and 
debated by mostly defending their selfish interests and what they perceived as their national security 
(Mitzen, 2013, 111-114; 117-119; 125-126), often neglecting the collective intention of maintaining 
European peace and instead using it as a mere rhetorical façade that hid their more selfish and 
prosaic objectives (Mitzen,2013, 109).17 Why, if actors’ selfish preferences in a forum are derived 
from the collective intention (Mitzen, 2013, 5), do we encounter so many obstacles in the collective 
 




action’s fulfillment? Does this mean that actors have selfish, particularistic intentions18 that do not 
derive from the collective one, but that instead are parallel to it and that often conflict with the 
forum’s mandate? In any case, despite the existence of some open questions, Mitzen’s concept of 
“intention” is an original and theoretically stimulating attempt to build a theory of international 
negotiations and, at the same time, offers the conceptual possibility of avoiding the 
rationalist/constructivist ontological debate. For these reasons, this research starts from Mitzen’s 
theory and tries to revise it in order to address its problematic features. 
As previously explained, Mitzen identifies a plural subject as something similar to a 
basketball team, and a collective intention with the intention, shared by all team players, of winning 
the match. However, this may not be the whole story: each player, together with this collective 
intention, may have many other particularistic ones. For instance, player A may not like the coach, 
and it may be in A’s interest to lose the game and try to get the coach sacked; player B may be 
against player A, and therefore decide not to pass the ball to A, even if this hampers the chances of 
winning; player C may be too focused on achieving personal “glory” on the court, and therefore 
overlook the “big picture” in order to try to score some spectacular points, and so on. Only if 
players decide to prioritize the collective intention over their particularistic ones can the game be 
won and there be a chance of accomplishing the goal of the whole team.19 It is therefore necessary 
to envision particularistic intentions that coexist with the collective one, and that sometimes conflict 
with it: each player has different intentions, but they all have a collective one in common. This 
 
18 In Mitzen’s work,  it  is clearly specified how the existence of a collective agency “does not subsume the agency of 
individual participants”,  since  “it  is  a  larger,  ‘macro’ purposiveness  that does not necessarily  coalesce  into unitary 
actorhood” (Mitzen, 2013, 5). But while her work accepts the existence of particularistic  intentions, the relationship 








pursuing  individualist  goals within  the  plural  subject  is  vulnerable  to  criticism,  it  is  also  true  that  such  pursuit  of 




interpretation would then suggest that particularistic intentions are not “filtered through” the 
collective one (Mitzen, 2013, 57), but coexist with it; instead of a “vertical”, hierarchical 
relationship between collective and particularistic intentions, therefore, this perspective would 
assume a horizontal dualism between them. As far as the context of the European Concert is 
concerned, Mitzen focuses too much on the group identity, describing states as melting into a 
unique body. Instead, this alternative conceptualization of her theory treats the group participants as 
individual actors, completely independent of one another, that are however bounded by a common 
intention and by a forum in which certain norms and agreements have been established. This does 
not mean that the particularistic intentions of individual actors disappear or always become 
subordinate to the collective intention, but that they simply exist simultaneously with a collective 
one. 
If the assumption of a horizontal coexistence of collective and particularistic intentions is 
accepted, then the fact that on certain occasions actors taking part in the European Concert acted by 
pursuing their own selfish goals is no longer contradictory. Simply, those forum participants were, 
in that moment, pursuing their particularistic intentions, while still sharing the collective intention 
of bracketing conflict in Europe with all other forum participants. Furthermore, while it is true that 
the pursuit of particularistic intentions might somehow clash with the realization of the collective 
intention, this does not constitute a theoretical paradox. Indeed, both the collective and the 
particularistic intentions have to be considered “complex” ones, long-term plans. Complex plans 
can coexist and be pursued at the same time, despite a certain degree of tension. For instance, a state 
A might have the intention of keeping peace in Europe and, at the same time, to increase its 
presence in the Mediterranean. These two efforts might create tension, but the two plans are not 




A, which  is  aiming  at  bracketing  conflict  in  Europe  and  increase  its  presence  in  the Mediterranean,  pursuing  an 
academic  career  and  raise  a  family  are  not  incompatible  plans,  and  they  can  be  pursued  at  the  same  time.  Yet, 
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2.7: Intentions as detectable unobservables 
 












Figure 3: Particularistic and collective intentions 
 
A, B, C and D are forum actors that are driven by some particularistic intentions. While some 
intentions might be shared by two or three forum participants at the same time, only the intentions 
shared by all four can be considered the collective intentions at the base of the forum. 21 
Furthermore, in the course of negotiations, each actor can pursue both the collective intention and 
any of their particularistic ones. Both collective and particularistic intentions have to be considered 
unobservable objects within international forums: on the one hand, they indicate something within 
actors’ minds and influence subjects’ behaviour; on the other, they may also describe oral or written 
 
possible  tension between  the  two purposes might  emerge:  for  instance, one might have  to  live  apart  from one’s 
partner because  it  is the only possibility of  finding a  job  in academia; or having a child might represent an obstacle 
(although  not  an  insurmountable  one)  to  the  planning  of  six‐months’  fieldwork  on  another  continent.  It  is  then 
possible  to conclude  that a subject can pursue more  than one complex plan – or complex  intention – at  the same 
time, and that possible tensions between the different pursued plans might emerge. 
21 As  previously  said,  the  fact  that  the  intention  is  shared  by  all  forum  participants  is  only  one  of  the  many 















commitments to follow a certain path. There are some features, however, that make “intentions” – 
or at least some intentions – empirically detectable observables. 
As it has been previously said, earlier theories of social interactions in forums regarded 
subjects’ “true dispositions” as the main feature to consider in order to distinguish and categorize 
different types of forum statements. For instance, delegates engaging in arguing needed to have a 
persuasion-oriented, truth-seeking and open-minded disposition (Risse, 2000, 10-12), despite power 
hierarchies between the forum participants (Risse, 2000, 7). In order to assess actors’ true 
dispositions, however, researchers needed to know their attitudes, feelings, believes, the way they 
reasoned. One can see how hard it is to identify empirical phenomena that allow indirect detection 
of empathy, truthfulness and openness, and it is not surprising that many of the attempts to do so led 
to problematic conclusions (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, 40; Saretzki, 2009, 174). 
Intentions, on the other hand, are defined in the present study as conduct-controlling pro-
attitudes towards a desired outcome in the future (Mitzen, 2013, 34-36). Differently than actors’ 
true dispositions, intentions are not necessarily something that lives only within the actors’ minds, 
since, when an intention is expressed (verbally or in a written form), a “token intention”, existing 
outside someone’s mind, is generated (Velleman, 1997, 37). Furthermore, while actors’ dispositions 
are only the “frame of mind” with which a certain action is carried on, the intentions of a subject are 
inextricably connected with that same subjects’ actions (Anscombe, 2016, 81-86). Since intentions 
are conduct-controlling pro-attitudes that aim at a certain desired – and achievable (Anscombe, 
2016, 120-121) – future outcome, they translate into empirical acts that contribute to define a 
subject’s behaviour. Since intentions translate into, and are inextricably connected with, actions that 
take place in the empirical world, it is possible to say that by looking at the actions made by 
subjects we can indirectly detect the intentions that they have; intentions are therefore detectable.22 
 






During a forum, for instance, the utterance of something during an official speech can be considered 
a change in the behaviour of an actor, conditioned by the existence of a certain intention. 
An example can better show the difference between intentions and dispositions, and explain 
why, according to this dissertation, the former are detectable unobservables and the latter 
undetectable ones. A forum F is driven by the collective intention X. In such a context, delegate A, 
who is committed to the collective intention like all other forum participants, utters the following 
sentence S: “We must do X because it is morally right to do so”. In this example, A’s intention X 
leads him/her to utter the sentence S.23 This means that the intention X leads A to say S during the 
forum, and that the intention X is, therefore, inextricably connected with the action S, in a similar 
way than the intention of going to the cinema is connected with the action of buying a but ticket that 
will drive towards the nearest movie theatre. An external observer could examine A’s behaviour in 
the empirical world and, by looking at S, could indirectly detect A’s intention X. 
But a person A, committed to the collective intention X, and uttering the sentence S, could do 
that while having different dispositions. A might say: “We must do X because it is morally right to 
do so” while having a truth-seeking, open-minded, persuasion-oriented disposition. In this case, A 
sincerely thinks that X is the right thing to do, and is genuinely trying to persuade other forum 
participants. But A might also say S while having a self-focused, strategic disposition. In this case, 
A might be trying to use the concept of morality as a rhetorical instrument by which to force other 
participants to do X. An external observer looking at S might be able to detect A’s intentions 
because they directly translate in A’s behaviour; but he/she will not be able to detect the disposition 
with which A is doing S. 
The conclusion that can be drawn by this example is that intentions are connected to subjects’ 
empirical actions in a way that dispositions are not, and that therefore the former should be 
considered empirically detectable objects, while the latter are empirically undetectable ones. This 
 




conclusion, however, leads to another question: how to detect subjects’ intentions while looking at 
real-world international forums? 
In his book The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, Patrick Jackson describes how 
many efforts that researchers have undertaken in order to solve the problem of unobservables have 
relied on abductive inference. In contrast to inductive inference (which examines particular cases in 
order to elaborate a general theory) and deductive inference (which starts from a general theory and 
attempts to explain particular cases), abductive inference “is a way of reasoning from some 
puzzling set of observations to a likely explanation of those observations” (Jackson, 2016, 94). On a 
first look, one might think that this description of abductive inference is very similar to the process 
of inductive inference, since the latter attempts to explain general phenomena by starting from 
particular observations as well. However, the difference between the two is revealed when Jackson 
highlights how the goal of abductive inference is to deliver “likely explanations”. While both 
deductive and inductive inferences aim at establishing reliable conclusions, abductive inference 
attempts to present plausible conjectures that explain a phenomenon, in absence of clear enough 
evidence able to support or to even test such explanation. A similar account of abductive inference 
is given by Klaus Krippendorff, who defined it as a method proceeding “across logically distinct 
domains, from particulars of one kind to particulars of another kind […]. Of course, one can make 
such inferences only with a certain probability […]” (Krippendorff, 2013, 42). 
Jackson explains how abductive inference can be extremely useful in integrating detectable 
unobservables within a theory (or even observables that have yet not been observed), by describing 
the research process that led towards the discovery of Neptune: 
 
The orbits of the planets were calculated, and some discrepancies in the 
orbit of Uranus were observed; astronomers seeking to explain those 
discrepancies hypothesized the existence of a planet beyond Uranus, and 
calculated its mass and orbit based on Newton’s laws of motion; telescopes 
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trained on the appropriate area of the sky detected a new planet – 
subsequently named Neptune – right where it was supposed to be (Jackson, 
2016, 94). 
 
Although Neptune was not a detectable unobservable, but rather a not yet discovered observable, 
the principle is the same: astronomers detected empirical evidence indicating that something not yet 
observed existed and, through abductive inference, elaborated a theory trying to explain it. The 
result was the “conceptualization” of Neptune before that planet was discovered. 
However, in order to claim that expressed intentions are detectable unobservables that 
influence the dynamics of international forums, it is first necessary to explain how these intentions 
are translated into the empirical realm. To do that, one needs to examine international forums and 
analyse their structural characteristics. 
 
2.8: Defining international forums 
 
As previously said, an international forum can be seen as a gathering of states’ representatives 
discussing an issue that interests them all. States may undertake negotiations for different reasons: 
for instance, to react to a recent crisis, to face a common threat or to seize an opportunity (Stein, 
1989, 243). Whatever the reason, states gather in negotiations because they want to cooperate in 
order to solve a problem. This thesis distinguishes between three different stages most international 
negotiations go through: pre-negotiations, negotiations and post-negotiations. Such a distinction has 
already been made by other authors: Olav Stokke and Davor Vidas, for instance, claim that every 
negotiation must go through the phases of initiative, negotiation and adoption (Stokke and Vidas, 







different dynamics and procedures and consequently, according to many authors, must be studied as 
separate and distinct processes (Stein, 1989, 248-249; Odell, 2010, 623). 
The pre-negotiation is the moment where actors gather in order to discuss the possibility of 
starting a negotiation; the only necessary condition for a pre-negotiation to take place is that some 
actors must consider it advantageous to cooperate (Stein, 1989, 243). During pre-negotiations, 
actors decide which commitments they would consider taking in an effective negotiation, when and 
where negotiations would take place, which legal status an eventual agreement would retain, which 
actors may participate, and which transitory mechanisms could be adopted in order to facilitate 
short-term agreements (Zartman, 1989, 8-14). Aside from these “administrative” matters, pre-
negotiations are also fundamental in assessing the goodwill and reliability of certain actors, the 
support that a certain policy would obtain within public opinion, and the possibility of building 
common definitions or coalitions of interests in order to facilitate the negotiating process (Stein, 
1989, 252-261). Pre-negotiations thus do not aim to solve an issue, but instead to establish the rules 
and the principles that will regulate the dynamics of the negotiation (Stein, 1989, 252). This phase 
ends when actors agree on the main guidelines that will determine future negotiations, or when they 
agree on the impossibility of cooperating over a certain matter (Zartman, 1989, 2-4). 
While pre-negotiations take place first, post-negotiations happen last. This negotiation stage 
includes all meetings following the stipulation, ratification and implementation of an agreement, a 
treaty or a protocol. In this phase, actors monitor the development of their common strategy, test the 
effectiveness of the governance mechanisms or the level of implementation of agreed measures, 
discuss controversies between parties, deal with particular and practical questions, and admonish 
(and, sometimes, punish) transgressors. Post-negotiations are focused on the administration of the 
international regime born from the negotiation process, and they follow dynamics that are different 
from pre-negotiations and negotiations (Odell, 2010, 623). 
Finally, the negotiation stage happens in between the two previously described ones, and it is 
the moment where actors effectively gather in order to find a solution or a shared plan of action as 
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far as a particular issue is concerned. The present study focuses uniquely on the phase of 
negotiation and does not examine neither pre-negotiation nor post-negotiation stages. Thus, from 
now on, whenever using the word “forum”, it will refer to a gathering where state representatives 
publicly debate a common issue. This type of forum is not just a way to elaborate a shared strategy 
as far as a certain topic is concerned; it is also a means to legitimate and justify that policy in front 
of the whole international community – or at least, in front of a majority of it (Mitzen, 2005, 401). 
Although negotiations can differ in many possible ways, they have certain features in common that 
are analyzed in the following paragraphs. 
Katharina Coleman claims that a negotiation is based on two distinct components: the 
mandate and the output. The mandate establishes why the forum has been summoned, while the 
output determines the nature, the legal status and the institutional features of the conclusions 
resulting from the debate (Coleman, 2013, 168). Jennifer Mitzen says something very similar in her 
description of international negotiations: actors that share a collective intention link that 
commitment to a particular forum, where they elaborate and establish strategies and methods in 
order to fulfill it (Mitzen, 2013, 21). Mitzen’s definition of a negotiation forum, however, is more 
specific, since she argues that the negotiation must be held publicly, in front of all of the forum 
participants, and the same goes for the commitments taken (Mitzen, 2013, 50). In such a context, a 
subject may make claims that are focused on defending his/her own interests, but these claims will 
be articulated, within the forum, in the most rational, general and abstract way possible, in order to 
make that claim more likely to be accepted and recognized by other participating actors, creating 
what Mitzen calls “the forum effect” (Mitzen, 2005, 411). Together with the mandate and the 
outcome, then, one also has to consider the forum’s fundamental component of publicity. 
The very fact that negotiation forums take place after pre-negotiations have been held shows 
that there are some overarching norms and agreements that influence actors’ behaviour: 
negotiations do not take place in a void, but instead follow certain rules disciplining the debate; they 
are legitimized by already-existing treaties or statements; they may refer to an already existing 
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diplomatic framework; and outcomes are reached by following pre-determined decision-making 
procedures, which may extensively differ and influence actors’ behaviour (Johnston, 2001, 509-
510). Together with the components of mandate, output and publicity, then, the fundamental 
component of pre-established norms has to be taken into consideration. 
There is, however, another factor that is able to influence the dynamics of public negotiations, 
that in this research is defined as “incidental issues”. State representatives’ claims, statements and 
actions do not always refer to the forum’s mandate, and, during the negotiations, states raise other 
issues, often unrelated to the purpose of the forum. During negotiations actors may mention things 
that do not necessarily concern the forum’s mandate, and these incidental issues should be 
considered another factor that can influence the course of negotiations.  
An example of how the existence of “incidental issues” can influence the course of the forum 
is the following: the negotiations that led to the elaboration of the Kyoto Protocol were driven by 
the mandate to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to provide mechanisms of mitigation and 
adaptation in order to tackle the issue of climate change. During the debate, many developing 
countries argued that, given their social and economic conditions, it was unfair to expect from them 
the same effort in emissions reduction as the global North (Jamieson, 2014, 45). Their claims 
influenced the outputs of negotiations, and the Kyoto Protocol established mechanisms for reducing 
carbon emissions that provided a differentiated treatment for developing countries (Baron and 
Colombier, 2005, 153). On the other hand, the United States, during climate negotiations, often 
raised issues that were unrelated to the purpose of tackling climate change, and were instead related 
to its desire to protect industrial and corporate interests (Brenton, 1994, 170-171). Washington’s 
focus on economic interests other than the forum’s mandate of climate negotiations is exactly what 
led the country to consider the Kyoto Protocol a threat to its sovereignty and economic growth, and 
to reject the protocol decisively under the presidency of George W. Bush (Jamieson, 2014, 46-47). 
In this example, both developing countries and the United States raised issues that were not 
specifically related to the forum’s mandate (reducing the greenhouse gas emissions and tackling 
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climate change), and both of them were able to influence the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and the 
output they produced. 
 
2.9: Detecting intentions through “abductive conjectures” 
 














Figure 4: structure of international forums 
 
The scheme above shows how international negotiations are public, and that they are 
influenced by three factors: their mandate (which is the goal that forum participants need to realize), 
the presence of pre-established norms (disciplining the debate and the decision-making procedures) 
and the existence of incidental issues (unrelated to the mandate and raised by states during the 
negotiation process). Finally, it is possible to see how negotiations end up generating an output, 
which is always an attempt to realize the forum’s mandate, whether successful or unsuccessful. 
By starting from these considerations, it is possible to argue that the mandate of the forum is 
an empirical, observable object that allows researchers indirectly to detect the presence of the 
collective intention shared by all the participants in the negotiation. This conclusion is reinforced by 








common knowledge” (Mitzen, 2013, 44-46). The forum’s mandate is officially established during 
pre-negotiations, and it is often expressed in written form, which makes it “common knowledge” 
for all subjects participating in the debate and for the public witnessing it. While it is not possible to 
conclude with absolute certainty that the forum’s mandate is identical to the collective intention,25 it 
is possible to conjecture that without a collective intention there would not be a forum mandate, and 
that the forum’s mandate is the indirect, empirical consequence of that collective intention. 
Similarly, the “incidental issues” raised by forum participants that do not explicitly concern the 
forum’s mandate can be considered empirical phenomena indicating the presence of expressed 
particularistic intentions. 
Considering once again the example of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, one can argue that 
the collective intention of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and of tackling the negative effects of 
climate change was what led to the elaboration of the mandate of the Kyoto Protocol forums. On the 
other hand, issues raised by certain actors – such as the American desire to defend US sovereignty 
and industry, or the developing countries’ request for preferential treatment – can be considered the 
particularistic intentions of one country or of a group of countries within the forum. 
To sum up, collective and particularistic intentions must be considered, like “actors’ true 
dispositions”, unobservable objects of international negotiations. However, in contrast to the latter, 
both types of intention can be detected by the presence of empirically observable, structural features 
of international forums: the forum’s mandate, which indicates the existence of a collective 
intention, and the incidental issues raised during the negotiations, which reveal particularistic 
intentions, parallel to the collective one, amongst forum participants. 
 




forum  collective  intention. What  it  is  possible  to  do,  however,  is  to  formulate,  through  abductive  inference,  a 
conjecture stating that, since there is a clear forum mandate, it is plausible to conclude that every actor participating 
in  the  forum shares  the collective  intention of  fulfilling  the  forum mandate.  If  this conjecture  is accepted,  then  the 






2.10: An instrumentalist approach to the concept of intention 
 
Previous sections have analysed the structural characteristics of international negotiations, and 
claimed that the forum mandate can be considered as the empirical indicator that allows the 
researcher to detect the presence of a collective intention, while the incidental issues raised during 
the debate can be seen as evidence of the particularistic intentions of forum participants. These 
considerations originated from a process of abduction – namely, from the formulation of a plausible 
conjecture. Abductive processes, however, can only be used to elaborate conjectures aiming at 
explaining a particular phenomenon (Jackson, 2016, 95), and cannot be used in order to establish 
whether a conjecture is true or false (Chernoff, 2005, 82). Furthermore, the claim that collective and 
particularistic intentions are detectable unobservables is not yet supported by “a set of more or less 
well-defined data-collection and data-analysis procedures” (Jackson, 2016, 87), which could 
empirically verify the existence of intentions and their correlation with features of international 
forums. 
Because of this, it is impossible to claim that there currently are mechanisms ensuring 
“reliable detection” of intentions, and the claim that intentions are detectable objects is only 
provisional, a starting point from which researchers can try to gather additional evidence and 
strengthen their grasp on the studied phenomenon. The questions arising from the nature of 
abductive inference and from the realization that the concept of “intention” is, at the moment, an 
inference relying uniquely on abductive conjectures are, then, two: do intentions really exist? And is 
their existence important for the purpose of this research? Since there are not yet clear procedures 
through which to test whether intentions actually exist, we should be agnostic as to their existence. 
At the same time, the theoretical construct of intention can be useful in building a model able to 
categorize the different types of forum behaviour in a systematic, reliable and valid way, 
independently of the actual existence of intentions. In doing so, this thesis adopts an instrumentalist 
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approach.26  Explaining the characteristics of instrumentalist approaches is the objective of the 
remainder of this section. 
The process that led this paper to identify intentions as the base on which to start formulating 
its theory is similar to the one described by Fred Chernoff as the fundamental process of 
instrumentalist scientific investigation. Chernoff, in fact, argues that “observations about the world” 
show certain phenomena and behaviours that constitute the “pre-scientific ontology” of the 
researchers. Amongst these phenomena could be included the observable objects that, according to 
common sense, are deemed to be real (Chernoff, 2009, 372-373) – examples of these phenomena 
could be, as far as this research is concerned, the forum’s mandate and the incidental issues raised 
in the course of the negotiations. According to Chernoff, observation of these phenomena leads the 
researcher to elaborate a theory aiming at explaining them – a theory that bases its explanation on 
the existence of postulated “further entities” (Chernoff, 2009, 372-373). In a similar fashion, this 
paper attempts to use the concepts of collective and particularistic intentions to explain the 
existence of the forum’s mandate and of the forum’s incidental issues, and it provides a conceptual 
framework linking theoretical constructs with empirical phenomena. Chernoff continues by arguing 
that “these latter entities are knowable only by reference to the explanations and theories of which 
they form a part. These is no other way of judging which, if any, exist. For this reason the entities 
cannot be specified prior to theorizing” (Chernoff, 2009, 373). Again, Chernoff’s reasoning seems 




in  the  introduction  that  this  research  is  following  a  neopositivist,  phenomenalist  approach  limiting  knowledge  to 
features that can be empirically experienced and observed. The use of abductive conjectures, however, is considered 
to be “entirely compatible with the kind of philosophical‐ontological assumptions made by neopositivists”  (Jackson, 
2016,  88).  Indeed, by  adopting  an  instrumentalist  approach,  a  researcher  can use  abductively  inferred  theoretical 
constructs to explain empirical phenomena without having to necessarily claim that they do exist beyond doubt, and 
instead adopting an agnostic take on the matter. Starting from an agnostic position does not prevent researchers from 
assessing  the  existence  of  an  entity  (in  this  case,  of  intentions)  further,  thus  putting  “an  end  to  the  necessity  of 





define the concept of “intentions” originated from the need to find reliable constructs on which to 
build a theory able to detect and categorize empirical phenomena occurring in international forums.  
According to Daniel Hausman, the first principle of instrumentalism is that “the ultimate 
goals of science are and should be exclusively practical”, and that “scientific theories are tools that 
should serve these goals” (Hausman, 1998, 189). In other words, an instrumentalist approach 
considers useful those researches that have practical utility and that are able to control and predict 
empirical phenomena. Instrumentalism has often been challenged by scientific realists, according to 
whom “science aims to discover the truth about its subject […] as well as to assist human practices” 
(Hausman, 1998, 191), and therefore science’s cognitive goals – i.e., its attempts to “discover the 
truth about its subject” (Hausman, 1998, 187) – are as important as the production of practical and 
useful knowledge. 
An important advocate for scientific realism in International Relations is Colin Wight, who 
counters instrumentalist assumptions by arguing that the effort of “getting things right is a practical, 
a political, and an ethical imperative, and although achieving it may be impossible, or knowing 
when we have achieved is extremely difficult”, the effort should never be abandoned by researchers 
(Wight, 2007, 381). Thus, according to Wight, scientific realist researchers have to assume that the 
entities they postulated in their theories are real (Wight, 2007, 382), since “the object of the theory 
is attempting to grasp” has to exist “independent of the theory” (Wight, 2007, 384). In his article “A 
Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR”, Wight does not entirely reject instrumentalist methods of 
theory building: in fact, he argues that situations in which there is no or too little possibility of 
asserting the existence of a theoretical postulate, or in case such a theory is new and at the earliest 
stages of validation, instrumentalism could be the best way to proceed (Wight, 2007, 383). 
However, he points out that the decision to follow an instrumentalist path must go along with the 
awareness that further research is needed, in order to confirm or disprove the existence of the 
theoretical postulate at the base of the theory (Wight, 2007, 383).  
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The choice between an instrumentalist or a scientific realist (SR) approach plays an important 
role in defining the way one approaches unobservables in research. While, in fact, scientific realists 
argue that “the claims theories make, including the claims involving unobservables, are true or false 
and should be true” (Hausman, 1998, 191), instrumentalists “welcome theory, no matter how 
outrageous its theoretical postulates, provided that it has some practical payoff” (Hausman, 1998, 
190). This is because, for instrumentalists, theoretical constructs are abstractions that should be 
assessed only on their usefulness in building theories that allow a researcher to formulate reliable 
and valid conclusions (Jackson, 2004, 284), while “it is inappropriate to assess the truth or falsity of 
theoretical claims at all” (Hausman, 1998, 193). 
As explained by Chernoff, “scientific realists claim that if we accept a theory as the best 
available, then we must accept the entities postulated by it into our ontology” (Chernoff, 2009, 
388). If this research followed an SR approach, it would need to consider intentions as “real” 
objects in international life. Furthermore, from a scientific realist perspective, the fact that this 
research has adopted abductive inference and instrumentalist reasoning in order to postulate the 
existence of intentions is not a problem in itself; however, the research should clearly state that the 
instrumentalist conclusion reached is only provisional, and this study should be followed by 
research projects aiming at assessing the empirical existence of both particularistic and collective 
intentions. In other words: 
 
SR does not deny that instrumentalism may be an appropriate tactic to 
employ at certain moments […]. What SR argues is that […] 
[instrumentalist] explanations are incomplete and that to understand science, 
and hence practice better science fully, we need to incorporate them into a 




While scientific realism considers instrumentalist procedures to be useful only in the 
formulation of provisional and transitory explanations that in the future one must confirm or 
disprove, Chernoff argues that “the conventional element never ‘drops out’ as scientific progress 
advances” (Chernoff, 2009, 382), because there are theoretical conventions that simply cannot be 
proven, but which are, however, useful for the purpose of scientific investigation. He gives as an 
example the convention used in physics according to which measuring rods do not experience 
changes in their length while moved into space; although there is no possible way to prove such a 
claim, it has been a proposition allowing physics to progress and to produce reliable theories for 
over a century (Chernoff, 2009, 382). This dissertation supports Chernoff’s stance, and it therefore 
decides to treat the theoretical construct of intention “as if” it exists, while acknowledging that, in 
reality, it may not. It does so because it believes that the theoretical construct of intention can be 
very useful in building a model allowing researchers to categorize different types of statement made 
during a forum, and in doing so it adopts – unless and until the effective existence of intentions is 
confirmed by further studies – a position described by many authors as “agnosticism” (Chernoff, 
2009, 384; Hausman, 1998, 189).27 This choice is in accordance with the principles of constructive 
empiricism, according to which “the history of science is one of continual theoretical change and 
improvement” (Chernoff, 2009, 375): a process of investigation in which even the most recognized 
and commonly accepted theories should not be considered dogmas, but explanations that could 
always, in the future, be disproven (Chakravartty, 2007, 28-29). 
At last, it is possible to identify the whole set of premises that constitute the base of this 
research’s attempt to study social interactions occurring in international forums. In order to 
 
27 In  his  “Manifesto”  in  defence  of  scientific  realism, Wight  dismisses  the  agnostic  position  by  treating  it  as  an 
incoherent one. He argues that “much as in the theological domain, an agnostic who goes to church (tests posits for 
their reality)  is probably really a believer, while one who does not  is probably an atheist (does not bother to test).” 
(Wight,  2007,  394,  note  57).  Chernoff  counters  this  claim  by  highlighting  how  suspending  judgement  on  certain 
questions  is a constant feature both  in ordinary  life and  in scientific  investigation. He also stresses how researchers 
often need to suspend any type of  judgement about the existence or non‐existence of theoretical entities  in case of 
“inadequate  evidence”  or  “on matters  that  current  theories  […]  cannot  answer”  (Chernoff,  2009,  384).  Thus,  he 
concludes, “there  is simply no  reason  to accept  the assertion  that people cannot suspend  judgement on  important 




circumvent the ontological debate between constructivism and rationalism, and in order to base its 
theorizing on reliable foundations, this chapter has identified in collective and particularistic 
intentions the detectable observables indirectly generating the forum’s mandate and the forum’s 
incidental issues raised by actors during negotiations. Furthermore, this section has highlighted how 
the reasoning that let to conceive intentions as the chosen conceptual lens through which to examine 
international forums has been an instrumentalist one. Having established these first, fundamental 
points, it is necessary to look in greater depth at the definitions of arguing and bargaining 
interactions that the literature has hitherto provided, with a focus on the differences between them. 
 
2.11: New definitions of arguing and bargaining 
 
This chapter has outlined how previous attempts to elaborate theoretical models aiming at 
distinguishing arguing from bargaining types of behaviour in international forums considered 
arguing a type of interaction relying on ethical and material mechanisms of validation, while 
bargaining interactions were considered as types of statement relying exclusively on the credibility 
of the speaker. While reviewing the existing literature, this chapter has also pointed out that arguing 
is generally considered to be characterized by a triadic structure, because the interlocutors appeal to 
an external authority in order to assess the morality or truthfulness of the claims made, while 
bargaining it thought to follow a dyadic structure, since the credibility of the speaker is only 
assessed by the listener (Saretzki, 2009, 165). The chapter then claimed that both arguing and 
bargaining are types of behaviour characterized by mechanisms of validation and by a triadic 
structure, and that is the reason why recent theoretical models were not able to elaborate a 
systematic, valid and reliable procedure on which to categorize different types of forum statement 
while looking at real-world negotiations. Starting from these considerations, this section proposes a 
different distinction between arguing and bargaining. Instead of differentiating them on the basis of 
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the presence or absence of mechanisms of validation, it analyses how these statements rely on 
different types of material, ethical and consistency validities. 
Indeed, this research has already established that a forum is a gathering where different 
subjects interact; each of them has some particularistic intentions, and sometimes the particularistic 
intentions of an actor conflict with those of another. However, all forum participants share the 
collective intention, which is at the base of the forum’s mandate, the only justification for the forum 
to exist and the only reason why independent and differentiated subjects have an interest in 
cooperating and negotiating. Given these preconditions, actors participating in a forum can make 
different types of statement, including arguing and bargaining. In an arguing situation, A will try to 
convince B that X is the best choice to make, while in a bargaining situation A will promise Y to B 
or threaten to do Y to B in order to convince B to do X. The material, ethical and consistency 
























Figure 5: arguing’s and bargaining’s validation mechanisms 
 
It can be seen that, by making an arguing statement, A tries to convince B that X is the best 
possible outcome in absolute terms, the most ethical decision to take and the most coherent one. No 
compromise, no deal is proposed: B has to realize that implementing X would be the right thing to 
do. The only way for A to argue that X is the best possible thing to do in terms of advantageousness 
and/or morality and/or consistency is to argue that X is an action directed towards the fulfilment of 
the collective intention shared by all forum participants. Thus, we can see why A would tell B that 
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X is the best possible choice: X is presented as the best way to fulfil the forum’s mandate, the best 
course of action in order to realize the collective intention. Similarly, X would be the most ethical 
choice because, by fulfilling the collective intention, it would provide the best possible outcome for 
every forum participant. Finally, X would be the most coherent thing to do because, by fulfilling the 
collective intention, it would effectively address the main reason actors are gathered in a forum. 
This does not imply that there is only one way to fulfil the forum’s mandate, nor that there is a 
“better argument” that could fulfil it in the best possible way; it only means that actors would justify 
their proposals by claiming that they are the most advantageous, ethical and coherent ways to fulfil 
the collective intention they all share. 
In a bargaining statement, instead, A tries to convince B that doing X in exchange for (or in 
order to avoid) Y is advantageous for B, that it is in B’s national interest to accept, and that the 
promise or the threat made is credible. Bargaining actors do not appeal to the collective intention 
shared by all the forum’s participants; on the contrary, they try to demonstrate that the proposed 
deal could realize B’s particularistic intentions. It is then possible to conclude that, while both 
arguing and bargaining are based on a type of reasoning relying on material, ethical and consistency 
validities, their claims proceed in different directions. Arguing statements are directed towards the 
realization of the collective intention shared by every forum participant, 28  while bargaining 
interactions are directed towards the fulfilment of the particularistic intentions of one or some of the 
forum participants, and they aim to seal a compromise reconciling the conflicting particularistic 
intentions of negotiating actors. Thus, the variable differentiating arguing and bargaining is not the 
presence or absence of mechanisms of validation, but the type of intention that the two types of 
statement are addressing. 
 
28 It has previously been highlighted how arguing, according to the  literature, can exist only  in presence of a “public 
sphere”, an audience witnessing  to  the negotiations  in  front of which delegates are accountable  (Risse, 2000, 22). 
However, this thesis’s theoretical framework considers international negotiations which happen publicly, in front of all 
other  forum  participants,  and  it  supports  Jennifer  Mitzen’s  theory,  according  to  which  the  public  nature  of 
international  forums  implies  that  the very  fact  that  states engaging  in multilateral diplomacy can be considered “a 
dimension of global public sphere legitimation” (Mitzen, 2005, 402). This is because, due to the “forum effect”, forum 





2.12: Collectivism and particularism 
 
The last section presented a new definition of arguing, describing it as a type of statement relying 
on material, ethical and consistency validities and directed towards the fulfilment of the forum’s 
collective intention. This particular definition, however, is problematic, mainly because it 
immediately leads to a question: if this is arguing, how is it distinguishable from rhetorical action? 
Rhetorical action has so far been defined by the literature as the strategic pursuit of an 
objective, justified through references to commonly accepted values (Schimmelfennig, 2002, 420), 
and a type of statement with which an actor tries to persuade another without in turn being ready to 
be persuaded (Risse, 2000, 9). Starting from this definition, it is possible to imagine situations 
where subjects would address the collective intention, aiming to convince other actors to back their 
proposal, but would do so without being ready to be convinced by other participants’ positions. In 
this case, the only possible way to distinguish between arguing and rhetoric is assessing the “true 
dispositions” of speakers; this conclusion leads back to the problem identified by Krebs and 
Jackson, since actors’ true dispositions are undetectable unobservables. Since the distinction 
between rhetoric and arguing lies in the speaker’s true dispositions, and the same act of speech 
could be classified either way depending on the speaker’s attitude, these concepts are not exactly 
types of statement, but “states of mind” of subjects engaging in negotiations. 
This reasoning leads to two considerations. First, if one does not focus on the hidden 
dispositions that drive a subject to interact in a certain way, and instead concentrates on the mere 
inherent characteristics of the different acts of speech, it is impossible to distinguish rhetorical 
speech from arguing behaviour. Second, actors making statements relying on material, ethical and 
consistency validities and addressing the collective intention could do that either because they are 
arguing or because they are engaging in rhetoric. If these conclusions are accepted, it is possible to 
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claim that arguing and rhetorical actions aiming to fulfil the forum’s collective intention are 
subcategories of a wider type of statement: collectivism. 
Similarly, this chapter has defined bargaining as a type of statement relying on material, 
ethical and consistency validities and directed towards the fulfilment of a particularistic intention. 
Bargaining behaviour, however, is not the only type of forum statement aiming to fulfil 
particularistic intentions. We can see this through by the following, ideal-typical example:  
 
In a forum F, subjects A, B and C are sharing the collective intention X; at 
the same time, however, C is also trying to pursue the particularistic 
intention Y. Starting from these premises, A tells B: “We need to help C 
realize Y, because it is the right thing to do”. 
 
This type of statement is focused towards the realization of the particularistic intention Y, 
and, consequently, cannot be considered as an example of collectivism; however, A is not 
promising nor threatening B, and A is not trying to demonstrate that doing X would be 
advantageous for B. This statement cannot be classified as bargaining either: A is acting as a 
champion of C’s interests in front of B, displaying what could be defined as an advocacy type of 
statement. 
Advocacy types of statement were particularly frequent in Swedish foreign policy during the 
last years of Tage Erlander’s premiership and during the government of Olof Palme (Ekengren, 
2011). During those years, Stockholm defended North Vietnam against American aggression, was 
an advocate for Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring, promoted African national liberation 
fronts and, in general, acted as a champion of other countries’ interests within international forums. 
In doing so, Stockholm generally justified its advocacy on the basis of the following reasoning: 
since certain countries were wronged by others, it was right to defend their interests and to 
champion them (Brysk, 2001, 43-45). From this consideration, it is possible to see that advocacy 
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statements rely both on ethical and consistency validities, tightly connected to each other: Sweden 
was in fact claiming that, since some countries had suffered wrongs in the past, helping them to 
pursue their particularistic intentions was both the most ethical and coherent thing to do. 
Furthermore, advocacy statements also imply that helping a certain country X to pursue its 
particularistic intentions is advantageous for X; consequently, advocacy statements are not only 
retaining ethical and consistency validities, but on material validity as well. 
Advocacy relies on different mechanisms of validation than bargaining, but, similarly to the 
latter, it is a type of statement directed towards the fulfilment of particularistic intentions, relying on 
material, ethical and consistency validities. Both bargaining and advocacy are statements that, in a 
forum driven by a collective intention, try to pursue parallel, particularistic intentions, and should 





So far, this discussion has focused on arguing and bargaining types of statement, examining their 
characteristics and the differences between them. Furthermore, it has claimed that these two types 
of statement need to be considered subcategories of broader types of statement: collectivism and 
particularism. Both types of statement rely on material, ethical and consistency validities, but while 
collectivism aims to fulfil the forum’s collective intention, particularism is directed towards the 
realization of one or more of the forum’s particularistic intentions. These, however, are not the only 
two types of statement that subjects can make during international negotiations. Many authors, in 
fact, have highlighted how certain forum statements are simply aimed at the fulfilment of already-
accepted norms and previously-established procedures (Risse, 2000, 3). 




In a forum F, subject A tells B: “You have to do X because doing X means 
complying with the already-established and agreed-upon norm N”. 
 
 In this example, A is engaging in what constructivists would call norm-orientated action, and 
he/she is behaving as the defender of an objective rule that needs to be implemented and that must 
guide actors’ decisions. Earlier in this chapter, international forums were defined as gatherings of 
state representatives driven by a mandate, entitled to produce a certain outcome and bound by 
certain pre-established norms regulating the debate, the decision-making mechanisms, et cetera. 
This type of statement is not directed towards the fulfilment of the forum’s collective intention, nor 
does it try to realize particularistic intentions: it is an action that is directed towards the observance 
of the forum’s pre-established norms. 
In a situation where A tells B: “You have to do X because you have to comply with N”, N 
could be many different things: a certain official document establishing rules by which negotiating 
parties need to abide; the rulebook disciplining the decision-making procedures; international 
treaties that all parties have previously agreed on, et cetera. In all these cases, A is claiming that, 
since a norm N has been established in the past, B needs to do X. This type of statement is based on 
ethical validity, since it relies on the following reasoning: “given that all forum participants, 
including you, previously agreed to N, you should do N, because commitments should not be 
broken”. Similarly, it is a type of statement that relies on consistency validity: since B previously 
accepted N, complying with it by doing X is the most coherent thing to do. However, in this ideal-
typical statement, A is not trying to convince B that doing X would be convenient for somebody: A 
is simply telling B to do X because N has already established that X is the action that needs to be 
taken. This type of statement is therefore devoid of material validity, and it only relies on ethical 




2.14: Mixed types of statement 
 
This chapter argues that the three main types of statement occurring in international forums are 
collectivism, particularism and proceduralism. These, however, have to be regarded as ideal 
concepts, rarely encountered in their purest form, and the behaviour of forum participants is usually 
more complex. However, while any statement encountered during international forums usually 
consists of a combination of two or more of the ideal-types hitherto identified, it can be argued that 
most of the time there is a predominant component in such a combination (Risse, 2000, 3). For 
instance, a certain statement can contain both elements of collectivism and proceduralism, but there 
is usually a predominant element that makes the claim mainly an example of collectivism or mainly 
a statement classifiable as proceduralism. This section looks at possible, theoretical examples of 
statements that are different from the previously outlined ideal-types, and that here will be called 
“mixed statements”. 
The following situation provides an example of mixed statement:  
 
In a forum F, participants A and B share the collective intention X, but A is 
also pursuing the particularistic intention Y, while B is trying to realize the 
particularistic intention Z. Given this context, A tells B: “If you do X, I 
promise I will help you do Z”. 
 
A is asking B to fulfil the forum’s collective intention X; at the same time, A is trying to convince B 
by promising to help B’s pursuit of particularistic intention Z. In order to classify this statement, it 
is necessary to examine the validities on which it relies on: 
 
 A is not defining X as the most advantageous thing to do in absolute 
terms. Instead, A is trying to convince B that X is the most 
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advantageous thing for B, since it will most likely lead towards the 
realization of B’s particularistic intention Z. This statement therefore 
relies on particularism’s material validity. 
 A is not defining X as a morally righteous choice to take for the 
whole forum. On the contrary, A is saying that doing X is in B’s 
national interest, since it will lead towards the realization of Z. 
Consequently, the statement relies on particularism’s ethical validity. 
 A is promising that, if B does X, A will help B to do Z. This 
promise, like any other, needs to be credible in order to be 
convincing, and it has therefore to be likely to take place in the 
future. The statement is therefore relying on particularism’s 
consistency validity. 
 
These considerations lead towards the following conclusion: although this type of mixed statement 
does not fit the ideal definition of particularism, it still has to be considered as such, since it relies 
on particularism’s three validities. 
Another example of a mixed statement could be the following:  
 
In a forum F, participants A and B share the collective intention X. Given 
this context, A tells B: “You must do X because you have to comply with 
the pre-established norm N”. 
 
A is aiming at the realization of the collective intention X, but is telling that it needs to be 




 A is not trying to convince B that doing X would be advantageous; 
instead, A is saying that X must be done no matter what, because it 
would mean observance of the pre-established rule N. This type of 
statement is therefore devoid of material validity. 
 A is not claiming that B should do X because it is the most ethical 
thing to do for the whole forum. Nor is A claiming that X is in B’s or 
anyone else’s national interest. On the contrary, A is saying that X is 
the right thing to do because not doing it would break the previous 
commitment sanctioned by N, and previous commitments have to be 
respected. This statement is therefore relying on the ethical validity 
of proceduralism. 
 A is not making promises that need to be credible. A is saying that, 
since B already agreed to N, doing X is the most coherent thing to 
do. This statement is therefore relying on proceduralism’s 
consistency validity. 
 
The conclusion drawn from these observations is the following: such a statement should be 
classified as an example of proceduralism. 
Finally, there could also be the following case:  
 
In a forum F, participants A and B share the collective intention X; at the 
same time, A is also trying to pursue the particularistic intention Y. Given 




In this case, A is promising to contribute to the realization of the collective intention X in exchange 
for some help in pursuing A’s particularistic intention Y. An examination of this statement’s 
validity leads to the following conclusions: 
 
 A is trying to convince B that the best way to realize X is helping A 
to realize Y. A is claiming that the realization of A’s particularistic 
intention is the advantageous thing to do for everyone in the forum, 
since it would help fulfilling the forum’s collective intention. The 
statement is therefore relying on collectivism’s material validity. 
 A is claiming that B’s help in realizing Y would lead to higher 
chances of fulfilling the collective intention X. A is therefore trying 
to convince B that the realization of A’s particularistic intention Y is 
the most ethical thing to do for the whole forum, since it would lead 
A to pursue the collective intention. The statement relies on 
arguing’s ethical validity. 
 A is making a promise, which has to be credible and likely to take 
place in the future. This statement, then, relies on the consistency 
validity of particularism. 
 
This third and last statement can effectively be considered a mixed type, since it is relying on 
collectivism’s material and ethical validities, but it is also appealing to particularism’s consistency 
validity. It is then possible to conclude that this theoretical model cannot provide a univocal and 
uncontroversial way to always distinguish and categorize forum types of statement, because there 
can be some types of mixed ones. However, it is also possible to argue that a theory that looks at the 
mechanisms of material, ethical and consistency validation, and that examines which intention the 
134 
 
statements made during the forum are addressing, would significantly reduce the amount of 
uncertainty, relegating it only to very particular and marginal types of interaction. 
 
2.15: Implications of the model 
 
This thesis has elaborated a new model of social interactions within international forums, which is 
based on the following premises: 
 
 Intentions are conduct-controlling pro-attitudes that can drive a 
subject to act in a certain way within the empirical world, and the 
actions provoked by a certain intention should be considered as steps 
directed towards the fulfilment of the intention itself. 
 International forums are public gathering of states representatives. 
All forum participants share a collective intention, which constitutes 
the very reason they gather to negotiate. At the same time, each 
participant has some particularistic intentions, and during 
negotiations each participant pursues the collective intention shared 
with other forum participants in parallel with his/her particularistic 
ones. 
 The forum mandate is the empirical manifestation of the forum 
collective intention, while the emergence, during negotiations, of 
issues unrelated with the forum mandate are the empirical 




Starting from these premises, the dissertation argues that it is possible to classify forum 
statements on the basis of the type of intention they pursue, and it identifies three main types of 
statements that can occur during negotiations: 
 
 Collectivism: Statements relying on material, ethical and consistency 
validities directed towards the fulfilment of the forum collective 
intention. 
 Particularism: Statements relying on material, ethical and 
consistency validities directed towards the fulfilment of one or more 
particularistic intentions of some forum participants. 
 Proceduralism: Statements relying on ethical and consistency 
validities directed towards the observance of pre-established norms. 
 
Thus, given that forum participants have certain intentions, and that these intentions influence 
their behaviour during negotiations, this thesis claims that the statements made by diplomatic 
delegates during official forum sessions would most of the times address some of the intentions they 
want to fulfil. If this assumption is true, a forum in which parties mostly interact by engaging in 
collectivist statements should be more likely to be correlated with an output with a higher degree of 
fulfilment of the forum collective intention. Consequently, since the forum’s mandate could be 
considered the empirical manifestation of the collective intention, a higher frequency of 
collectivism should be correlated with a forum output with a higher realization of the forum’s 
mandate.29 Such a greater fulfilment of the forum’s mandate would then be correlated with a 
 
29 The thesis argues that a higher frequency of collectivism is correlated with greater fulfilment of the forum collective 
intention;  it does not argue  that greater  frequency of collectivism causes greater  fulfilment of  the  forum collective 
intention.  This  is  because  it  is  not  possible  –  given  the  theoretical  premises  outlined  –  to  claim  that  presence  of 
collectivism would lead to greater realization of the collective intention per se. Furthermore, even if this last claim was 
true, the fact that forum participants engage more in collectivist statements could just be the empirical consequence 




greater level of legitimacy of the forum’s output. This last sentence introduces the concept of 
legitimacy, which is a controversial and contested concept in international relations (Hurrelmann, 
Schneider and Steffek, 2007). Before continuing with the formulation of the hypothesis drawn from 
this thesis’s theoretical model, it is therefore necessary to clearly explain the precise meaning this 
dissertation will give to the word “legitimacy”, and why exactly the legitimacy of the forum’s 
output should be considered as something correlated with the degree of fulfilment of the forum’s 
mandate. 
 
2.16: Defining legitimacy of the forum’s output 
Legitimacy in international relations can be defined and examined in different ways; Steffek, 
among others, observes that legitimacy can be analysed both on a normative and on a sociological 
perspective. The former uses legitimacy as a way to normatively evaluate “existing or imaginary 
political regimes”, while the latter treats legitimacy as “an empirical fact that scholars can 
investigate and report” (Steffek, 2015, 265). This thesis, as already explained in the introduction, 
belongs to the neo-positivist spectrum of the research, and its objective is not to normatively assess 
the existing international system, but to try to provide a description of some of its features in a way 
that can to a certain extent be supported by empirical evidence. Because of this, the concept of 
legitimacy is here examined on a sociological basis, and not on a normative one.30 There are three 
main types of legitimacy that have been identified by the discipline: input legitimacy, throughput 
legitimacy and output legitimacy. 
The input legitimacy “addresses the question of who is entitled to make decisions and who is 
represented in the decisionmaking process” (Take, 2012, 501). To assess the level of input 





converge  in  a  given  area  of  international  relations”  (Krasner,  1982,  186).  Furthermore,  international  regimes  are 
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the fairness and the rightfulness of democratic and representative decision-making. This is 
maintained for instance by Ingo Take, who writes that “the underlying normative assumption is that 
the equal and active participation in deliberative processes of decisionmaking by all stakeholders is 
a prerequisite for effectively transporting the demands and preferences of the rule addressees (Take, 
2012, 501; my emphasis). Once again, since this research belongs to the neo-positivist spectrum of 
the debate, and since the concept of input legitimacy is based on an “underlying normative 
assumption”, such a legitimacy type is not considered in this research as a criterion by which to 
measure the legitimacy of a forum’s output. 
The throughput legitimacy measures to what extent decision-making is transparent and to 
what extent decision-makers are accountable to those affected by their decisions (Ingi, 2017, 459-
460). This type of legitimacy is, similarly to input legitimacy, based on a certain normative 
assumption and on a certain commitment to democratic values – i.e., “that decisionmakers will only 
act according to stakeholder preferences when they can be held accountable” (Take, 2012, 501). 
The fact that throughput legitimacy is based on normative stances and on a certain commitment to 
democratic values seems to be confirmed by one of the authors that contributed the most to the 
elaboration of this concept: in one of her articles, Vivien Schmidt defines throughput legitimacy as 
a “normative criterion” that should be used to assess the democratic legitimacy of the European 
Union (Schmidt, 2013, 2). Since this type of legitimacy is tied with normative assumption, this 
thesis does not consider it as a principle by which to assess whether a forum output is legitimate. 
Finally, the concept of output legitimacy is mostly used in the literature to assess the 
legitimacy of an international regime on sociological, empirical and analytical bases, and not on 
normative ones (Steffek, 2015, 267).32 If viewed by taking an empirical-analytical and strictly non-
normative approach, output legitimacy can be defined either on an acceptance-based criterion or on 
 
equated with  the  forum’s output because  it  is argued  that  the  former are  the  result of  the negotiations occurring 





an effectiveness-based one. The acceptance-based criterion considers “empirical data on 
stakeholders’ acceptance of a global governance arrangement […] an indicator of output 
legitimacy” (Take, 2012, 501) – basically, according to this definition an international regime is 
legitimate when stakeholders claim that it is so and abide to the regime’s norms. On the other hand, 
according to the effectiveness-based criterion, output legitimacy should be assessed by examining 
the effectiveness with which an international regime is able to address the issues it is set to adress 
(Lindgren and Persson, 2010, 451) – in other words, effective performance is seen as a source of 
legitimacy.  
The effectiveness-based definition of output legitimacy is probably the most common within 
the literature (Steffek, 2015, 267); however, the concept of “effectiveness” of international regimes 
is another contested one (Andersen and Hey, 2005, 211-212), and the literature has not been able to 
elaborate a widely accepted definition of effectiveness-based output legitimacy. Because of this, 
and since this thesis does not want to excessively delve into the debate about the true meaning of 
“effectiveness”, the definition of “legitimacy” hereby adopted is a very limited and basic version of 
output legitimacy, not connected with “the fulfilment of targeted goals”, but with “the degree to 
which a governance arrangement is generating acceptance by its internal and external stakeholders” 
(Take, 2012, 503). In conceptualizing legitimacy of international regimes on such “minimalist” 
terms, this thesis does not want to argue that such a definition should be considered unproblematic 
or exhaustive; nor it does want to say that normative accounts of legitimacy should not be 
considered as valid ones. This research adopts this particular definition of legitimacy because it is 
considered to be the most adapt to its own purposes, while recognizing that other definitions may be 






2.17: Formulating a hypothesis: correlation between frequency of collectivism and legitimacy of 
the forum’s output 
The previous section has established that this thesis will adopt an acceptance-based 
conceptualization of output legitimacy as a way to assess whether the output of a forum – i.e., the 
international regime resulting from forum negotiations – is legitimate or not. The specific definition 
of legitimacy adopted by this thesis is the one provided by Olav Stokke and Davor Vidas. Starting 
from an acceptance-based definition of output legitimacy, the two authors argue that an 
international regime is perceived as legitimate when its members feel committed to its mandate 
provisions (internal legitimacy), and when the international community accepts and recognizes its 
existence and its authority (external legitimacy) (Stokke and Vidas, 1996, 20-23).33  
Before examining the concept of legitimacy, this dissertation has argued that if statements 
made by diplomatic delegates during official forum sessions would most of the times address the 
intentions they want to fulfil, then greater presence of collectivism should be correlated with a 
greater fulfilment of the forum collective intention. Furthermore, since the forum mandate is 
considered in this research to be the empirical manifestation of the forum collective intention, 
greater frequency of collectivist statements within a forum should be correlated with a forum output 
with a higher level of fulfilment of the forum mandate. The extent to which the international regime 
is able to fulfil its own mandate is deeply related to the extent to which that very regime is accepted 
and considered legitimate by international actors. 
As previously seen, Take, together with Stokke and Vidas, argue that the accepted-based 
output legitimacy of an international regime has an “internal” and an “external” component. For a 
regime to be internally legitimate, it needs to be considered as such by the members of that very 
regime (Take, 2012, 503; Stokke and Vidas, 1996, 20-23); for a regime to be externally legitimate, 
 
33 The term “international community” is a complex and contested concept, and the purpose of this dissertation is not 





it needs to be considered as such by “its […] external stakeholders” (Take, 2012, 503) – namely, by 
those who are affected by the regime’s provisions without being a part of it. Starting from these 
premises, it is possible to argue that states that are members of an international forum are 
committed to the realization of the forum mandate, and that therefore they will be more likely to 
accept an output that presents a greater fulfilment of it. Furthermore, there are certain types of 
international regimes in which the fulfilment of the forum mandate can be an important variable in 
determining its levels of external legitimacy as well. It is the case, for instance, of global commons 
international forums, which aim to protect and preserve resources that benefits all of humankind 
and the whole international community (Joyner, 1998, 30). The provisions of regimes administering 
global commons affect everyone, even those states that are not part of the regime. Therefore, a 
regime able to fulfil its mandate of protecting the common will be more likely to be accepted by 
non-members as well; this means the regime would enjoy a greater degree of external legitimacy.34 
It is therefore finally possible to enunciate the hypothesis drawn from the premises of this 
theoretical model: greater frequency of collectivist statements within a forum is likely to be 
correlated with a higher level of legitimacy of that forum’s output. 
A critique that could be made to this hypothesis is that the first steps of its development rely 
on a tautological type of reasoning. One could in fact argue that, if a higher frequency of collectivist 
statements is equated with delegates’ greater commitment to the forum collective intention, it is 
indeed tautological to assume that greater commitment to the collective intention is correlated with 
greater fulfilment of it. However, this dissertation does not argue anything of the sort. 
Indeed, collectivism is an act of speech relying on material, ethical and consistency validities 
directed towards the fulfilment of the collective intention. This in no way entails that an actor 
engaging in collectivist statements must necessarily be more committed to the realization of the 
collective intention than actors making, for instance, particularistic statements. In this dissertation, 
 




the presence of collectivism is not evidence of the presence of or commitment to a collective 
intention; evidence of the latter is the existence of a forum mandate. In fact, as long as there is a 
forum with a certain mandate, it is plausible to assume that forum participants will all be committed 
to the fulfilment of the collective intention which empirically manifests itself in that mandate. Even 
the extremely unlikely example of a forum in which there are no collectivist statements whatsoever 
will be considered, in this dissertation, to be driven by a collective intention which empirically 
translates in the forum’s mandate. 
This thesis also argues that forum participants making collectivist statements might do so for 
different reasons. One could consider, for instance, the following example: in a forum F, actors A 
and B share the collective intention X; at the same time, however, A is also driven by the 
particularistic intention Y, and B is driven by the particularistic intention Z, and the particularistic 
intentions Y and Z are mutually exclusive. In this context, A wants to stop B from pursuing Z, 
because in this way A could better pursue Y; because of this, A says during the negotiations: “We 
must not do Z, because it goes against the collective intention X and it is therefore unethical”. A is 
engaging in collectivism, because he/she is saying that not doing Z would promote the collective 
intention X, and therefore not doing Z is the most ethical thing to do (collectivist material validity). 
At the same time, A is engaging in collectivism while pursuing the particularistic intention Y. The 
fact that A’s sentence relies on ethical validity directed towards the fulfilment of the collective 
intention does not necessarily represent an evidence of A’s commitment to the collective intention 
while saying that sentence. The fact that collectivism encompasses both arguing and rhetorical 
behaviour – as argued in section twelve – is already an evidence of that. Another evidence that the 
thesis follows this reasoning can be found in section fourteen, in which the problem of “mixed types 
of statement” is addressed. This particular section of the thesis, in fact, claims that a delegate 
participating in the forum could pursue the fulfilment of the collective intention even by, 
sometimes, making statements that rely on mechanisms of validation directed towards the 
fulfilment of the particularistic intentions of the listener.  
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Furthermore, this thesis claims that forum participants are driven both by a collective and by 
particularistic intentions, and during international forums they can deliver statements addressing 
either of them. This thesis does not argue that an actor A choosing to make more collectivist 
statements than particularistic ones is more committed to the collective intention than to its 
particularistic ones. It simply argues that A chose to address the forum collective intention more 
often than his/her own particularistic ones. The reasons behind this choice, which may be various, 
are not examined in this dissertation, and this is the reason why this thesis does not argue that 
greater frequency of collectivism causes greater legitimacy of the forum output. This dissertation 
only hypothesizes that there is a correlation between the frequency to which forum participants 
address the collective intention and the degree of legitimacy of the forum’s output. 
In other words, collectivism and collective intention are not the same thing, and greater 
presence of collectivism cannot be evidence of greater commitment to the collective intention. The 
first step of this thesis’s hypothesis is based on the claims that 
 
 If forum participants publicly delivering their statements will most of 
the times (not all the times) express some of the intentions they want 
to fulfil; and 
 If what delegates say during official negotiations plays a role in 
shaping the output of an international forum (i.e., the international 
regime born from that forum); 
 Then an international forum with greater frequency of collectivist 
statements is likely to be correlated with greater fulfilment of the 
forum mandate. 
 
This entails that what delegates said during official forum sessions has an effect on the forum’s 
output. And this is not a tautological, nor an obvious claim. 
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Then, the hypothesis takes a further step, and it claims that since the fulfilment of the forum 
mandate is a component of acceptance-based output legitimacy of the forum output, greater 
frequency of collectivism is likely to be correlated with a forum output having a higher level of 
legitimacy. If the hypothesis will be supported by empirical evidence, it will mean that the types of 
statements made during negotiations could be correlated with the degree by which the output of 
those negotiations is accepted as legitimate. All this would lead to the consideration that sentences 
uttered during forum plenary sessions are much more than empty words and the display of 
diplomatic etiquette. It would mean that a systematic analysis of public interactions within 
international forums could be helpful to understand some important dynamics of inter-state 
negotiations. 
In other words, this thesis argues that there is a certain correlation between intentions (which 
dwell in the minds of forum participants) and statements (which are the acts of speeches made by 
forum participants). It also argues that there is a certain correlation between statements uttered 
during forums and the legitimacy of the forum output (which is an international regime). To try to 
falsify this hypothesis, one should analyse two forums similar in all but the frequency of 
collectivism and the legitimacy of the international regimes they produced. In case the forum 
having greater frequency of collectivist statements will lead to the least legitimate forum, the 
hypothesis should be considered falsified. 
 
2.18: A summary of what has been argued insofar 
Now that the theoretical premises, the theoretical model and its implications have been laid 
out, it is possible to provide a brief summary of this chapter’s content. This thesis attempts to build 
a new approach looking at social interactions within international forums. More specifically, it tries 
to elaborate a theoretical model able to empirically distinguish between the different modes of 
interactions that can be observed in the course of negotiations. This new approach cannot be built 
around the theoretical construct of forum actors’ “true dispositions”, which should be considered 
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undetectable unobservable features in international forums. A revised version of Jennifer Mitzen’s 
theory of collective intention provides more reliable conceptual foundations. While collective and 
particularistic intentions can be regarded as unobservable features of international forums, they can 
be empirically – although indirectly – detected respectively by the presence of a forum mandate and 
by the existence of incidental issues raised during the negotiations. These empirically detectable 
features of international forums are linked with the theoretical constructs of collective and 
particularistic intentions by a process of abductive inference, driven by instrumentalist logic and 
aiming at formulating plausible conjectures explaining empirical phenomena. 
Having established these premises, this chapter examined how the current literature treats 
social interactions within international forums. Existing accounts differentiate between arguing and 
bargaining types of statement, according to which the former relies on mechanisms of validation, 
and the latter on the credibility of promises or threats. This chapter instead claimed that arguing and 
bargaining should be considered as types of statement relying on the same types of validities: 
empirical, ethical and consistency ones. The current distinction between the two types of statement 
should be discarded, and a new one formulated. Furthermore, the chapter has presented new 
definitions of arguing and bargaining, portraying arguing as a type of statement relying on material, 
ethical and consistency validities and aiming at the fulfilment of the forum’s collective intention, 
while bargaining is a type of statement relying on the same validities but attempting to fulfil one or 
more particularistic intentions of actors participating in the forum. 
This new distinction between arguing and bargaining implies that these two are sub-categories 
of broader types of statement: arguing falls, together with rhetorical action, under the category of 
“collectivism”, while bargaining belongs, together with the type of statement described as 
advocacy, to the category of “particularism”. This new theoretical approach also led to a new 
definition of norm-orientated types of statement, classified as “proceduralism”, and defined as types 
of statement relying on ethical and consistency validities and aiming at ensuring the observance of 
pre-established rules within the forum. In the end, this chapter formulated the hypothesis that 
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forums presenting a higher frequency of collectivist types of statement should be more likely to be 

























Chapter Three – Outline of the case study 
 
The previous chapter outlined a new model of social interactions within international forums. The 
model distinguishes three different types of statement that can be made during negotiations: 
collectivism, particularism and proceduralism. The first type indicates statements relying on 
material, ethical and consistency validities aiming at the fulfilment of the forum’s collective 
intention. The second describes statements relying on material, ethical and consistency validities 
aiming at the fulfilment of one or more particularistic intentions. Finally, the third refers to an 
interaction relying on ethical and consistency validities aiming at the observance of already-
established norms and procedures. The hypothesis deriving from the theoretical model is the 
following: an international forum with greater frequency of collectivist statements is more likely to 
be correlated with an output with a greater level of legitimacy. 
However, the output of an international forum is determined by more than a lower or higher 
frequency of collectivist statements: structural factors such as, for instance, decision-making 
procedures, the number of forum participants, the historical context in which the forum takes place, 
and the distribution of power amongst forum participants are just some of the variables that can 
affect whether an international negotiation fulfils the forum’s mandate and, consequently, whether 





In this formula, y is the legitimacy of the forum’s output, x is the frequency of collectivist 
statements within the negotiations, and the remaining elements are all other factors which play a 
role in determining y. 
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In a model where y is the dependent variable and x is the independent variable, all other 
factors can be considered intervening variables, gathered under k, defined in the following way: 
 
y = x + k 
k =y-x 
 
Starting from these considerations, it is possible to envision a situation in which two different 
forums are attended by the same forum participants, are regulated by the same membership and 
decision-making procedures, are organized during the same historical period and are very similar in 
all features included in k, but produce two outputs with a different level of legitimacy y. The only 
explanation is that the difference in y depends on x – namely, on a different frequency of 
collectivist statements in the two forums: 
 






Furthermore, the theoretical model outlined in the previous chapter hypothesizes that the 
forum with greater legitimacy of its output should be correlated with greater frequency of 
collectivist statements: 
 








To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to find two international forums sharing the same 
mandate, attended by the same participating actors, driven by the same decision-making and 
membership procedures, located in the same historical context, which delivered very different 
outputs as far as their legitimacy is concerned. Statements made during these two forums should be 
examined and systematically categorized, in order to identify the frequency of collectivism in both 
of them. If the forum which produces a more legitimate output is found to have more collectivist 
statements, then the hypothesis should be considered plausible, and to a certain extent confirmed. 
This type of case study is therefore a most-similar one, and the aim of this case study is to conduct a 
plausibility probe. According to Jack Levy 
 
A plausibility probe is comparable to a pilot study in experimental or survey 
research. It allows the researcher to sharpen a hypothesis or theory, to refine 
the operationalization or measurement of key variables, or to explore the 
suitability of a particular case as a vehicle for testing a theory before 
engaging in a costly and time-consuming research effort, whether that effort 
involves a major quantitative data collection project, extensive fieldwork, a 
large survey, or detailed archive work (Levy, 2008 6, emphasis added).1 
 
As long as the plausibility probe procedure is “applied in a methodologically self-conscious 
way”, it can play an important role in the development of a theoretical framework – especially in 






2008, 7). This is exactly the case of the theory presented in this dissertation. If, at the end of the 
empirical analysis of the two selected cases, the hypothesis here presented will be deemed as 
plausible, its validity and its inference potential will be further tested by more costly and time-
consuming research. 
To sum up, this research intends to test its hypothesis on a most-similar case study, and it 
does so in order to pursue two aims, a theoretical and a methodological one. Theoretically, it wants 
to test whether the distinction between collective, particularistic and procedural types of statement 
is plausible, and whether the implications drawn from the model’s premises are borne out. 
Methodologically, it wants to assess whether the theoretical model can generate a reliable and valid 
way to isolate, distinguish and categorize forum statements. Thus, the purpose of this case study is 
not to examine the effective inference potential of the thesis’s theoretical model, but to test the 
internal coherence and plausibility of its assumptions and implications, and its ability to be applied 
in the study of real-world negotiations. 
To select the two forums at the base of the most-similar case study, one needs to consider that 
there are different types of international forums, driven by different mandates, and that the nature of 
the mandate can influence the characteristics of the forums. Similarly, forums take place in a certain 
diplomatic framework, regulated by specific norms and procedures. Finally, there can also be 
forums held in the same diplomatic framework and sharing the same mandate which are different in 
other structural features – for instance, the number of forum participants or the historical context. 
To sum up, it is necessary to choose two forums sharing the same mandate, held in the same 







3.1: Natural global commons international forums 
 
The majority of authors define “natural global commons” as natural resources that are outside 
states’ jurisdiction, which generate public goods that benefit the majority – if not the whole – of 
humankind. The public goods produced by the commons are non-rival and non-excludable (Joyner, 
1998, 26-27), since nobody can be excluded from their enjoyment, and there is no competition for 
access to greater quantities (Kaul, Grundberg and Stern, 1999, 2-3). John Vogler presents a list of 
some of the most important natural global commons: oceans, deep seabed, outer space, Antarctica 
and the atmosphere (the last one including both the ozone layer and climate) (Vogler, 1992, 5). 
Vogler argues that the initial condition of natural global commons – their state of nature – is 
the condition of res nullius: nobody owns them, nobody administers them, and the first actor 
exercising control over them can claim sovereignty (Vogler, 1995, 17). Christopher Joyner has 
questioned this definition, since the main feature of global commons is the impossibility of their 
enclosure (Joyner, 1998, 31). Hence, Joyner claims that global commons are, in their “state of 
nature”, res communis: the commons belong to the community, and the public goods they produce 
are at everyone’s disposal. According to this – more precise – definition, actors cannot claim 
sovereignty over the commons, but they can freely exploit them as they wish (Joyner, 1998, 32). In 
this initial stage, the public goods provided by the commons seem endless; however, the 
development of more intensive and advanced techniques of exploitation rapidly shows their limits 
and their vulnerability (Joyner, 1998, 29). This often leads states to organize forums aiming at 
establishing a regulated use of the commons, and to establish norms ensuring its protection and 
preservation (Vogler, 1995, 17). The mandate of international forums governing global commons is 
thus always the following: to protect the existence of the commons and their public goods. 
Many obstacles hamper the fulfilment of this mandate, almost all caused by states’ focus on 
the protection and the promotion of their national interests. They consequently find it difficult to 
cooperate on global and collective issues, especially since the international community is anarchic 
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(Kaul, Grundberg and Stern, 1999, 15). These considerations are not new in the discipline of 
international politics (Hardin, 1968, 1244), which often has examined the main problems occurring 
within forums concerning global commons: “free riding” and the “prisoner’s dilemma”. 
Free-riding can be summarized as follows: an actor does not commit to the protection and the 
rational use of global commons because he/she prefers freely to benefit from their public goods, 
leaving to others the burden of keeping the commons intact (Kaul, Grundberg and Stern, 1999; 
Death, 2014a, 74; Joyner, 1998, 29). The “prisoner’s dilemma”, on the other hand, involves a 
reciprocal mistrust amongst forum participants, or a situation where actors are unwilling to 
cooperate for mutual gain (Kaul, Grundberg and Stern, 1999, 7). Scientific uncertainty, corporate 
interests, costs of implementing the agreed measures and clashes between developed and 
developing countries are other significant issues that can be encountered in this type of international 
forum (Elliott, 2004, 79). 
Non-state actors such as the scientific community or NGOs can be helpful in overcoming or 
mitigating these obstacles: they can provide reliable knowledge with which to tackle scientific 
uncertainty, raise awareness and mobilize public opinion towards a certain goal, or even monitor the 
effectiveness of negotiations and of their outcomes (Martin, 1999, 60). Problems in the distributions 
of costs and gains, on the other hand, can be solved by institutional arrangements and governance 
mechanisms – although, sometimes, these arrangements can be difficult to implement (Keohane, 
1996, 5-7). In any case, the fulfilment of the mandate of forums governing the global commons is 
constantly endangered by particularistic interests, uncertainties, mistrust and misunderstanding. 
The reason for choosing negotiations in international forums governing global commons to 
test this thesis’s hypothesis is that this type of forum presents a clearer differentiation between the 
collective intention at the base of the forum mandate and the particularistic intentions of negotiating 
actors, for three main reasons. First, states that gather in global commons international forums do so 
driven by the shared understanding that “if global commons are to remain economically productive 
they must remain environmentally solvent” (Joyner, 1998, 30) – thus, there is a common 
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understanding of the issue at the base of the forum mandate. Second, the mandate of these forums is 
always the protection of the commons and its public goods – hence, the forum mandate is clear and 
constant, and so is the collective intention generating it. Third, the existence of such a clear and 
well-defined collective intention makes it possible to isolate the particularistic intentions arising 
during the debate: any issue raised by states representatives that does not concern the forum 
mandate shall be considered as a reference to or a promotion of the particularistic intentions of one 
or more forum participants. 
To sum up, global commons international forums are negotiations in which participants are 
driven by the collective intention of preserving the commons and by particularistic intentions which 
often conflict with the collective one. The two global commons international negotiations that are 
examined in this research as most-similar cases are two forums which took place within the 
diplomatic framework of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). 
 
3.2: The Antarctic global common 
 
Antarctica does not entirely fit the “ideal-type” of global commons, mainly due to its exclusive 
nature: the legal regime administering the continent, in fact, does not include the whole 
international community. Even more importantly, only some of the member states of the ATS are 
Antarctic Consultative Parties (ACPs) and are therefore able to have a say in Antarctic affairs 
(Vidas, 1996, 45-46). Currently, of the 52 members of the ATS, only 29 countries are Consultative 
Parties,2 while 23 of them are Contracting Parties, without any decision-making power.3 Article 13 
of the Antarctic Treaty – also known as the Washington Treaty – establishes that any member of the 





3 Austria,  Belarus,  Canada,  Colombia,  Cuba,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Greece,  Guatemala,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Kazakhstan, 




1998, 48), while there are two ways to gain the status of ACP: to be one of the original seven 
claimant states4 or to display constant employment of resources and personnel in the field of 
scientific research in Antarctica (Joyner, 1998, 61). 
The exclusivity of the ATS and the existence of sovereignty claims over portions of the 
Antarctic territory are the reasons why Antarctica is often considered a “special kind of common”, a 
“disputed common” or an “impure common” (Joyner, 1998, 44-45). However, Antarctica can (and 
must) be considered a global common: while it is true that seven states presented sovereignty claims 
over certain areas of the continent, it is also true that they never exercised effective and continuous 
control over the claimed territory, due to the extremely difficult environmental conditions; 
furthermore, those sovereignty claims are, without exception, controversial, and not fully 
recognized by all ACPs (Joyner, 1998, 46). For this reason, Antarctica should be considered a 
region of the world which is outside of any national jurisdiction (Joyner, 1998, 45), and this is one 
of the main characteristics of natural global commons. 
Moreover, Antarctica produces public goods that benefit the whole of humankind, and that are 
endangered by unrestricted human activities (Joyner, 1998, 44-45). These public goods are various. 
First of all, the pristine nature of the Antarctic continent, together with the absence of human 
activities over much of its territory, makes it a unique field for the study of meteorites, and a 
fundamental source of information for the scientific fields of geology and palaeontology. The 
continent also allows the uninterrupted observation of solar activity during summer, when the sun is 
visible 24 hours a day (Suter, 1992, 2-3). The scientific community considers Antarctica a sort of 
climate thermometer, a vital resource through which to measure and assess the effects and the 
progress of climate change (Suter, 1992, 3): the air captured within the continental ice sheet allows 
researchers to monitor the variations of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and of 
temperature, and to establish to what extent human activities have accelerated and enhanced climate 





inestimable scientific value, which must to be considered a public good produced by the southern 
continent. 
Antarctica, however, is not just a fundamental asset for many fields of scientific research. 
Antarctic ice amounts to 65% of Earth’s clear water reserves (Suter, 1992, 4), and the continent 
plays a fundamental role in preserving Earth’s climate stability (Summerson, 2012, 106): the ice 
sheet shields the planet from overheating by reflecting 80% of the sun’s rays, and the difference 
between polar and equatorial temperatures allows the continuity and regularity of the marine and 
atmospheric currents (Cousteau and Charrier, 1992, 6). Together with its scientific value, then, 
Antarctica also has considerable environmental value, and the sum of the two amounts to the public 
goods produced. 
Finally, and similarly to other natural global commons, Antarctica is threatened by the 
consequences of the current, unsustainable system of industrial production and consumption, and its 
degradation will probably enhance global environmental degradation. As Joyner said: 
 
[…] to the degree that the ice sheet is melting, global warming might be 
enhanced by the loss of […] Antarctic reflecting power. Antarctica, given its 
sensitivity to environmental change, serves as a global early warning system 
for climatic change. Detection of the ozone hole above Antarctica, therefore, 
might be a harbinger of more serious problems for the rest of the planet 
(Joyner, 1998, 50). 
 
3.3: The Antarctic Treaty System 
 
In 1908, the United Kingdom presented the first territorial claim over a portion of the Antarctic 
continent. After that New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Norway (1929 and 1939), Australia 
(1933), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1942) presented similar claims, with three of them (the British, 
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the Chilean and the Argentinean) overlapping each other. Each country justified its claims on 
different – and, therefore, not universally recognized – juridical bases (Beck, 1986, 29-39), and that 
is why before the Antarctic Treaty the continent was the source of “disputes during the 1940s 
among the United Kingdom, Argentina, and Chile over their overlapping sovereignty claims to the 
Antarctic Peninsula” (Joyner, 1998, 54). After the Second World War Antarctica was caught up in 
the Cold War, and the international community started fearing that the continent would become 
theatre of nuclear experiments (Beck, 1986, 21-22). The long and troubled negotiations that led to 
the Washington Treaty of 1959 were not, according to some authors, generated by potential 
advantages of international cooperation in Antarctica, but by the fear that the continent could 
become the theater of international conflicts and tensions (Elliott, 1994, 31). The Treaty was the 
result of compromises between parties, and negotiations were held in a general climate of secrecy, 
organized as closed gatherings of a few interested actors (Elliott, 1994, 34-35). 
The three main principles regulating the Washington Treaty are peace, freedom of science and 
Antarctic extraterritoriality. The “peaceful nature” of the Antarctic continent is established in 
Article 1, which bans any type of military activities in the continent – except those exclusively for 
logistic and pacific support to scientific expeditions – and forbids the test of any kind of weapon in 
Antarctica; these resolutions are further strengthened by Article 5, which outlaws nuclear 
explosions and the storage of radioactive waste in the continent. Freedom of science is promoted by 
Article 2, which claims that scientific research in Antarctica must remain free, and that Antarctic 
parties should freely share information resulting from their expeditions. Article 3 goes further, 
encouraging parties to exchange “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable” not just research 
results, but also research plans, equipment and personnel. Sovereignty issues are dealt in Article 4, 
which, while recognizing the existence of sovereignty claims, suspends their validity and forbids 
the assertion of any new claim for the whole time the Treaty will be in force. The 
“extraterritoriality” of Antarctica is developed in Article 8, which establishes that people in the 
continent are “subject to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in 
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respect of all acts and omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising 
their functions”. All provisions are strengthened by Article 7, establishing that “in order to promote 
the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the […] treaty”, every party has the 
right to perform inspections, not necessarily announced, in all areas of the continent, at any time. 
Article 9 establishes that ACPs have periodically to participate in Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), in order to exchange information, to resolve controversies and to 
discuss the elaboration and implementation of new measures. Consultative Meetings often lead to 
the elaboration of “Recommendations”, that become official and effective only when approved by 
all Consultative Parties – thus, the Antarctic Treaty System mostly deliberates by following the 
consensus rule. From 1961 to 1995, Recommendations resulting from ATCMs were always treated 
as legal acts of a binding nature; there were, however, doubts regarding their legal nature, especially 
concerning the retroactivity for the new states that joined the Treaty. These problems were 
overcome during the XIX Consultative Meeting in Seoul (1995), that distinguished among three 
types of acts deriving from Consultative Meetings: legally binding “Measures”, non-legally binding 
“Resolutions” (which have the status of authoritative recommendations) and administrative 
“Decisions” (regarding administrative and organizational problems) (Joyner, 1998, 62-63). 
The Treaty, as Article 12 provides, can be changed at any moment, but proposed amendments 
need to be agreed by all Antarctic Consultative Parties. The same article also contemplates the 
possibility, thirty years after the coming into force of the Treaty, of calling a review conference 
including all parties; on that occasion, changes proposed would become effective only if approved 
by the majority of all ACPs. In case one or more actors disagree with the approved changes, it is 
possible for them to withdraw from the Treaty by not ratifying those amendments and by giving 
notice of their intention to withdraw, which will come into force two years after its receipt. 
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 was fundamental in shaping further development of the 
Antarctic international regime. This is clearly shown in Article 9, which establishes that 
Recommendations coming from Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) must concern 
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“use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; facilitation of scientific research; facilitation of 
scientific cooperation; facilitation of the exercise of rights of inspections; questions related to the 
exercise of jurisdiction; preservation and conservation of living resources”. Article 9 is important 
because it influences every diplomatic forum juridically related to the Antarctic Treaty System 
which took place afterwards. It established, in fact, that all Antarctic international negotiations 
taking place under the Antarctic diplomatic framework must be driven by the mandate of preserving 
peace, promoting scientific research and preserving living resources in the continent. 
As far as the last point is concerned, the Treaty did not contemplate measures safeguarding 
the Antarctic environment. However, soon after its coming into force, ACPs started to elaborate 
new documents and conventions which protected nature and wilderness in the continent. These 
agreements were the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora (1964), 
the Seals Convention (1972), the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention (1982) and, most 
recently, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1998). The integration 
of these agreements, appendices, conventions and protocols led academics and politicians to talk 
about an Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), where the term “system” indicates an internally coherent 
corpus of documents, closely interrelated and regulating the whole range of human activities in the 
continent (Vidas, 1996, 37-40). 
This thesis has chosen to focus on Antarctic forums, amongst many other global commons 
international forums, for the following reasons. First, while it is true that this type of forum is 
legitimized and justified by the mandate of preserving the commons and their public goods, not all 
global commons international forums state their mandates so clearly as Antarctic ones: article 9 
clearly establishes the mandate of every Antarctic negotiation, which is based on the three pillars of 
peace, freedom of science and environmental protection (Joyner, 1998, 57-64). These three pillars 
are the empirical expression of the general mandate of preserving the Antarctic common and to 
safeguard the public goods produced by the southern continent. 
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The second section of this chapter explained how Antarctica can provide fundamental, vital 
information for scientific research in various fields, and how its scientific value can definitely be 
considered an Antarctic public good; the principle of freedom of science is an attempt to promote, 
defend and maximize this public good. Furthermore, it has been shown how the continent plays a 
vital role in stabilizing the Earth’s climate, and it is fundamental for the maintenance of life on our 
planet. The principle of environmental protection represents the attempt to protect Antarctic 
ecosystem and wilderness, and therefore to safeguard the vital role played by Antarctica in the 
stability of the planet’s climate. The principle of Antarctica as a continent of peace is an attempt to 
prevent conflicts among states from affecting the administration of the continent, which must be 
considered beyond states’ jurisdiction and as a land that belongs to humankind. It is therefore 
possible to claim that the three main principles of the ATS are just an empirical manifestation of the 
main principle at the base of every global commons international forum: the preservation of the 
common and of their public goods. Together with these three pillars of the Antarctic regime there is 
the principle of extraterritoriality. This last principle is not considered to be a guideline for future 
treaties, 5  but the necessary precondition for the existence of an Antarctic Treaty and for the 
existence of the Antarctic’s status as a global common, since it leads the continent to be considered 
a land where territorial sovereignty is de facto non-existent. The very idea of a continent devoted to 
peace, where research is free and where human activities must be limited for the sake of the 
Antarctic ecosystem is possible only if the principle of extraterritoriality is established. 
The Antarctic Treaty System is the diplomatic framework in which all international 
negotiations concerning Antarctica take place. The two Antarctic Meetings compared in this 
 
5 The  reason why  the  principle  of  Antarctic  extraterritoriality  is  not  considered  part  of  the mandate  of  Antarctic 
forums  is the following: the principles of peace, science and environmental protection are guidelines that shape the 
main  characteristics of every  agreement  related  to Antarctic politics; on  the  contrary, extraterritoriality  cannot be 
considered a guideline: it is an established juridical status which regulates relationships between Antarctic parties. An 
agreement on Antarctic policy  consequent  to  and  related with  the 1959 Washington  Treaty  can be driven by  the 
desire of restoring peace,  fostering scientific research or safeguarding the environment, but  it cannot encourage or 
maintain extraterritoriality, because the  latter  is an already‐established principle – guaranteed by the very existence 




research are the fourth and the eleventh Special Antarctic Consultative Meetings (SATCMs); the 
former led to the elaboration of the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources 
Activities (CRAMRA), while the latter resulted in the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty (better known as the Madrid Protocol). In both forums, mineral exploitation in 
Antarctica was at centre stage in the debate. 
 
3.4: Mineral exploitation in Antarctica 
 
There are, in Eastern Antarctica, large deposits of iron, and there are deposits of copper in the 
Transantarctic Mountains. Both also have deposits of coal, while veins of silver and gold have been 
found in the Antarctic Peninsula and in Adélie Land (Sahurie, 1992, 352-361). Although the 
existence of these mineral resources was already known, it was only after natural gas deposits were 
detected in the Ross Sea (1971-1972) and the oil crisis of 1973-1974 destabilized Western 
economies that ACPs started contemplating the possibility of conducting mineral activities in the 
continent (Joyner, 1996, 154). 
The issue of Antarctic mining was examined and contemplated to such a great extent during 
the 1970s and the 1980s that some authors thought that the mineral issue would transform 
Antarctica into one of the main sources of tension in international politics (Beck, 1983, 3). In fact, 
although there was no certainty on the effective extent and significance of Antarctic mineral 
resources, and although mining would have been extremely expensive given the prohibitive 
environmental conditions (Sahurie, 1992, 352-353), many countries previously alien to Antarctic 
politics started joining the Treaty, attracted by the possibility of access to the mineral resources of 
the southern continent (Beck, 1986, 4). As in the Arctic, claims about the indeterminate extent of 
the continent’s mineral resources and the costliness of their eventual extraction did not induce 
parties to give up on the idea of mining (Suter, 1992, 3). 
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The perspective of negotiations on mining in Antarctica foreshadowed problems and conflicts 
amongst ACPs from the beginning. The USSR, for instance, was keen to develop fishing in the 
continent, but was hostile on mining, given its technological inferiority to the US and the existence 
of an already developed mining sector in its national territory. The United States, on the other hand, 
was divided between the desire for mineral exploitation and the need to appeal to the 
environmentalist sectors of public opinion, an important source of electoral support. In South 
America, Chile desired to use its territorial claim in order to obtain an advantageous position in 
Antarctic mineral negotiations, but was also concerned by the possible consequences of unregulated 
mining, given that its whole fishing industry depended on the health of the Antarctic ecosystem. 
Nevertheless, the increase of diplomatic tensions led to the decision that an agreement on mineral 
exploitation was better than no agreement (Elliott, 1994, 107-109), and ACPs started to meet and to 
establish the guidelines for a treaty regulating mining in the continent. From the beginning, the 
parties agreed that deliberations must follow the consensus rule, in line with the tradition of 
Antarctic diplomatic forums (Joyner, 196, 152). 
The ACPs’ negotiations on mining saw increasing participation by non-state actors, which 
argued that the ATS had the moral and ethical obligation to protect the Antarctic environment, the 
last pristine wilderness of the world, and claimed that Antarctic nature had an intrinsic value, 
independent of human utilitarian interests (Suter, 1992, 1-2). Before the 1970s, the only NGO that 
had a certain influence on Antarctic negotiations was SCAR (Special Committee on Antarctic 
Research). SCAR, however, has been described by some as a “quasi-governmental” organization 
(Herr, 1996, 96-98), since it is the most important source of scientific information within the ATS 
framework, and since its finances are entirely dependent on ACPs; this led some to doubt its 
independence from the influence of national governments’ influence (Sahurie, 1992, 77-78). Once 
the debate over mineral exploitation gained momentum, other NGOs, predominantly 
environmentalist ones, became interested in Antarctic issues. They operated mainly as conveyors of 
information, instruments focused on raising public awareness and advocates of the environmentalist 
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cause. Some NGOs questioned SCAR’s impartiality (Herr, 1996, 98), contested the agendas of 
ACPs and presented an alternative plan that would transform Antarctica in a global natural reserve. 
At the same time, they lobbied some of the countries involved in the negotiating process (Herr, 
1996, 106-107). 
 
3.5: CRAMRA negotiations 
 
In 1975, when the debate on mineral activities in Antarctica had just started, New Zealand proposed 
a permanent moratorium on mining, and the transformation of the continent into a world park 
(Elliott, 1994, 114-115). Nobody supported the proposal, and the forum that led to the elaboration 
of CRAMRA started from the assumption that mineral activities in Antarctica were something to be 
allowed and regulated through an international agreement (Elliott, 1994, 121). ACPs started 
negotiations in 1981 and reached an agreement in June 1988; in November 1988 the agreement was 
opened for signature in Wellington (Joyner, 1998, 73). Negotiations were not characterized by a 
dominant coalition of actors (Elliott, 1994, 122): there were divisions between claimants and non-
claimants, pro-development and environmentalist countries, mining and non-mining states (with the 
latter more interested in Antarctic mining opportunities), 6  and all these divisions overlapped, 
leading to a fluid and confused scenario (Elliott, 1994, 123). 
At any rate, the mandate of the forum, the main justification for the negotiations that led to 
CRAMRA, was exactly the same as any other Antarctic forum, and it was articulated in three main 
principles: maintenance of peace, promotion of free scientific research, and protection of the 
environment. This was clear from the beginning: the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
(ATCM) of 1981, which elaborated Recommendation XI-1 (Joyner, 1996, 154), established that: 
 
6 Non‐mining states,  in  fact, saw  in Antarctica  the possibility  to establish  their own mining  industrial sector, and  to 
access  to mineral  resources  that were not  available  in  their  territory. Mining  states, on  the other hand, were not 
especially interested in starting activities in the Southern continent. Instead, some of them were afraid of the possible 





 ACPs must play a key role in deciding the extent and the regulation 
of mining. 
 The Antarctic Treaty had to be considered in its entirety as the main 
guideline inspiring the upcoming treaty. 
 The protection of the Antarctic environment and of all dependent 
and associated ecosystems must be an issue of primary importance. 
 Mineral exploitation by ATS members should not harm the wider 
interests of mankind. 
 Mineral activities should not have to be a cause of international 
controversies. 
 
Peace, science and environmental protection were therefore the principles inspiring the Convention 
(the mandate of the forum). Furthermore, Antarctica was clearly recognized as a global common, 
and priority was not given to the particularistic interests of ACPs, but to the general and collective 
interest of humankind. 
Nevertheless, CRAMRA negotiations were characterized by a series of overlapping divisions 
generated by conflicting political and economic interests amongst ACPs (Elliott, 1994, 124-125). 
To obtain an agreement based on consensus, negotiations were mostly held in long rounds of closed 
sessions, characterized by secrecy and informality (Elliott, 1994, 125-126). Another interesting 
feature of CRAMRA negotiations was the marginalization of NGOs and of the scientific 
community. Many members of the latter were hostile to mining, while NGOs criticized the 
excessive secrecy of negotiations, contested the efficacy of the proposed mechanisms of 
environmental protection and asserted the international community’s ethical responsibility to 
protect Antarctic wilderness and to ban mineral activities (Elliott, 1994, 127-128). However, almost 
no scientist external to SCAR was considered as a reliable source of information during the forum 
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(Elliott, 1994, 127). The result of twelve long and difficult negotiating sessions was the Convention 
for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA), described by Joyner as a 
complex agreement “broadly arranged to protect the interests of all state parties” (Joyner, 1996, 
160-161), and by Lorraine Elliott as a complicated balancing act between the interests of claimant 
and non-claimant states (Elliott, 1994, 135). 
 
3.6: The Mineral Convention and its demise 
 
CRAMRA provided for the creation of four institutions: 
 
 The Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission, composed of all 
Antarctic Consultative Parties. 
 The Special Meeting of State Parties, composed of all members of 
CRAMRA and having a merely symbolic role. 
 The Scientific, Technical and Environmental Advisory Committee, 
devoid of any decision-making power. 
 Regulatory Committees, formed for specific areas where mineral 
activities were to have taken place, and composed of four claimants 
(including the State that held a claim for that particular area) and six 
non-claimants, including the USA and the USSR. 
 
Mineral activities were divided into three types, governed according to different rules: 
 
 Prospecting actions, aiming at identifying potential mining areas, 
which were completely unrestricted. 
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 Exploratory actions, involving drilling and excavation activities 
aiming at identifying the potential of the deposit, which had to be 
approved by all members of Antarctic Mineral Resources 
Commissions, and later by the two-third majority of the Regulatory 
Committee specifically formed for that particular area. 
 Development actions, indicating the effective exploitation of the 
deposit, which had to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the 
Regulatory Committee. 
 
It is important to remember that the mandate of CRAMRA negotiations was not to elaborate 
an efficient way to organize mining in Antarctica. It was, instead, to make sure that mining 
activities would comply with the three main ATS pillars: maintenance of peace, promotion of free 
scientific research and protection of the environment. This is clearly shown in Article 2 of the 
Convention, which notes the peaceful nature of Antarctica, the need to preserve the Antarctic 
environment and the duty to promote the interest of mankind. Article 2 also establishes that any 
authorization of mining activities had to consider issues of environmental impact, and the third 
paragraph stressed the “special responsibility of the Consultative Parties for the protection of the 
environment”. It also affirmed that the Convention was “an integral part of the Antarctic Treaty 
System”, and that contracting parties had to guarantee that mining activities would be “consistent 
with all the components of the Antarctic Treaty System and the obligations following therefrom”. 
Article 10 reiterated that mining activities had to be consistent with the Antarctic Treaty, the Seals 
Convention, the CCAMLR and “the measure[s] effected pursuant to those agreements”. From this 
evidence we can conclude that the main purpose of the Convention – and the mandate which drove 
CRAMRA negotiations – was not to allow mineral activities, but to protect the continent’s 
environmental and scientific values from those activities. Article 10, in fact, establishes the main 




To protect the Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated 
ecosystems; to respect Antarctica’s significance for its impact upon the 
earth’s environment; to respect other lawful uses of the Antarctic; to respect 
Antarctica’s scientific worth and aesthetic and wilderness values; to ensure 
safe operations in Antarctica; to promote opportunities for fair and effective 
participation by all parties; to take into account the interests of the 
international community. 
 
This extract shows how CRAMRA negotiations were expected to fulfil the three main principles 
enunciated in the Antarctic Treaty. 
The agreement was opened for signature in Wellington, New Zealand, on June 1988 
(Verhoeven, 1992, 11). However, in May 1989 the Australian government – representing the 
country with the largest territorial claim – refused to sign the Convention, claiming that it did not 
provide sufficient protection of the environment and proposing a ban of any mineral activity in the 
continent. This action promptly blocked CRAMRA from coming into force, since Article 62 
established that the Convention could be effective only if ratified by all claimant states (Joyner, 
1996, 162-163). In June 1989, France supported Canberra’s decision, and the two countries 
presented a joint proposal for an environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty that would ban 
mining (Joyner, 1996, 164). Paris and Canberra made their final rejection of the Convention official 
in August 1989 (Verhoeven, 1992, 12), and as a consequence CRAMRA was relegated to juridical 






3.7: New negotiations, towards the Madrid Protocol 
 
Australian and French refusal to sign the Mineral Convention violated, for the first time in the 
history of the ATS, the unspoken rule according to which consensus, once reached during 
negotiations, could not be broken (Elliott, 1994, 166). This generated a heated debate regarding 
mining in Antarctica, involving states, NGOs, scientists and the academic community. In this 
delicate situation, some ACPs recognized, during the Consultative meeting of October 1989, that 
the ATS lacked comprehensiveness and internal coherence as far as environmental protection was 
concerned. During the same meeting, they established, through Recommendation XV-1, the need to 
elaborate an environmental protocol to the Antarctic treaty, in order to make sure that “human 
activity does not have adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment or its dependent or associated 
ecosystems or compromise the scientific, aesthetic or wilderness values of Antarctica” (Joyner, 
1996, 165). 
During this new round of negotiations, the scientific community external to SCAR kept 
supporting a mining ban (Elliott, 1994, 183), while NGOs adopted a double-edged strategy: on the 
one hand, they mobilized public opinion in favour of the French-Australian proposal (Elliott, 1994, 
182); on the other, they provided scientific information in support of a mining ban and attempted to 
lobby the delegations which were participating in the forum (Herr, 1996, 92). As negotiations went 
on, an increasing number of countries started supporting Canberra’s and Paris’s proposal: Belgium, 
Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Greece and South Korea (Vicuña, 1996, 290) – together with the two key 
developing countries of India and China (Joyner, 1996, 164-165) – withdrew their support from the 
Convention. The effective turn, however, took place in February 1990, when New Zealand’s Prime 
Minister Geoffrey Palmer withdrew his support from CRAMRA and advocated a legally-binding 
moratorium on mineral activities (Elliott 1994, 184). From this moment, three of the most important 
actors of the ATS were actively against CRAMRA, while only two countries kept insisting on 
allowing mineral activities: the United Kingdom and the United States (Elliott, 1994, 175). Further 
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negotiations took place in the 11th Special Consultative Meeting in Viña del Mar, Chile, between 
November and December 1990. Here, ACPs established the need to develop binding mechanisms of 
environmental protection and elaborated a first draft of a protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. The draft 
was later reviewed and modified in Madrid, between April and June 1991 (Joyner, 1996, 166). 
Opposition from the UK or the USA could still impede the adoption of the Protocol (Elliott, 1994, 
192), but the new, overwhelming consensus in favour of the mining ban isolated the two countries, 
which were eventually forced to capitulate (Elliott, 1994, 193-194). The Protocol was opened for 
signature in the October 1991 (Joyner, 1996, 166), and came into force the 14th of January 1998 
(Vidas, 2000, 1). 
 
3.8: The Madrid Protocol 
 
Many of the terms and formulations of the Madrid Protocol are similar those of CRAMRA, but 
measures of environmental protection are no longer exclusively applied to mining activities, but to 
every human activity in Antarctica. This is what led Davor Vidas to claim that the Protocol did not 
represent a moment of discontinuity from CRAMRA (Vidas, 2000, 6). Other authors, however, 
have highlighted how, in contrast to other Antarctic documents regulating access and exploitation of 
Antarctic resources (such as, for instance, CCAMLR and CRAMRA) the Protocol did not provide a 
normative framework for sustainable exploitation, but for preservation of the whole continental 
environment (Vicuña, 1006, 289). The Protocol’s importance and innovative potential is clearly 
visible in Article 3: 
 
The protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent associated 
ecosystem and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its wilderness and 
aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct of scientific 
research, in particular research essential to understanding the global 
168 
 
environment, shall be fundamental considerations in the planning and 
conduct of all human activities in the Antarctic Treaty area. 
 
There is a remarkable similarity to CRAMRA’s formulations, but clearly a greater 
commitment to the forum mandate: an intrinsic value is attributed to the Antarctic environment, 
while limitations to human activities are not confined to mining but to every human activity in the 
continent. Article 3 also clarifies that planning of human activities in Antarctica will have to be 
carried on in order to avoid negative effects on: 
 
 Climate or “weather patterns”. 
 Air or water quality. 
 Atmospheric, terrestrial, glacial or maritime environments.  
 The distribution, the quantity and the productivity of some species 
of flora and fauna in Antarctica. 
 Already endangered species.  
 Areas of particular scientific, wilderness, aesthetic or historical 
importance. 
 
Article 7 bans mining in Antarctica, by establishing that “any activity relating to mineral 
resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited”. The Treaty also created the 
Committee for Environmental Protection, with the duty to monitor compliance with the protocol; 
the Committee, however, is devoid of any sanctioning power, and compliance is effectively in the 
hands of contracting parties. Finally, five Annexes were added at the end of the document, 
regulating procedures for environmental impact and assessment, conservation of Antarctic fauna 
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and updates to the agreed measures, waste disposal and management, prevention of marine 
pollution and expansion of protected areas in the continent (Joyner, 1998, 79-80). 
The Protocol established the possibility of organizing a conference for its revision, 50 years 
after its coming into force, to discuss whether to lift the ban on mining. Every amendment, 
however, has to be approved by the majority of all Antarctic Treaty members, and by three-quarters 
of Consultative Parties, including all the states that were Consultative Parties when the Protocol was 
approved. Furthermore, even if an amendment is approved, the previous norms of the Protocol 
remain legally binding until they are replaced by another binding legal treaty regulating mining. 
The new legal regime should: 
 
 Clarify whether mineral activities will be allowed or not.  
 Establish how mineral activities, if allowed, would take place.  
 Protect the principle of Antarctic extraterritoriality and prevent conflicts over 
sovereignty from arising. 
 
If the new mining regime did not come into force within three years from its opening to 
signatures, every contracting party could withdraw from the Protocol, and be free to act unilaterally 
as far as mining was concerned. Although Article 7 did not establish a permanent ban on mining, 
many authors have highlighted how such a ban had been established in practice, considering how 
difficult it will be to lift it given the extremely restrictive amendment procedures (Vicuña, 1996, 
292). 
The Protocol represents a consistent strengthening of the ATS legal framework, since it 
provides a comprehensive system of environmental protection in Antarctica, it is legally binding 
and it gave birth to the first Antarctic international institution entirely concerned with the 
environment (Vidas, 2000, 9). The Protocol’s success is even more clear if one considers how it 
reinforces the principle of environmental protection as a core value of the ATS (Joyner, 1998, 163). 
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It is remarkable that negotiations generating the Madrid Protocol were conducted at an unusually 
quick pace (Joyner, 1996, 165), and some argued that parties were able to reach an agreement so 
soon due to the legitimacy crisis in the ATS. According to Vidas, in fact, the French-Australian 
withdrawal from CRAMRA aggravated conflicts between ACPs and led many politicians, jurists 
and academics to even question the legitimacy of the ATS (Vidas, 2000, 3). As Joyner said: 
 
The fatal flaw with CRAMRA came not to rest on its inability to regulate 
Antarctic mineral resource activities. Rather, it turned on CRAMRA’s 
perceived lack of efficacy and a widespread belief that the regime could not 
effectively prevent environmental degradation of the pristine Antarctic 
(Joyner, 1996a, 167). 
 
3.9: Comparing the CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol forums 
 
Both the CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol negotiations were driven by the same mandate, the 
same collective intention, articulated in three main principles: peace, freedom of science and 
environmental protection. The mandate is not the only similarity that these two Antarctic 
negotiations shared: they took place very close in time (CRAMRA negotiations ended in 1988, 
while those that led to the Madrid Protocol began immediately after, and were concluded in the 
beginning of 1990s), and the international actors participating in the negotiations were almost the 
same. Furthermore, both rounds of negotiations took place within the diplomatic framework of the 
Antarctic Treaty System, and the binding nature of agreements, the method of deliberation, the 
norms regulating the debate and the institutional structure of the forums were therefore identical. 
Even the topics debated were very similar, since the issue of mineral exploitation in Antarctica was 
at the centre of both forum debates. 
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The outputs of these two rounds of negotiations, however, could not be more different. The 
Mineral Convention went through heavy criticism as far as its legitimacy was concerned: many 
claimed that it did not sufficiently respect the ATS main principles, while others claimed that the 
Convention’s governance mechanisms were too difficult to implement or ineffective in achieving 
the main goals of the treaty. These contestations later led some key actors to withdraw from the 
Convention, relegating it to a sort of “juridical limbo”. On the other hand, the Madrid Protocol, 
despite its limitations, was hailed by many as an effective and legitimate agreement, able to foster 
the main principles of the Antarctic Treaty System. It was ratified rather quickly, and since then it 
has been effectively implemented and it has shown juridical strength and a clear capacity to achieve 
its main goals. Thus, two rounds of negotiations, attended by almost the same participating actors, 
driven by the same mandate, taking place in a very similar historical period, debating very similar 
issues while being located within the same diplomatic framework, delivered radically different 
outputs, as far as their legitimacy was concerned. 
The previous chapter identified the legitimacy of the forum’s output as its level of acceptance, 
both amongst forum members (internal legitimacy) and the international community as a whole 
(external legitimacy). The Mineral Convention lacked both: internally, some of the most important 
ATS members refused to sign it, describing it as unable to fulfil its own mandate; externally, 
CRAMRA led an increasing number of authors, politicians, NGOs and international organizations 
to question the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the whole Antarctic diplomatic framework. Some 
authors argued that CRAMRA was the final evidence that ACPs supported mining on the continent, 
betraying their mandate of protecting the Antarctic environment (Hussain, 1992, 90), while a 
number of developing countries started to ask, in the UN General Assembly, for radical changes to 
the ATS legal framework (Vidas, 2000, 3). This shows how CRAMRA’s perceived lack of 
legitimacy led not only to the agreement’s demise, but also to a legitimacy crisis that endangered 
the whole Antarctic international regime. The Madrid Protocol, on the other hand, was perceived as 
legitimate both internally and externally: internally, it was swiftly accepted and ratified by all 
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ACPs, and it is still one of the pillars of the Antarctic Treaty System; externally, its coming into 
force led most criticisms of the ATS to die down, restoring the international community’s trust in 
the Antarctic system of governance. 
Governments, scientists, NGOs, politicians and the public opinion perceived this difference of 
legitimacy by considering the ability of the two agreements to fulfil the ATS mandate of peace, 
science and environmental protection. Countries who opposed the Convention, both inside and 
outside the ATS, persistently argued that CRAMRA was neglecting its very mandate. Many pointed 
out how mineral exploitation could lead to disputes between countries (Verhoeven, 1992, 13-14), 
while others stressed that allowing mineral activities could endanger scientific freedom: indeed, 
economic competition could discourage ATS countries from sharing certain discoveries, aiming to 
maintain advantages in mining (Joyner, 1996, 170). Others attempted to show how just the fact that 
the Convention allowed mineral activities made mining more likely to take place, thus endangering 
the Antarctic environment (Bush, 1992, 71). Opponents constantly questioned some of the main 
provisions of the Convention, claiming that they were not sufficiently coherent with the mandate 
and the core values of the ATS. Some criticized the fact that prospecting activities were unrestricted 
(Vicuña, 1996, 275); others questioned the part of the treaty stating that mining must pose a risk for 
“significant” alterations in the “distribution, abundance or productivity of populations of species of 
flora and fauna” in order to be forbidden, without providing any precise definition of the term 
“significant” (Bush, 1992, 75). The Advisory Committee and the Regulatory Committees, two of 
the institutions created by CRAMRA, were heavily criticized, the first because it lacked any 
decision-making power (Joyner, 1996, 169) and the second because the principle of assessing 
environmental impact uniquely on the area in which mining would take place did not consider the 
potential consequences for all Antarctic ecosystems (Vicuña, 1996, 276). The general narrative of 
those opposing CRAMRA was that states’ exclusive responsibility for implementing the agreement 
generated a conflict of interests, since governments that could benefit from mining activities had, in 
theory, the duty to restrict them (Vicuña, 1996, 275). 
173 
 
The Madrid Protocol did not escape criticism either: some argued that too stringent 
environmental protection mechanisms would endanger the freedom of research, by excessively 
limiting scientific activities in the continent. Others claimed that, while the Protocol was valid only 
from the 60th Parallel to the south, Antarctic ecosystems extended beyond that line and some sub-
Antarctic islands were excluded from the agreement (Joyner, 1998, 165). Finally, some pointed out 
the absence of any instrument of coercion or punishment in case of rules infraction, and that thus 
states remained the only actors with the power to implement the Protocol’s provisions (Joyner, 
1998, 166). While, however, critiques of CRAMRA were structural, addressing the whole 
Convention and challenging its ability to fulfil the Antarctic mandate, criticisms of the Protocol 
focused on technical, procedural questions, relating to implementation of the treaty, not the treaty 
itself. 
It is therefore possible to see how two very similar international forums delivered very 
different outputs as far as legitimacy was concerned. This research claims that the reason for that 
difference was a different distribution of types of statement within these two forums. The Madrid 
Protocol negotiations registered a higher frequency of collectivist statements, and thus their output 
was more legitimate.7 
One could at this point argue that CRAMRA negotiations – and their failure – played an 
important role in shaping the output of Madrid Protocol’s negotiations. If, indeed, it is true that the 
output of CRAMRA negotiations was not able to fulfil the ATS mandate, and that this led the ATS 
to endure a serious legitimacy crisis, why not to argue that the Madrid Protocol negotiations were 
more successful than CRAMRA ones exactly because ACPs wanted to avoid another diplomatic 
failure and to address the criticisms that were directed against them? If this claim is endorsed, is it 
still possible to consider CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol as two distinct cases that share many 
 
7 When addressing the legitimacy of the Madrid Protocol, this thesis does not necessarily claim that this international 




structural similarities? Or should they be considered as two sequential stages of the same 
negotiating process? 
These are important questions to ask, but it is important to remark that the 4th and the 11th 
SATCMs should not be considered as parts of the same negotiating process. In fact, while both 
forums were driven by the same, overall mandate of peace, science, and environmental protection, 
such mandate was articulated differently in the two forums. CRAMRA negotiations aimed at 
establishing an international regime that would protect Antarctica from the negative environmental 
consequences of mining activities. The Madrid Protocol negotiations wanted to unite all previous 
Antarctic environmental agreements into a coherent whole. Furthermore, the two forums were 
organized in different SATCMs, and are considered by the very ATS as two different rounds of 
negotiations.8 Therefore, CRAMRA and Madrid Protocol negotiations should be considered as two 
distinct forums. The hypothesis that the output of CRAMRA negotiations may have played a role in 
the output of Madrid Protocol negotiations is an interesting one, but to test such a hypothesis is not 
the purpose of this dissertation.  
 
3.10: Limitations of the case study 
 
The main limitation of this case selection lies in the research inference potential: it might be argued 
that since Antarctic negotiations take place outside the United Nations international framework, are 
driven by peculiar and perhaps unique dynamics, are influenced by a particular history and by 
particular conventions, they are not comparable to other international forums. At the same time, it is 
impossible to overlook the many similarities between the Antarctic negotiations and other global 
commons ones: tensions between developing and developed countries; the necessity of a clear 
evaluation of the environmental impact of human actions; particularistic intentions hampering the 
fulfilment of the collective one; the importance of scientific knowledge; the indirect influence of 
 




NGOs and the scientific community; and problems regarding national sovereignty – all are typical 
traits of every global commons international forum (Elliott, 1994, 120-128). Finally, despite the 
uniqueness of Antarctica in international politics, the continent has often been regarded by 
politicians and authors as a “political laboratory”, which provided mechanisms later used as models 
in other contexts; the de-nuclearization of the continent, established in the 1959 Washington Treaty, 
for instance, later inspired many similar international resolutions involving South America, Africa 
and the South Pacific Ocean (Suter, 1992, 7). 
Of course, it would be very difficult to argue that any conclusions reached through the study 
of two very similar Antarctic forums could be irrefutably applied to all global commons 
international forums. This, however, is not the purpose of this thesis. Its two main objectives are 
instead the following: to build a conceptual and methodological framework by which to isolate and 
categorize different types of statement made during international negotiations and to take 
preliminary steps in assessing whether the model can deliver plausible and empirically testable 
hypotheses. If the model emerges from these empirical tests as consistent, plausible and effective, it 












Chapter Four – Setting the Methodology: Qualitative Content Analysis 
of Forum Interactions 
 
While outlining its theoretical model in the second chapter, this thesis identified three types of 
statement that can be made during international forums: collectivist, particularistic and procedural. 
It has also hypothesized that higher frequencies of collectivism during negotiations are likely to lead 
to greater legitimacy of the forum’s output. The third chapter has described the selected empirical 
cases – the CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol Antarctic negotiations – and provided an 
explanation of the logic behind the case selection process. In order to test the hypothesis deriving 
from the theoretical model, the research looks at the two Antarctic forums in order to assess the 
frequency with which each type of statement recurs. Furthermore, it aims to assess whether the 
forum which resulted in a more legitimate output (the Madrid Protocol) presented a higher 
frequency of collectivism, than the Mineral Convention. 
For this empirical analysis, a method by which to measure the frequencies of different types 
of forum statements must be identified. This chapter selects the type of empirical data to analyse. 
Furthermore, it picks a sample amongst the available data while explaining why such a sample can 
be considered representative. Finally, it chooses the method of analysis. 
 
4.1: Selecting the data to consider 
 





 Internal official documents: 1 Minutes, statements, papers, 
declarations and any other form of official documents presented by 
forum participants during the negotiation rounds. 
 External official documents: Public statements, press releases, 
parliamentary and governmental debates concerning the topics 
discussed within the forum. 
 Unofficial documents: Private correspondence between diplomatic 
delegations and their national governments, or informal 
communications between two or more forum participants. 
 Interviews: Interviews with diplomatic personnel and other 
individuals who took part in the forum negotiations or that witnessed 
them. 
 
This thesis does not consider external official documents, for two main reasons. First, the 
theoretical model focuses on social interactions that take place within the forum, during negotiating 
rounds, between participating actors. Thus, any interaction between forum participants and other 
subjects external to the forum – be it ministers, MPs, journalists, party members, the public et cetera 
– should not be considered. Second, although these types of data might be useful in order to 
understand the agenda and the priorities of certain actors before and during the negotiations, 
obtaining this information is not the purpose of the thesis. This dissertation, in fact, aims clearly to 
isolate and categorize the different types of statement that can be made during international 
 









forums.2 For the same reason, unofficial documents are not considered either: first because they 
often involve interactions between members of the forum and a party external to it (i.e. letters from 
a certain diplomatic delegation to their Ministry of Foreign Affairs); second because, even in case 
of unofficial documents which describe an interaction between forum participants, they describe 
informal interactions that do not take place in front of all forum participants, and they therefore are 
not useful for the purposes of this research. 
Interviews, on the other hand, could be useful in order to understand forum dynamics with 
greater depth. Basing the hypothesis-testing on elite interviews, however, might be problematic, 
mostly because clearly to distinguish the frequencies of collectivism, particularism and 
proceduralism within two forums one needs to examine the highest possible number of statements 
made by forum participants, with particular attention to the act of speech in itself rather than to the 
actors’ inner dispositions. This is difficult to do through interviews, where a researcher relies on the 
memories of the interviewed; this difficulty is even greater in cases, like the two Antarctic forums, 
that took place three decades ago. Furthermore, risks connected with elite interviews – especially 
the bias of the interviewed – have already been examined in previous chapters. 
Finally, interviews are what Klaus Krippendorff identified as an obtrusive method of analysis. 
According to him, obtrusive methods are “acts of measurement [that] interfere with the phenomena 
being assessed and [that] create contaminated observations; the greater the observer probes, the 
greater the severity of contamination” (Krippendorff, 2013, 45). Krippendorff meant that testing a 
hypothesis through “controlled experiments, interviews, focus groups, surveys and projective tests” 
would lead subjects to be aware that they are being observed and tested; thus their reactions, their 
answers and the information they provide could be influenced by this awareness, undermining the 
objectivity of the research (Krippendorff, 2013, 45). Of course, this research does not claim that 






method that should be implemented when looking at international forums in order to systematically 
distinguish between different types of statement and to measure the frequency of each type. While 
this research does not use interviews as an instrument of hypothesis-testing, it resorts to elite 
interviews as a way of confirming the validity of methodological procedures: members of the 
diplomatic personnel have been interviewed in order to assess whether certain methodological 
choices reflected the nature and the characteristics of “real world” international forums. 
Internal official documents, on the other hand, are the record of actors’ behaviour during 
negotiations, and are data that can be examined also when the forum took place many years in the 
past. Furthermore, as textual analysis is an unobtrusive method (Krippendorff, 2013, 45), most risks 
of “contaminated observations” can be avoided. That is why the empirical analysis considers only 
this type of source.  
 
4.2: Types of internal official documents 
 
The empirical analysis looks at two Antarctic forums: the 4th SATCM and the 11th SATCM. A 
researcher approaching these two forums encounters a great number of documents of very different 
types: treaty drafts, meeting reports, formal statements, working papers, speeches and so on. 
Examining all these documents might be problematic, for three main reasons. First, analysing all the 
available data would be extremely time-consuming, especially since the research relies on the work 
of just one coder. Second, it is necessary to examine documents that can provide information on 
how subjects interacted within a forum, and many of the forum documents are not useful for this 
purpose: there are administrative reports, proposed amendments to an existing draft, and papers 
discussing procedural or legal issues, that are devoid of any reference to the actors’ forum 
interactions. Finally, the research relies on available documents, and it is impossible to access every 
paper ever written in the course of the two examined Antarctic meetings. Thus, using all available 
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documents might over-represent certain actors, simply because there would be more documents 
available from a certain state. 
These considerations suggest that this paper should examine a sample of documents which is: 
 
 Limited: There cannot be an excessive number of documents, in 
order to allow a single coder to carry on the analysis within a 
reasonable period of time. 
 Pertinent: The sampled documents must be useful for understanding 
how forum participants interacted with each other; procedural and 
administrative material must be excluded, along with all other 
irrelevant data. 
 Representative: Within the chosen sample, no country should be 
over-represented. 
 
For these three reasons, this research focuses on countries’ statements, speeches and 
declarations. 3  These are surely pertinent, since they offer a clear portrait of the actors’ main 
positions and attitudes within a forum. The assumption that countries’ diplomatic speeches and 
statements are relevant for understanding countries’ positions has been confirmed by interviewing a 
former member of a diplomatic mission to the UN.4 During the interview, he said that the official 












It reflects what it [the country] wants to obtain; obviously, like in every 
negotiation […] some countries might start from a very “strong” position 
and later on de-escalate their requests. This means that things said in a 
diplomatic statement are not “red lines” – things that states would never 
compromise on – but that they reflect what is their overall position in the 
negotiation. 
 
Thus, diplomatic speeches are proper diplomatic statements, acts of speech that can also be 
considered representative of the general behaviour of participating actors.5 The topics outlined in 
these documents, and the way those topics were expressed, can provide a portrait of the types of 
statement made by each forum participant. These documents are also a representative type of 
source, since, during an international forum, usually every country wishing actively to participate in 
negotiations delivers one. Thus, the set of statements and speeches delivered during a forum can be 
considered a pertinent and representative portrait of actors’ behaviour in the course of negotiations. 
 
4.3: Sampling available data 
 
This study’s empirical analysis looks at the Fourth and the Eleventh Special Antarctic Consultative 
Meetings (SATCMs), which led to the creation respectively of CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol. 
These two forums, however, extended across different rounds: the fourth SATCM was spread 
across twelve rounds of negotiations, and the eleventh SATCM across four. Delegations did not 
 








provide diplomatic statements each time they met.6 It is therefore necessary to select a sample of 
data that would allow a limited, pertinent and representative comparison of the two forums. This 
research analyses the last sessions of both the fourth and the eleventh Special Antarctic Consultative 
Meetings.7 The main justification for this sampling selection is the following: this paper’s empirical 
analysis is structured as a most-similar case study, and these rounds of negotiations share many 
similarities as far as their structural characteristics are concerned.8 
First, the IV-12 and the XI-4 SATCMs were attended by almost the same actors: the former 
saw the participation of 33 delegations, the latter of 41, and 32 countries sat in both meetings. The 
similarities are even greater between the groups of Antarctic Consultative Parties (ACPs) that 
participated in the meetings, which are the only delegations whose statements this research 
considers.9 The IV-12 SATCM saw the participation of 20 ACPs, and the XI-4 of 26; 95% of 
Consultative Parties delegations that sat in the VI-12 SATCM participated in the XI-4 SATCM as 













second,  there  are  no  available  documents  of  the  VI‐1  SATCM  in  English,  since  the  only  version  provided  in  the 
Antarctic Treaty database is the Russian one. 












The two forum sessions are also very similar as far as the time span is concerned: the IV-12 
SATCM took place in the spring of 1988, while the XI-4 SATCM was held in the Autumn of 1991; 
only two years and four months separate them. Moreover, the two forum sessions are also similar if 
one looks at the issues which were debated within them: in both forum sessions ACPs elaborated 
the final draft of an international agreement concerning the environmental protection of Antarctica, 
and delivered speeches and statements presenting each country’s position in the negotiation. 
Finally, both forum sections were held within the diplomatic framework and the membership, 
debate and decision-making procedures of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
However, it might be argued that the differences between the two negotiation rounds may be 
in the internal political structure of participants. Between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s, the world was shaken by significant political changes. South America went through a 
process of political transition that saw the end of military dictatorships and the birth of new 
democratic regimes; South Africa initiated a process of democratization; and the communist 
governments of the Eastern Bloc unravelled. These changes also affected some of the ACPs. Can, 
therefore, the IV-12 and the XI-4 SATCMs still be considered most-similar cases? 
As far as South America is concerned, only one ACP underwent significant political changes 
due to a process of democratic transition: Chile. Five South American Consultative Parties changed 
presidents between the two forums, but these changes were due to democratic elections, and did not 
imply significant constitutional ruptures. Furthermore, it is also very difficult to define a clear 
electoral trend: while in Argentina, Peru and Uruguay a right-wing administration replaced a left-
wing one, Ecuador witnessed an opposite change, while Brazil saw an alternation in the Presidency 
between a centrist party and a right-wing one. Finally, while it is true that Peru went through 
significant constitutional changes at the beginning of the 1990s, it is also true that President Alberto 
Fujimori dissolved the Congress only in 1992, and that he must still be considered a constitutionally 



































Figure 6: Countries participating in the IV-12 and XI-4 Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
 
In South Africa, the National Party was in charge both in the spring of 1988 and in the 
autumn of 1991, and the transition from apartheid to a democratic government was still at its 
earliest stages. The greatest political changes amongst ACPs occurred in the Eastern Bloc. Four 
countries that sat as communist regimes during the IV-12 SATCM participated as democratic 
governments in the XI-1 SATCM.12 However, only one was a Consultative Party (Poland), while 
 






the Soviet Union – the leading country of the Eastern Bloc and key ATS actor – was still ruled by 
the Communist Party during the XI-4 SATCM, and Gorbachev was still its head of state.13 
 
4.4: Method of analysis 
 
After selecting and sampling the set of data with which to conduct the empirical analysis, it is 
necessary to decide how to analyse those data. There are many different ways to approach official 
forum documents, and this section only considers some of the main methods. 
One of them is narrative event analysis, described by Larry Griffith and Robert Korstad as an 
approach aiming to “unpack an event, […] breaking it into its constituent parts and analytically 
reconstructing it as a causal interpretation of what happened and why it happened as it did” (Griffin 
and Korstad, 1998, 145). This approach would be ideal for a researcher aiming to understand why a 
certain forum delivered a specific output, or why certain forums were characterized by a higher 
frequency of collectivist statements than others. This thesis, however, attempts to measure the 
frequency of the three main types of forum statements within the two selected samples, without 
answering causal questions. 
Similar reasoning should be applied when considering process-tracing, described as a way to 
“explore the chain of events or decision-making by which initial case conditions are translated into 
case outcomes” (Van Evera, 1997, 64). The objective of the present research is not to track the 
evolution of an international regime through the analysis of its decision-making mechanisms, nor it 





be  for  actors’  interactions. What  if  these  sessions  do  not  represent  the  dynamics  of  their  forums?  This  possible 
criticism is tackled in the next chapter. After analysing the IV‐12 and the XI‐4 SATCM sessions, it will explain why these 
two sessions could be considered representative of the two forums encompassing them. It does so by providing clear 




extremely useful for these purposes, but it is not suited to examining the frequency of specific types 
of statement within a forum. 
Discourse analysis is, on the other hand, a very broad term encompassing a number of 
methods (Potter, 2008, 217). Nevertheless, all these approaches share certain hallmarks: they 
attempt to study the discourse, the way events are contextualized in a certain representation of 
reality, and the way such contextualization attributes a particular meaning and interpretation to 
those events (Holzscheiter, 2013, 144). In other words, discourse analysis attempts to study 
conceptual frameworks, and to examine how they shape the understanding of reality amongst 
political actors (Schreier, 2012, 46-47). The evolution of discourse as far as a particular issue is 
concerned is a long and complex phenomenon, and it is influenced by a great number of actors and 
contingencies – many of them external to a diplomatic forum. This research, however, does not aim 
to study how changes in the discourse may influence the frequency of types of statement within 
negotiations; nor it does try to assess how the recurrence of certain types of statement may change 
the discourse revolving around the forum’s mandate. Instead, it considers the forum’s mandate as an 
exogenous datum, and discourse analysis is therefore not fit for the purpose of this case study. 
Finally, “Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2013, 24; 
emphasis suppressed). It is a method that, by analysing a body of text through the lens of an 
analytical construct (a coding scheme), aims to provide an answer to a research question 
(Krippendorff, 2013, 35-36). This type of analysis, then, tries to elaborate replicable techniques of 
text analysis, and to produce valid results, “in the sense that the research effort is open to careful 
scrutiny and the resulting claims can be upheld in the face of independently available evidence” 
(Krippendorff, 2013, 24-25). It is a particularly appropriate method in the examination of textual 
material (Krippendorff, 2013, 24-26), it has often been used for hypothesis testing (Krippendorff, 
2013, 91-92) and it tries to “categorize textual data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual 
categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables of themes” (Julien, 
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2008, 217). This thesis’s aims to build a model able systematically to examine the statements made 
by forum participants; to classify them in specific categories (collectivism, particularism and 
proceduralism) in a reliable and valid way; and to elaborate plausible and empirically-testable 
hypotheses. Thus, content analysis seems to be the right approach to take. There are some issues as 
far as the inference potential of content analysis is concerned, but these are addressed in the next 
section. 
 
4.5: Qualitative or quantitative content analysis 
 
Usually, content analysis has been associated with quantitative research. Many authors, however, 
have highlighted how “qualitative approaches to text interpretation are not incompatible with 
content analysis” (Krippendorff, 2013, 89). According to Margit Schreier, the most significant 
difference between qualitative and quantitative content analysis is the following: qualitative content 
analysis focuses on “latent meaning, meaning that is not immediately obvious”, while “quantitative 
content analysis focuses on manifest, literal meaning” (Schreier, 2012, 15). She also claims that 
qualitative content analysis is considered to be the best choice to take when “the meaning of […] 
[the analysed text] is less obvious, when interpretation is needed” (Schreier, 2012, 29). In this 
research, every statement made in the two forums has to be analysed in order to answer the 
following question: which intention is this statement aiming to fulfil? Answering this question 
requires a high degree of interpretation, and the coding scheme needs to be shaped according to the 
characteristics and the particularities of the examined forum.14 For these reasons, the method to be 
followed is that of qualitative content analysis. 
 
14 Indeed,  the  forum’s mandate  is considered  to be  the empirical  translation of  the collective  intention, and  forum 
statements have  to be examined  in order  to understand whether  they are  referring  to  the  forum’s mandate or  to 






Qualitative content analysis has not often been used for hypothesis testing: qualitative studies, 
in fact, usually rely on a smaller body of data, and this can hinder the achievement of satisfactory 
standards of reliability and of statistical inference. However, the aim of this research is not to 
confirm or disconfirm the inference potential of the theoretical model,15 but to test its plausibility; 
this more modest type of hypothesis testing mitigates the objections to the use of qualitative content 
analysis. Further justification for the use of qualitative content analysis in order to build a 
plausibility probe for the research theoretical model is the following: qualitative content analysis is 
indeed a qualitative method, and it takes specific context of the case study into account; however, it 
does so much less extensively than other qualitative methods, allowing a higher level of 
generalization of findings (Schreier, 2012, 31). Finally, qualitative content analysis involves 
subjective interpretation of the latent meaning of available text, and it is therefore undoubtedly a 
subjective, reflexive approach.16 However, it is also true that “the goal [of qualitative content 
analysis] is to arrive at a socially shared, consensual understanding” and that “this socially shared 
understanding should transcend […] individual background and assumptions” (Schreier, 2013, 31). 
To sum up, qualitative content analysis is a good fit for this research for two main reasons. 
First, its qualitative nature allows a better study of data which require a higher degree of 
interpretation. Second, its stress on reliability and validity, its being “systematic” (Schreier, 2012, 
5), and its process of reducing and generalizing findings in more abstract terms (Schreier, 2012, 7) 
allow a higher degree of generalization of its findings, and it is therefore a satisfactory type of 












4.6: Context and unitization 
 
The steps that Schreier identified in order to implement a qualitative content analysis are the 
following (Schreier, 2012, 6): 
 
 Decide on a research question. 
 Select the material (the data) to analyze. 
 Build a coding scheme through which to analyse those data. 
 Divide the data into units of coding. 
 Conduct preliminary tests to the coding frame, in order to assess its 
reliability. 
 Apply the coding scheme to the whole body of text. 
 Interpret and present the findings. 
 
As previously established, the question that the research wants to answer is the following: 
“How can one measure the frequency of the different types of statement made during international 
forums?”, while the analysed data are diplomatic statements and declarations of the IV-12 and the 
XI-4 Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. These two basic points having been 
established, it is necessary to start building a coding scheme to serve as a basis for the qualitative 
content analysis. Before doing that, however, one needs to provide a context on which to build the 
coding frame, and to unitize the text. 
Krippendorff has stressed how a coding scheme has to be built around a context “within 
which to make sense of the body of text” (Krippendorff, 2013, 35), i.e., the conceptual framework 
that shapes the structure of the coding scheme. In this research, the context is provided by the 
theoretical model of forum social interactions outlined in the second chapter, that distinguishes 
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between collectivist, particularistic and proceduralist types of forum statements. The coding 
scheme, therefore, has to operationalize this context. 
After identifying the context at the base of the coding scheme, another preliminary step needs 
to be taken: the unitization of data. As Krippendorff said, “unitizing draws systematic distinctions 
within a continuum of otherwise undifferentiated text […] that are of interest to an analysis” 
(Krippendorff, 2013, 84). How, in fact, is the content analysis applied to the available data? Should 
every diplomatic speech be considered a single unit, to be classified as an example of collectivism, 
particularism or proceduralism? This choice might be problematic, since diplomatic speeches are 
complex documents, that represent a summary of the behaviour displayed by subjects participating 
in the forum. It is very unlikely that actors would display a single type of behaviour during 
negotiations (Kotzian, 2007, 86), and a single opening speech should therefore be considered a 
complex document, composed by different types of statement assembled into a single strategy. 
Speeches must, then, be divided into smaller units, the “bricks”, the atoms of the content analysis – 
the indivisible textual sections that will be categorized (Krippendorff, 2013, 98). 
There are different ways to divide opening speeches into smaller units. One way could be to 
identify, in each of the selected documents, specific moments in which the speaker changes a topic 
and starts considering another issue. While this “thematic” criterion (Schreier, 2012, 143) might 
offer a more insightful look at each document, it could lead to weaknesses of the coding scheme’s 
reliability: choosing a unitizing system as subjective as the “thematic criterion”, in fact, might lead 
to a situation where different coders would divide the text into different units, hampering the 
replicability of the analysis – especially in contexts such as that of qualitative content analysis, 
where a higher degree of subjective interpretation is already involved. 
A “formal” criterion of unitization (Schreier, 2012, 143), on the other hand, means to divide 
the text by following clear indicators: data could be segmented in words, quasi-sentences, 
sentences, paragraphs or pages. This approach might be a less insightful one, but, on the other hand, 
it delivers higher levels of replicability, since every coder should divide the text in the same way. 
191 
 
Choosing a formal criterion of segmentation also requires the investigator to identify the way to 
divide data into sections that is most suited for the purpose of the study. The qualitative nature of 
the analysis makes the text division into words unsuitable; on the other hand, dividing the text in 
units that are too wide, such as paragraphs or pages, might lead to problems as well, since opening 
speeches contain different types of statement, and units that are too big might not be able to 
effectively separate them. Because of this, the thesis divides the data into sentences, since it 
considers this type of unitization broad enough to allow interpretation of actors’ behaviour and 
narrow enough to isolate single types of interaction. 
 
4.7: Categories of the coding scheme 
 
To build a coding scheme means to bridge “the gap between texts and someone’s reading of them”, 
in order to deliver “durable and analysable records of otherwise transient phenomena” and to 
“transform unedited texts […] into analysable representations” (Krippendorff, 2013, 85). It means, 
in this research, to elaborate a systematic way to assess each sentence of the examined body of text. 
It has been already pointed out how the analysed text needs to be divided into sentences, and that 
each of these sentences are examined through the lens of a coding scheme, in order to determine 
whether they belong to the categories of collectivism, particularism or proceduralism. This process 
is described as “categorical distinction”, since units are classified according to “their membership in 
a class or category” (Krippendorff, 2013, 106). 
In a coding scheme, categories should be (Schreier, 2012, 75-77): 
 
 Mutually exclusive: a sentence can only belong to one category. 
 Exhaustive: every sentence has to be classifiable into one of the 
existing categories. 




The first three categories of this coding scheme are the following: 
 
 Proceduralism: type of statement relying on ethical and consistency 
validities advocating the observance of pre-established norms. 
 Collectivism: type of statement relying on material, ethical and 
consistency validities focused on the fulfilment of the collective 
intention. 
 Particularism: type of statement relying on material, ethical and 
consistency validities trying to achieve one or more particularistic 
intentions. 
 
During the analysis, however, one could encounter sentences that do not belong to any of 
these three categories, and are only an example of the many formalities enacted during international 
negotiations – such as, for instance, the thanking of the forum’s chairperson. In order to fulfil the 
principle of saturation, then, another category is included in the coding scheme, designated as 
“other”, encompassing all those sentences that do not fit the previous three categories and that are 
therefore irrelevant for the study. This procedure has already been extensively applied in works 
relying on qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2012, 82). 
The coding scheme, therefore, has four categories: three of them are significant ones, and 
represent the different types of forum statements, while the fourth one includes all the irrelevant 
material. However, these categories are theoretical ideal-types, and, in order to be able to 
empirically categorize each unit of text in a clear and precise fashion, one needs a more solid 
empirical base. Usually, this is achieved by taking the relevant categories and further dividing them 
into sub-categories, which would include all the possible empirical manifestations of the three types 
of ideal statements; these sub-categories should also follow the principles of mutual exclusivity, 
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exhaustiveness and saturation (Schreier, 2012, 59-60). In this research, a similar approach to the 
analysis of empirical data could be implemented as follows: each relevant category could be divided 
into sub-categories that referred to one of the particular validities of the type of statement. For 
instance, collectivism is a category that includes all sentences relying on material, ethical and 
consistency validities aiming to fulfil the collective intention; collectivism could then be divided 
into three sub-categories, each of them referring to a particular type of validity. 
The problem with this approach, however, is the following: the theoretical model presented in 
the second chapter does not claim that collectivism can rely on anyone of these three validities, nor 
does it argue that, for a statement to be considered an example of collectivism, it has to rely on all 
the three validities of collectivism. Indeed, collectivism is presented as a type of statement that 
addresses the collective intention while relying on material validity and/or ethical validity and/or 
consistency validity; the same reasoning goes for the other two types of statement. Given the 
characteristics that the theoretical model attributes to forum statements, then, the division of each 
category into subcategories according to their validities would not work, because the same sentence 
could be put into more than one subcategory, and this would mean not respecting the principle of 
mutual exclusivity. The coding scheme at the base of this content analysis, then, does not rely on 
subcategories, and employs only the distinction between the aforementioned categories of 
collectivism, particularism, proceduralism and other. 
Most qualitative content analysis relies on coding schemes that are built by both concept-
driven and data-driven procedures: 
 
A typical “mix” would be to come up with important topics based on what 
you already know and to turn these into main categories; this first step 
would be the concept-driven part of the procedure. In a second step, you 
specify what is said about these topics by creating subcategories based on 
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your material; this is the data-driven part of this strategy (Schreier, 2012, 
89). 
 
However, since this coding scheme is not relying on subcategories, it follows a slightly 
different approach. The creation of the four different categories is concept-driven, since it is shaped 
by the concepts provided by the theoretical framework. On the other hand, choice of the empirical 
indicators that assess where amongst the four categories a sentence should be classified is data-
driven, following the method of subsumption (Schreier, 2012, 115). Applying the process of 
subsumption means that there needs to be a synthesis between the theory-driven definitions of 
forum types of statement and the empirical reality of forum negotiations. One needs to examine the 
empirical data to see whether there are terms, expressions, formulations that are pertinent to one of 
the theory’s main categories; the terms, expressions and formulations pertinent to a category are 
then considered to be the empirical indicators of that category (Schreier, 2012, 115-116). This 
process of subsumption has been applied while examining all diplomatic speeches of the IV-12 and 
the XI-4 SATCMs, and it led to a list of empirical indicators for each of the three types of statement 
contemplated by the theoretical model. The result is the following: 
 
 Empirical indicators of collectivism 
o It has already been pointed out how statements characterized 
as collectivism aim at the fulfilment of the forum’s collective 
intention and justify themselves by relying on material, 
ethical and consistency validities. The second chapter argued 
that the forum’s mandate should be considered the empirical 
manifestation of the forum’s collective intention. Finally, 
when describing collectivism’s mechanisms of validation, 
this paper has stipulated that the material validity of a claim, 
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in case of this form of interaction, depends on whether it can 
be demonstrated that a certain choice or a certain policy is 
the one that has more chances to fulfil the forum’s mandate. 
o Starting from this, every sentence that advocates the 
fulfilment of the forum’s mandate, that mentions the 
importance of the issues at the base of the forum’s mandate, 
or that simply refers to them, should be considered as an 
example of collectivism. In the specific case of Antarctic 
policy, the mandate at the base of every forum is threefold: 
protection of the Antarctic environment, promotion of 
freedom of scientific research within the Southern Continent, 
and use of Antarctica exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
Thus, any sentence specifically advocating these objectives, 
or simply referring to them, should be considered an 
empirical indicator of collectivism. 
o Furthermore, the standard of ethical validity invoked by 
collectivist statements is whether a certain policy is the best 
and the most moral thing to do for everyone involved. In 
international forums involving the administration of a global 
common (as it is the case for the Antarctic forum), the whole 
of humanity is involved; in the Antarctic context, then 
collectivist arguments for the ethical validity of a decision 
rely on the claim that a certain choice is best for humankind. 
Any reference to humanity or humankind, to the need for 
protecting it or to act on its behalf should be considered an 
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example of collective reasoning invoking considerations that 
give that kind of argument ethical validity. 
o Finally, the consistency validity of collectivist statements 
depends on demonstrating that acting to fulfil the forum’s 
mandate is the most coherent thing to do, since the forum’s 
mandate is the only reason forum participants gather in the 
first place. Hence, any sentence in which actors are asked to 
focus on their “common interests” rather than on their 
respective differences should be considered as an empirical 
manifestation of collectivism. 
 Empirical indicators of particularism 
o This paper has defined particularism as a type of statement 
relying on material, ethical and consistency validities, aiming 
at the fulfilment of one or more particularistic intentions 
within the forum. Previous chapters have also explained why 
incidental issues raised during the forum should be 
considered the empirical manifestation of particularistic 
intentions. 
o Forum participants engaging in particularism are not 
promoting the forum’s mandate, and are not talking as 
members of the plural subject. Instead, they are talking as 
members of a certain state, or as spokespeople for a 
particular group of countries within the forum. Thus, cases in 
which one representative from a certain country (for instance, 
Italy) does not refer to himself/herself as a member of the 
“Italian delegation”, but instead as the spokesperson of 
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“Italy”, of the “Italian people”, “Italian government” and so 
on, should be considered empirical manifestations of 
particularism. The subject, in fact, is not speaking as a 
delegate, a member of a collective body bound by a certain 
mandate, but as the advocate for the interests of a single 
country.17 
o The same reasoning applies when forum participants mention 
or speak on behalf of a particular group of countries (for 
instance, developing countries, European countries, et 
cetera). In all these cases the speaker is referring to sub-
groups within the forum, and he/she is not portraying the 
forum as a plural subject, but instead as a meeting in which 
different groups holding different particularistic intentions 
discuss them. These cases should then be considered an 
empirical indicator of particularism. 
o The previous point highlighted how actors engaging in 
particularism do not rely on the forum’s mandate, and do not 
consider the forum a plural subject; a forum, in a 
particularistic view, is a gathering where different subjects 
driven by different interests have to find a compromise 
between conflicting positions. Hence, any mention of the 










ground between conflicting interests” and so on should be 
considered as an indicator of particularism. 
o Finally, it has previously been highlighted how particularistic 
assertions of an action’s ethical validity rely on the argument 
that forum participants have the duty to defend and promote 
their national interests. Thus, any mention of national interest 
or of the necessity to promote it should be considered an 
empirical indicator of particularism. 
 
 
 Empirical indicators of proceduralism 
o Proceduralism has been defined earlier in this research a type 
of statement in which ethical and consistency validities 
depend on the observance of pre-established norms. 
o Forum participants engaging in proceduralism argue that a 
certain policy should be pursued because of previous 
commitments to do so; furthermore, they appeal to specific 
and previous agreements in order to justify and legitimize 
their claims. Thus, every reference to previously established 
agreements between forum participants, including 
international treaties or resolutions, should be considered an 
empirical indicator of proceduralism. 
 
While looking at this list of empirical indicators, one might raise the following issue: the 
theoretical model has often argued that the different mechanisms of validation are the key element 
distinguishing different types of forum statements; however, the empirical indicators at the base of 
199 
 
the coding scheme do not provide clear evidence of those mechanisms of validation. For instance, 
the fact that a forum participant uses the term “developing countries” does not provide unequivocal 
proof that a statement is relying on particularism’s material, ethical or consistency validities. 
Similarly, a delegate mentioning “scientific research in Antarctica” does not provide clear evidence 
that the statements he/she is making relies on collectivism’s mechanisms of validation. All of this is 
true, but it should be remembered that content analysis is a method relying on abductive inference. 
As Krippendorff points out: 
 
Abductive inferences proceed across logically distinct domains, from 
particulars of one kind to particulars of another kind […]. Consider 
linguistic competence and age. Logically, neither implies the other. 
However, if one has practical experience with infants’ language acquisition, 
one might be able to infer children’s ages from the sounds they make or 
from the vocabulary they use. Of course, one can make such inferences only 
with a certain probability (Krippendorff, 2013, 42). 
 
Content analysis, therefore, is an attempt to connect a body of data (text) with a hypothesis 
(the coding scheme) that attempts to provide the most plausible interpretation of the data 
(Krippendorff, 2013, 42-43). Starting from these premises, it is possible to understand why the 
empirical indicators of the coding scheme do not explicitly refer to the theoretical framework’s 







4.8: The structure of the coding scheme 
 
It is now possible to see how the coding scheme of this paper’s content analysis is structured. 
Whenever looking at a unit of the analysed text, the following questions should be asked: 
 
 Q1: Does the sentence mention specific18 articles of a treaty (for example: “Article 17 
of the UN Charter says that…”)? 
o If YES to Q1, classify the sentence under the category of Proceduralism. If 
NO, then proceed to Q2. 
 Q2: Does the sentence refer to specific, previously taken Recommendations (for 
example: “Recommendation X-1 says that…”; or: “I’d like to recall Recommendation 
X-1…”)? 
o If YES to Q2, classify the sentence under the category of Proceduralism. If 
NO, then proceed to Q3. 
 Q3: Does the sentence mention terms like: “protection of the Antarctic environment”, 
“concern for the Antarctic environment”, “importance of the Antarctic environment”, 
“need to preserve the Antarctic environment”, or something similar? 
o If YES to Q3, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q4. 




specific  Recommendations  should  be  considered  as  empirical  indicators  of  proceduralism.  The  reason  behind  this 
choice  is to avoid as much as possible that  incidental references to  international agreements would  lead to an over‐
representation of the category of proceduralism. For instance, a sentence such as: “We, the members of the Antarctic 
Treaty  should do  X”  should not  be  classified  as  proceduralism,  because  the mentioning  of  the Antarctic  Treaty  is 
incidental. On  the other hand, a sentence such as: “We,  the members of  the Antarctic Treaty should do X because 




o If YES to Q4, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q5. 
 Q5: Does the sentence make any mention of the Antarctic environment or nature in the 
Antarctic in general? 
o If YES to Q5, then: 
 Q5.1: Is the only reference to the environment in the sentence a 
mention of the treaty’s title (for instance: “we have signed the Protocol 
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty)?19 
 If YES to Q5.1, then proceed to Q6. If NO, classify the sentence under 
the category of Collectivism. 
 Q6: Does the sentence mention terms like: “freedom of science”, “importance of 
science in Antarctica”, “science in Antarctica” or something similar? 
o If YES to Q6, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q7. 
 Q7: Does the sentence refer to Antarctica as a “continent of peace”? 
o If YES to Q7, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q8. 
 Q8: Does the sentence refer to “the importance of peace in Antarctica”, the need to use 
Antarctica “for peaceful purposes only”, or something similar? 
o If YES to Q8, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q9. 










o If YES to Q9, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q10. 
 Q10: Does the sentence mention the need to “act on behalf” or “in the interest” or “for 
the benefit” or “the protection” of humankind or something similar? 
o If YES to Q10, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q11. 
 Q11: Does the sentence mention mankind in general? 
o If YES to Q11, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q12. 
 Q12: Does the sentence mention the need to “look at the common interest”, to “focus 
on the common ground” or something similar? 
o If YES to Q12, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q13. 
 Q13: Does the sentence express the need to put the interest of Antarctica above selfish 
interests? 
o If YES to Q13, classify the sentence under the category of Collectivism. If NO, 
then proceed to Q14. 
 Q14: Does the sentence use terms like: “my government”, “my country”, “my people”, 
or does it refer to a specific government, a specific country or a specific people? 
o If YES to Q14, then: 
 Q14.1: Is the only mention to a specific country or people or 
government in the sentence inserted in an expression of gratitude or of 
congratulations?20 
 
20 This  question  is  formulated  in  order  to  avoid  an  over‐representation  of  Particularism.  Indeed, most  of  forum 





 If YES to Q14.1, then proceed to Q15. If NO, classify the sentence 
under the category of Particularism. 
 Q15: Does the sentence mention a particular group of countries within the forum (for 
instance: “developing countries”, “claimant states”, “non-claimant states”, “African 
countries”, or something similar)? 
o If YES to Q15, classify the sentence under the category of Particularism. If 
NO, then proceed to Q16. 
 Q16: Does the sentence mention a series of countries that act jointly or that hold a 
similar position (for instance: “Italy, Germany, France and New Zealand have 
submitted a request”, or “Italy and Australia think X”)? 
o If YES to Q16, classify the sentence under the category of Particularism. If 
NO, then proceed to Q17. 
 Q17: Does the sentence mention national interest? 
o If YES to Q17, then: 
 Q17.1: Does the sentence advocate discarding national interest in the 
name of the common good, to set aside narrow, selfish interests in the 
name of the common interest or something like that? 
 If YES to Q17.1, classify the sentence under the category of 
Collectivism. If NO, classify the sentence under the category of 
Particularism. 
o If NO to Q17, then proceed to Q18. 
 Q18: Does the sentence mention the need to “conciliate conflicting interests”, “find a 
middle ground between different objectives”, “find a balance between opposite 
fronts”, or something similar? 
o If YES to Q18, classify the sentence under the category of Particularism. 
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o If NO to Q18, then discard the sentence as irrelevant and classify it under the 
category of Other. 
 
A feature that could stand out from this coding scheme is that it follows a certain order: it first 
tries to isolate all proceduralist statements, then it looks for examples of collectivism and, lastly, for 
empirical indicators of particularism. This procedure aims at reducing the risks of wrongful coding 
and of overlapping categories. 
The coding scheme looks first at proceduralism because this thesis argues that, whenever 
there is reference to a specific article of an international treaty, it is possible to assume that the 
interaction is most likely relying on the legitimacy provided by procedural reasoning. This is 
because whatever is argued in that sentence is most likely legitimized by the reference to that 
particular article. Two examples could perhaps better clarify the reasoning just outlined. One could 
imagine two different interactions occurring during an Antarctic forum: 
 
 Sentence 1: Subject A tells subject B: “We, the members of the 
Antarctic Treaty, are required to protect the Antarctic environment, 
as commanded by article X”. 
 Sentence 2: Subject A tells subject B: “We, the members of the 
Antarctic Treaty, are required to take into consideration the 
territorial claims of claimant states, as provided by recommendation 
Y”. 
 
It is possible to see that the first sentence is mentioning the collective intention of environmental 
protection, while the second sentence is mentioning a particular group of countries within the forum 
– in this case, claimant states. One could, therefore, think that these sentences should be classified 
respectively as examples of collectivism and particularism, according to the previously outlined 
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coding scheme. However, both these sentences are legitimizing their claims by referring to a precise 
article of an international treaty, or a specific recommendation elaborated during an Antarctic 
meeting. Because of this, the two hypothetical sentences are arguing that certain actions should be 
taken because there are previously agreed norms that establish the obligation of enacting them. 
Consequently, they are relying on the ethical and consistency validities of proceduralism, and 
should be classified as proceduralist statements. From these two examples, it should be possible to 
understand why the coding scheme considers every statement of this sort as an example of 
proceduralism, and why the coding looks at proceduralism first: in order to avoid wrongful 
categorization, it skims through all sentences referring to specific articles or recommendations, and 
it then starts to look for examples of collectivism and particularism. 
One could argue that a coding scheme of this sort may run the risk of over-representing 
proceduralism. However, it is possible to answer that such a risk is avoided by the fact that there are 
very strict conditions required in order to classify a sentence under such category. As specified in 
the questions Q1 and Q2 of the coding scheme, for a sentence to be considered proceduralist there 
needs to be at least one clear reference to specific articles of international treaties or previously 
agreed-upon recommendations. This choice was taken in order to avoid having incidental references 
to international treaties lead to an over-representation of this category. Thus, a sentence of this sort: 
 
Subject A tells subject B: “We, the members of the Antarctic Treaty, are 
required to protect the environment” 
 
would not be categorized as proceduralism, since it does not mention specific articles or 
Recommendations and the reference to the Antarctic Treaty might be an incidental one. 
Furthermore, while there could be incidental mentions of treaties and international agreements, this 
thesis argues that it would be less likely that references to a specific article of a treaty would be 
incidental. By following this reasoning, this dissertation argues that the choice to look first at 
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examples of proceduralism helps to avoid false coding, while the imposition of such strict 
requirements for the categorization of a sentence as an example of this type of interaction is useful 
in reducing the risk of proceduralism’s over-representation. 
Once the coding scheme rules out the possibility that a certain sentence can be categorized as 
a proceduralist statement, it starts assessing whether it can be considered as a collectivist one; only 
once the coding has excluded this second eventuality does it examine whether the sentence can be 
categorized under the label of particularism. The choice to look for collectivism’s indicators before 
particularistic ones comes from the consideration that, as previously outlined in this chapter, the 
process of identification of empirical indicators of different social interactions has been a data-
driven one, which followed the process of subsumption. While this is a normal and recommended 
procedure in qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2012, 89), it can lead towards a situation where 
the empirical indicators used to identify a certain social interaction may not be the same type as 
those used to identify another. 
For instance, in this research’s coding scheme collectivism is often identified by indicators 
that refer to the content of the sentence, such as references to the Antarctic environment, freedom of 
science or peace; this is because these three subjects are part of the mandate of Antarctic forums, 
and mentions of them most likely indicate that the sentence is aiming at the realization of the 
forum’s collective intention. On the other hand, some empirical indicators of particularism – more 
specifically, those indicated in Question Q14 of the coding scheme – mostly focus on how speakers 
are referring to themselves while making a statement. Indeed, as previously outlined, when 
encountering sentences that have terms like “my government”, “my country”, or “my people”, this 
study considers those terms to be indicators that the speakers are acting as spokespeople for their 
own governments, not as members of the collective body represented by the forum – a judgement 
supported by interviews with diplomatic personnel. Hence, they are treated as expressing an 
intention that belongs only to that particular country, and that is not necessarily shared by the rest of 
the forum’s participants. 
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However, since the empirical indicators of collectivism and particularism are not the same, 
one might encounter, while examining Antarctic documents, sentences like: 
 
“My government thinks that the protection of the Antarctic environment is 
in the interest of humankind.” 
 
In this case, the speaker is speaking as a representative of his/her own government, and is 
expressing the intention of a single nation; however, the nation’s intention expressed by the 
sentence is the collective intention of protecting the environment. This is not contradictory, since 
this paper’s theoretical model argues that each forum participant has different intentions but that 
they all share a collective one. It is therefore perfectly possible that, when a state representative 
expresses an intention of his/her own government, he/she might express one that is shared by all 
other forum participants and that it is thus collective. However, this would mean that the speaker 
would make a statement aiming at the fulfilment of the collective intention which is at the base of 
the forum mandate, and that such interaction should therefore be considered as an example of 
collectivism. Starting from these considerations, the coding scheme tries to avoid wrong coding 
originated by these situations and it looks at empirical indicators of proceduralism first, then of 




One of the most important features of content analysis is its degree of reliability – namely, the 
researcher needs to show that “data are obtained independent of the measuring event, instrument or 
person” (Kaplan and Goldsen, 1965, 83-84). Applying a reliable coding frame to the same set of 
data should lead to similar results, independently of the researcher conducting the analysis or when 
the study takes place. Reliability is the main reason why content analysis is considered to be a 
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“systematic” approach, able to provide “consensual, shared understanding” (Schreier, 2013, 31), 
and every coding scheme, both in quantitative and qualitative content analysis, needs to be a 
reliable one. For a coding scheme to be reliable, it must be replicable.21 In content analysis, the 
concept of replicability can be defined as “the degree to which a process can be reproduced by 
different analysts, working under varying conditions, at different locations, or using different but 
functionally equivalent measuring instruments” (Krippendorff, 2013, 271). The lesser the variations 
of results between different coders, the higher the replicability. 
In order to test the replicability of the coding scheme, this research conducted a pilot study. 
Two researchers who had played no role in elaborating the theoretical model or the coding scheme 
were asked to examine, together with the author, the same documents. The coding of this pilot study 
was a “blind” one (Schreier, 2012, 146), since every coder had examined the data separately, 
without sharing or discussing their results for the whole duration of the analysis. In this pilot study, 
the three coders (the two independent ones and the author) looked at a sample of the data that were 
later examined in the main analysis. While this procedure is often discouraged in quantitative 
content analysis, it is considered perfectly legitimate in qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2012, 
148). An equal number of speeches belonging to the IV-12 and the XI-4 SATCMs were included in 
the pilot test, in order to allow a satisfactory level of “variability” to the study (Schreier, 2012m 
149), and the selected material included units that, in a preliminary coding session, were able to fill 
every one of the four categories, in order to “cover the full range of options that can be found across 
[…] [the] material” (Schreier, 2012, 150). Finally, following the main guidelines for pilot studies 
(Schreier, 2012, 151), this research included 20% of all the research data in the trial coding. 
 
21 Replicability  is not  the only  type of  factor used  to measure  the  reliability of  the  coding  scheme. The  concept of 
stability, for  instance, measures “the degree to which a process  is unchanging over time” (Krippendorff, 2013, 271). 
The method used to assess the stability of a coding scheme  is to conduct the same coding twice, once a reasonable 






Once all three coders had examined the data, their results were compared, and the reliability 
of the coding scheme was assessed through the calculation of Krippendorff α coefficient of inter-
coder reliability (Krippendorff, 2013, 301-324). Following Klaus Krippendorff’s guidelines, a result 
above 0.800 has been considered reliable; a result with an Alpha between 0.667 and 0.800 has been 
considered as valid for tentative conclusions; finally, results below 0.667 have been considered 
unreliable (Krippendorff, 2013, 325). After the pilot study, the main analysis was conducted, and 
the whole set of data was passed through the lens of the coding scheme. It is finally possible to see 
all the steps that composed the qualitative content analysis: 
 
1. All data were examined through a process of preliminary coding, in 
order to identify a sample of data to submit to trial coding. 
2. 20% of the available data were examined through a blind pilot study, 
conducted by the author and two independent researchers. 
3. Once the reliability of the coding scheme had been tested, the main 
analysis, where all data were examined, was conducted. 
 
4.10: Validity of data 
 
A coding scheme must be not only reliable, but valid as well (Krippendorff, 2013, 329). Eduard 
Carmines and Richard Zeller argued that one should assess three different types of validity in 
research: content, criterion and construct validities (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). In order to examine 
the content validity of research, one needs to assess whether the chosen analytical approach is 
appropriate to the research question – meaning in this case, whether qualitative content analysis is 
the right methodology to apply in order to conduct the case study required for empirical testing. 
This has already been established in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 of this chapter, which explained why this 
method is the best approach to test the thesis’s theoretical model. 
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The criterion validity of research is “the requirement that […] [a] coding frame captures what 
set[s] out to capture” (Schreier, 2012, 35). For instance, “one ‘validates’ a written driver’s test by 
showing that it accurately predicts how well some group of persons can operate an automobile” 
(Carmines and Zeller, 1979, 17). Criterion validity is usually measured by comparing the results of 
the coding with a procedure that is considered valid and correct.22 Such comparisons are difficult to 
carry out in this research, since no other attempt to distinguish between forum interactions has been 
uncontroversial, and therefore there are no “correct procedures” to be used as reference points. In 
the absence of a consensus on the correct procedures, the results of the analysis were validated 
through secondary literature: the works of authors who have extensively written about the 4th and 
the 11th SATCMs were examined, in order to assess whether their findings were in line with the 
conclusions drawn from the content analysis. Finally, in order to satisfy the criterion of construct 
validity, the analysis should provide results that are not counter-intuitive and that do not contradict 
the main, general assumptions of the theoretical framework. To test the construct validity, this 
thesis relied once more on secondary literature, and assessed whether the conclusions drawn from 
this dissertation’s empirical analysis are similar to those of previous authors. 
 
4.11: Summary of the research’s methodology 
 
This chapter has outlined the fundamental methodological choices that shaped the empirical 
analysis aiming to assess the plausibility of this research’s theoretical model. First, it explained that 
the type of data examined are official documents which summarize activities and interactions that 
took place during the two examined international forums – specifically, speeches and diplomatic 
statements formulated by Antarctic Consultative Parties during the 4th and the IX Special Antarctic 
Consultative Meetings (SATCMs). Secondly, it explained the reasons behind the sampling of 
 
22 The  concept  of  “criterion  validity”  presented  by  Carmines  and  Zeller  is  very  similar  to what  Krippendorff  calls 




empirical data, which includes speeches and statements from the IV-12 and the IX-4 sections of the 
two SATCMs. 
Having established the dataset, the chapter set out the rationale for examining those data 
through the methodology of qualitative content analysis. Furthermore, it outlined the coding 
scheme’s categories and the empirical indicators that were used to classify the different units of 
text. Finally, it described the structure of the coding scheme, and the procedures for testing the 
reliability and the validity of the findings. Having put this framework in place, it is possible to 



















Chapter Five: Research Findings, Statistical Significance, Reliability 
and Validity 
 
Previous chapters have outlined how this research is analysing diplomatic speeches and statements 
that took place during two forum sessions: the IV-12 SATCM and the XI-4 SATM –the last 
sessions of the negotiations which led to the elaboration, respectively, of CRAMRA and of the 
Madrid Protocol. These documents are examined through the lens of a coding scheme aiming at 
categorizing single sentences in these documents into three groups, reflecting the three types of 
statement that, according to the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2, can be made during 
international forums: collectivism, particularism and proceduralism. 
Furthermore, while describing the CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol negotiations in greater 
detail, this dissertation highlighted how the latter delivered an output which was considered more 
legitimate than the former. Indeed, CRAMRA’s legitimacy was challenged both internally and 
externally: internally, some key ATS actors refused to ratify on the ground that it did not 
sufficiently fulfil the forum mandate (Bush, 1992, 71); externally, countries which were not parties 
to the ATS contested the agreement and started to advocate, within the UN General Assembly, a 
radical reform to Antarctic governance (Vidas, 2000, 3). The Madrid Protocol, on the other hand, 
was quickly accepted by all ATS members and by the wider international community; once the 
Protocol came into force, most calls for radical changes to the ATS faded away. This, according to 
the present research’s hypothesis, was because the Madrid protocol provided higher fulfilment of 
the Antarctic forum mandate, which consists in the three pillars of peace, freedom of science and 
environmental protection. 
This dissertation’s theoretical framework has depicted collectivism as type of statement 
attempting to fulfil the forum’s collective intention and particularism as a form of statement aiming 
at the realization of forum participants’ particularistic intentions. The hypothesis derived from these 
definitions is that the forum with a higher realization of the collective intention (the 11th SATCM, 
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which led to the Madrid Protocol) is expected to have more frequent collectivist statements than the 
IV SATCM, which resulted in the Mineral Convention. 
 
5.1: Findings of the qualitative content analysis, their statistical significance and reliability 
 
The analysis of the two forums session led to the following results: 
 
IV‐12 SATCM 
Interaction types  Units  % of total  % of relevant 
Collectivism  18  8.78  21.43 
Particularism  34  16.59  40.48 
Proceduralism  32  15.61  38.09 
Discard  121  59.02    
Relevant Units  84  40.98    
Total  205  100  100 
Figure 7: Results from the coding of the IV-12 SATCM 
 
XI‐4 SATCM 
   Units  % of total  % of relevant 
Collectivism  67  22.48  56.78 
Particularism  39  13.09  33.05 
Proceduralism  12  4.03  10.17 
Discard  180  60.40    
Relevant Units  118  39.60    
Total  298  100  100 
Figure 8: Results from the coding of the XI-4 SATCM 
 
As it is possible to see from the tables, a comparison between the IV-12 and the XI-4 SATCMs 
shows that the former has a significantly greater frequency of particularistic and proceduralist 




Figure 9: Distribution of IV-12 SATCM relevant units 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of XI-4 SATCM relevant units 
 
Only 8.78% of all the IV-12 SATCM units were categorized as collectivist, against 22.48% of 
all XI-4 SATCM sentences. The difference is equally, if not more, striking if one examines the 
frequency of collectivism by taking into consideration the relevant units only – namely, all those 
units that were categorized as examples of either collectivism, particularism or proceduralism. A bit 
more than one-fifth of the IV-12 SATCM’s relevant units were categorized as collectivist 
statements (21.42%), against more than the half of all XI-4 SATCM’s relevant units (56.78%). A 





























































Madrid Protocol forum session has 13.70% more collectivist statements than the Mineral 
Convention’s forum session; by only considering relevant units, the difference is 35.36% in favour 
of the Madrid Protocol forum session. 
As far as other interactions are concerned, 16.58% of all the IV-12 SATCM units were coded 
as examples of particularism (40.48% of relevant units), while 15.61% of all units was classified as 
proceduralist statements (38.10% of relevant units). In the XI-4 SATCM, instead, the frequency of 
particularism amounts to 13.09% of all units (33.05% of relevant units), while only 4.03% of all 
units were classified as proceduralist statements (10.17% of relevant units). A comparison between 
the two forum sessions shows that, if all units are taken into consideration, the Mineral Convention 
forum session has 3,49% more particularistic statements and 11.58% more proceduralist statements 
than the Madrid Protocol’s forum session. If we consider only relevant units, the IV-12 SATCM has 
7.43% more particularism and 27.93% more proceduralism than the XI-4 SATCM. 
It is clear from the findings that the 4th and the 11th SATCMs are characterized by different 
frequencies of collectivism, proceduralism and particularism; it is also clear that in the 11th SATCM 
collectivist statements were more frequent than in the 4th SATCM. Once this has been established, it 
is necessary to measure whether the differences in forum statements’ frequency between the two 
Antarctic meetings is statistically significant. In other words, one must exclude that the differences 
in the way collectivism, particularism and proceduralism were distributed in the two forums were a 
product of chance and, therefore, marginal and not significant on a statistical level. 
This issue was addressed by calculating the χ2 test, which is a test measuring the statistical 
significance of research findings. This test provides a value between 1 and 0 – where 1 indicates 
that there are 100% probabilities that the different distributions of variables observed in the 
empirical analysis are accidental. To conduct the χ2 test it is necessary to establish a threshold 
above which results should not be considered statistically significant. This dissertation chose the 
most stringent threshold adopted when calculating the χ2 test, which is 0.01. This means that, if the 
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test would indicate that there is a 1% chance that the observed differences in frequency of forum 
statements between the 4th and the 11th SATCMs are accidental, then the findings should not be 
considered statistically significant. 
The χ2 test was calculated, and it led to a result of 0.00000111.1 This means that there is only 
a 0.000111% probability that the observed differences in forum statements’ frequency between the 
two Antarctic meetings is a product of chance. Since the result of the χ2 test is below the 0.01 
threshold, the differences in forum statements between the 4th and the 11th SATCM should be 
considered statistically significant and not accidental. Thus, the results of the qualitative content 
analysis confirm the assumptions drawn from this thesis’s theoretical framework. Amongst the two 
forum sessions selected, the one which was part of the Madrid Protocol negotiations has a higher 
frequency of collectivism. However, before evaluating the research findings, it is necessary to 
assess two fundamental components of any content analysis research: the reliability and the validity 
of the coding scheme. 
The reliability of the coding scheme was assessed through a pilot study before the main 
analysis of data. The pilot study, as explained in an earlier chapter, was performed blind with two 
other researchers that were not involved in the elaboration of the research framework or of the 
coding scheme.2 The results3 were then examined, through the R-Studio software, in order to assess 
the Krippendorff α coefficient, which measures the inter-coder reliability of a coding scheme. As 
already outlined in the fourth chapter, a Krippendorff α coefficient above 0.800 is usually 
interpreted as supporting evidence that the coding scheme adopted is a reliable one (Krippendorff, 
2013, 325). The Krippendorff α resulting from this research’s pilot study was 0.912; thus, 
according to the guidelines provided by Krippendorff, the coding scheme adopted by this research 








To conclude, it can be claimed, with sufficient reliability, that the examined Madrid Protocol 
forum session had a higher frequency of collectivism than the examined Mineral Convention forum 
session.4 However, this does not in itself confirm this dissertation’s theoretical argument. Two 
further steps are needed. First, this qualitative content analysis was conducted on only two sections 
of two larger forums; it is therefore necessary to assess whether the internal dynamics of the IV-12 
SATCM and the XI-4 SATCM can be considered representative samples of the broader forums. 
Second, one needs to examine the content, criterion and construct validities of the research findings. 
 
5.2: The IV-12 SATCM as representative of all CRAMRA negotiations 
 
To assess whether the IV-12 SATCM can be considered a representative sample of the CRAMRA 
negotiations, it is necessary to examine the forum which led to the elaboration of the Mineral 
Convention in greater depth.  
As previously outlined, the forum mandate for CRAMRA negotiation resembled the mandate 
of any other Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, and was threefold: to maintain Antarctica as a 
de-militarized continent to be used for “peaceful purposes only”; to encourage free scientific 
 
4 One could at this point argue that the difference in the frequency of collectivism in the two forums could be due to 
the  fact  that  they were driven by different mandates. “After all,” – one would argue – “the CRAMRA negotiations’ 
main  objective was  the  establishment  of  a mining  regime  in  Antarctica, while  the  objective  of Madrid  Protocol’s 
negotiation was  the  creation  of  a  coherent  and  comprehensive  Antarctic  regime,  able  to  effectively  protect  the 
environment of  the Southern  continent.  Is  it  so  strange  that environmental protection was mentioned more  times 
during the Madrid Protocol negotiations than in the CRAMRA ones?”. 
  This  is  an  important  critique  to  examine.  In  fact,  if  this  critique was  true,  and  if  the mandate  of  the  CRAMRA 
negotiations was so different from the mandate of Madrid Protocol’s negotiations, then  it would not be possible to 
consider  these  two  forums  as  most‐similar  case  studies.  Such  a  critique,  however,  is  based  on  the  erroneous 







the  Antarctic  environment.  However,  CRAMRA’s  mandate  of  protecting  the  environment  from  the  adverse 
consequences  of  mining  is  mentioned  much  less  frequently  than  Madrid  Protocol’s  mandate  of  creating  a 
comprehensive agreement on environmental protection. The greater frequency of collectivism during Madrid Protocol 




research on the continent; and to protect the Antarctic ecosystems. However, scholars have noted 
numerous debates in the CRAMRA negotiations over issues alien to the forum’s mandate. Lorraine 
Elliott, for instance, highlights how “the major split” between parties in the CRAMRA negotiation 
“was between claimants and non-claimants” (Elliott, 1994, 122) – namely, between those states 
who had claims of territorial sovereignty over certain portions of the continent and those states who 
did not. Other authors have supported her view: Christopher Joyner, for instance, highlights the 
importance of the division between claimants and non-claimants in shaping the output of the 
negotiations (Joyner, 1996, 153). 
During CRAMRA negotiations, claimants were worried that their power in Antarctica was 
declining, since more countries were joining the ATS and becoming Consultative Parties – thus 
reducing their numerical power during meetings – and, as far as the issue of mineral exploitation 
was concerned, they demanded “unilateral control over activities in their territory, including 
exploitation of resources” (Elliott, 1994, 122). Non-claimants, on the other hand, opposed granting 
any privileges to claimants (Elliott, 1994, 123). The clash between claimants and non-claimants, 
however, was not the only issue alien to the forum mandate that was extensively debated during 
CRAMRA negotiations. Developing countries became increasingly involved in the forum – 
especially after Brazil, China and India acquired the status of Consultative parties – and often acted 
as a united front. Their claims were mainly focused on obtaining preferential treatment as far as 
mining was concerned (Elliott, 1994, 123-124). 
It follows that for the IV-12 SATCM to be representative of the CRAMRA negotiations as a 
whole, the issues of territorial sovereignty and of involvement of developing countries in mining 
activities should have occupied centre stage in the negotiations. To assess whether this is true, all 
speeches and diplomatic statements delivered during the IV-12 SATCM were again unitized into 
sentences, and each sentence was examined and categorized according to the topics it touched. The 
analysis looked for all those sentences addressing at least one topic related to the forum’s mandate 
(peace, science and environmental protection) and for all those referring to issues of territorial 
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sovereignty in Antarctica and to the involvement of developing countries in mineral activities. The 
results of this analysis were the following: 
 
IV‐12 SATCM 
TOPICS  Units  % of total  % of relevant  
Issue of territorial 
sovereignty  20  9.77  23.81 
Interests and rights of 
developing countries  6  2.93  7.14 
Environmental protection  11  5.36  13.09 
Science and Antarctica  2  0.98  2.38 
Antarctica and peace  4  1.95  4.76 
Units  205  20.97    
Relevant Units  84     51.19 
Figure 11: Distribution of examined topics in the IV-12 SATCM 
 
From this analysis, it is possible to see that the issue of territorial sovereignty was the most 
mentioned topic amongst the five selected. It was mentioned in 9.76% of all the IV-12 SATCM 
units; if one only considers the relevant units, a bit under one-fourth of them referred to it (23.81%). 
Such a high number testifies to how the clashes between claimant and non-claimant states were 
central in the debate in this specific CRAMRA session. The other incidental issue, pertaining to the 
interests and the rights of developing countries in mining activities, was mentioned in 2.93% of all 
the IV-12 SATCM units (13.09% of relevant units). This seems to confirm that this topic occupied 
an important position amongst those debated, but not as important as territorial sovereignty. The 
same was true for CRAMRA negotiations in general, since the interests of developing countries 
were widely debated, but less than issues of territorial sovereignty (Elliott, 1994, 123-124). Even 
though the incidental issue of developing countries’ rights in mining exploitation was less important 
than the issue of territorial sovereignty, it was still the third most-mentioned topic amongst the five 
selected, overtaken only by the topic of environmental protection (5.36% of all units, 13.09% of 





Figure 12: Graph on distribution of topics raised during the IV-12 SATCM 
 
Furthermore, by adding up all the IV-SATCM units which mentioned at least one of the 
topics concerning the forum’s mandate – promotion of peace, scientific research and environmental 
protection – one finds that the CRAMRA forum’s mandate was referred to in 8.28% of all IV-12 
SATCM units (20.23% of relevant units). What it is striking is that, during the 12th session of the 
CRAMRA negotiations, the forum’s mandate as a whole was less debated than the issue of 
territorial sovereignty. Indeed, a comparison between the times the issue of territorial sovereignty 
was mentioned and the times one or more of the three topics constituting the forum mandate was 
mentioned shows that, if all the IV-12 SATCM units are taken into consideration, the issue of 
territorial sovereignty has 1.48% more mentions than the forum’s mandate. If one considers only 
relevant units, territorial sovereignty has 3.58% more mentions than the forum’s mandate. Analysis 
of the IV-12 SATCM speeches and statements shows that the incidental issue of territorial 
sovereignty was the most debated topic during this forum session – even more than the issues at the 
base of the forum mandate. Moreover, the issue of the rights and interests of developing countries 
was often raised.  
That sovereignty and developing countries’ interests and rights were amongst the most 





































confirmed by looking at CRAMRA negotiations session by session. In order to do that, this thesis 
resorts to two different sources. The first is Lorraine Elliott’s International Environmental Politics: 
Protecting the Antarctic (1994), one of the most detailed analyses of both the CRAMRA and the 
Madrid Protocol negotiations. The second is archival sources from the British Antarctic Survey: 
more specifically, Memoranda by the Secretary of State for Foreign Commonwealth Affairs on 
Antarctic meetings and CRAMRA meeting reports by Sir Arthur Watts, Head of the British 
Delegation during the Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.5  
In her book, Elliott highlights how discussions during CRAMRA’s first, second and third 
sessions were hampered by disagreements and clashes between claimants and non-claimants 
(Elliott, 1994, 129-132). This seems to be confirmed by archival sources, which stress how the main 
clashes in the early forum session were between East and West, and between claimants and non-
claimants, while the issue of how to take into account the interests of developing countries started to 
arise during the third session.6 
Elliott writes that during the fourth session clashes between claimants and non-claimants 
continued (Elliott, 1994, 132), and archival sources paint a very similar portrait of the fourth session 
of CRAMRA negotiations, since they highlight how claimants stood together “in promoting 
Claimant States interests”,7 and that the necessity of accommodating claimant interests was still one 
of the main issues in the negotiating process.8 However, they also point out two other important 
issues which characterized this forum session: the East and West divide,9 and the question of how to 
 
5 The  archival material  of  the  British  Antarctic  Survey  provided  extensive  summary  of  nine  sessions  of  CRAMRA 
negotiations: the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th. Reports from the third to the sixth sessions were provided 
as “Memorandum by  the Secretary of State  for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on  the Antarctic Treaty Special 
Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources”. Reports from the 7th section onwards, instead, were authored 
by Sir Arthur Watts, head of the British Delegation during CRAMRA negotiations. 
6 Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Affairs  on  the  Antarctic  Treaty  Special 
Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources, 28/03/1984, page 1. 
7 Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Affairs  on  the  Antarctic  Treaty  Special 
Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources, 28/03/1984, page 2. 
8 Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Affairs  on  the  Antarctic  Treaty  Special 
Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources, 02/01, 1985, page 2.  




take into account the interests of developing countries as far as mineral exploitation was 
concerned.10 Furthermore, archival sources from the British Antarctic Survey show that, contrasts 
between claimants and non-claimants, the East-West divide, and the interests of developing 
countries occupied a central stage during the fifth session as well. 
Elliott argues that the sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth sessions were characterized by 
extremely slow progress, due to the constant need to accommodate the different requests advanced 
by claimants and non-claimants (Elliott, 1994, 132-133); her argument is supported by the 
consulted archival sources, which examine the above-mentioned sessions in greater detail. The UK 
delegation’s report claimed that one of the “central issues” debated during the CRAMRA’s sixth 
session was “the participation of developing countries which are parties to the regime in minerals 
activity” (Watts, 1985, 1),11 while claimant states seemed to form a compact front and effectively to 
pursue their interests (Watts, 1985, 2).12 In the seventh session negotiations saw “some sharpening 
of the underlying Claimant/non-Claimant differences over the way in which Claimant interests had 
to be met” (Watts, 1985, 1),13 while “the developing countries amongst the Consultative Parties 
(Argentina, Brazil, China and India) gained ground as a special interest group with their own 
requirements” (Watts, 1985, 2).14 In session eight, the UK Delegation reported that participation of 
developing countries in the mineral regime was one of the most debated issues (Watts, 1986, 1),15 
while “Claimant issues were not at the centre of the discussion, but where they were raised 
Claimant States, while continuing to press strongly their requirements, made no headway on major 
points” (Watts, 1986, 1).16 This seems to be confirmed by the fact that “the USA was again in the 
 













forefront in firmly resisting claimant positions” (Watts, 1986, 1).17 In the ninth session, the issues of 
“preferential treatment for developing countries” and “the positions of Claimant States” were once 
more considered to be crucial policy issues (Watts, 1986, 1).18 
As far as CRAMRA’s tenth session is concerned, Watts points out how “on […] important 
subjects discussed, positions remain[ed] a considerable distance apart on financial benefit for 
Claimant States” (Watts, 1987, 1),19 how “non-Claimant developing countries acted as a compact 
interest group” (Watts, 1987, 2),20 and how “Japan, with the FRG support”, defended the interests 
of “industrialized non-Claimant states” (Watts, 1987, 2-3).21 Finally, archival sources describe the 
IV-11 SATCM as a session in which little progress was made on “major issues” such as 
“international participation by the Soviet Union and developing countries in mineral activities 
conducted by others, special economic benefit for Claimant States, decision-making and, for the 
FRG,22 a series of issues which raised a number of legal and constitutional problems” (Watts, 1988, 
1).23 
Once all twelve sessions of CRAMRA negotiations are examined, it can be seen that the 
disagreement between claimants and non-claimants – and, therefore, over the issue of territorial 
sovereignty – was central in every session of the forum, while the debate regarding the interests and 
the rights of developing countries in mining activities was prominent in nine CRAMRA sessions 
out of twelve. It can thus be claimed that the IV-12 SATCM, which registers a very strong presence 
of the issue of territorial sovereignty and a significant presence of the issue of developing countries’ 















5.3: The XI-4 SATCM as representative of all Madrid Protocol negotiations 
 
To decide whether the XI-4 SATCM was representative of the whole negotiation process that led to 
the Madrid Protocol, the dynamics of this particular forum must be examined in greater detail. 
Different authors have highlighted how, from the beginning, the Madrid Protocol negotiations were 
characterized by a stronger emphasis on the principle of environmental protection than the 
CRAMRA ones (Verhoeven, 1992, 12; Elliott, 1994, 179). Moreover, while the issue of territorial 
sovereignty was still considered to have a certain – although reduced – importance during the forum 
(Joyner, 1996, 164), the interests and rights of developing countries were almost never mentioned. 
To sum up, Madrid Protocol negotiations are said to have been characterized by frequent references 
to environmental protection and much less emphasis on territorial sovereignty and developing 
countries’ rights. 
To assess whether that was the case for the fourth session of the XI-4 SATCM, this study 
considered all speeches and diplomatic statements of that particular forum session and – as with the 
IV-12 SATCM – it unitized them into sentences. The analysis categorized these units by the topic 
they addressed, and it chose five categories: the three topics of science, peace and environmental 
protection related to the forum’s mandate and the two most salient incidental issues raised in 
Antarctic forums – namely, the issues of territorial sovereignty and of developing countries’ rights 
(Elliott, 1994, 193-195). The results were the following: 
XI‐4 SATCM 
TOPICS  Units  % Of total  % Of relevant 
Issue of territorial 
sovereignty  1  0.34  0.85 
Interests and rights of 
developing countries  0  0  0 
Environmental protection  45  15.10  38.13 
Science and Antarctica  15  5.03  12.71 
Antarctica and peace  8  2.68  6.78 
Units  298  23.15    
Relevant Units  118     58.47 




The analysis highlights how frequent mention of the principle of environmental protection 
was during this particular round of negotiations. It was mentioned in the 15.10% of all the XI-4 
SATCM units (38.13% of relevant units). The incidental issues of territorial sovereignty and 
interests and rights of developing countries, which were central during CRAMRA negotiations, 
were marginal or non-existent within the diplomatic speeches formulated in the XI-4 SATCM; this 
seems to confirm that collectivism played a far greater role in the Madrid Protocol negotiations than 
in CRAMRA ones. Finally, the fundamental importance accorded to environmental protection in 
the XI-4 SATCM is confirmed by the fact that, if we sum up all the sentences which mention any of 
the other four topics examined by this analysis (territorial sovereignty, developing countries, 
science in Antarctica, peace in Antarctica), one ends up with only 8.04% of all XI-4 SATCM units 
(20.34% of all relevant units). The issue of environmental protection was mentioned almost twice as 
often as all the other issues in the analysis together. 
The analysis of the XI-4 SATCM confirms that the Madrid Protocol was dominated by 
interactions concerning environmental protection. However, to assess whether the XI-4 SATCM is 
representative of the Madrid Protocol forum, one must assess whether other forum sessions were 
similar. To do so, different sources must be used than for the CRAMRA negotiations. This is 
because diplomatic memoranda and reports summing up the outputs of Madrid Protocol 
negotiations are, in contrast to those regarding CRAMRA, still subject to the 30-year seal, and 
therefore not accessible. Instead, to assess the representativeness of the XI-4 SATCM, this 
dissertation considers the only other Madrid Protocol forum session at which participants delivered 
diplomatic speeches and statements – namely, XI-1 SATCM, the first session of Madrid Protocol 
negotiations. All speeches and diplomatic statements of this forum session were unitized into 
sentences; those sentences were then sorted into the five categories of peace, science, environmental 
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TOPICS  Units  % Of total  % Of relevant 
Issue of territorial 
sovereignty  5  0.60  1.35 
Interests and rights of 
developing countries  0  0  0 
Environmental protection  169  20.19  45.80 
Science and Antarctica  41  4.90  11.11 
Antarctica and peace  9  1.07  2.44 
Units  837  26.76    
Relevant Units  369     60.70 
Figure 14: Distribution of examined topics in the XI-1 SATCM 
 
The analysis confirms that the issue of environmental protection was the most salient in this 
diplomatic session as well: it was mentioned in 20.19% of all the XI-1 SATCM units (45.80% of 
relevant units). The two Madrid Protocol forum sessions examined share another characteristic: the 
marginality of the issue of territorial sovereignty and the lack of references to the interests and the 
rights of developing countries. If all XI-1 SATCM sentences which mention at least one of the four 
topics of territorial sovereignty, developing countries, science in Antarctica, and peace in Antarctica 
are summed, they amount to 6.57% of all XI-1 SATCM units (14.90% of all relevant units). On the 




24 Every  unit which  specifically  referred  to  the  Antarctic  environment  and/or  the  need  to  protect  it  from  human 
activities was  included within the category of “environmental protection”, with only one exception: all sentences  in 
which the only reference to the Antarctic environment included the term “comprehensive protection of the Antarctic 









Figure 15: Graph on distribution of topics raised during the XI-1 SATCM 
 
Figure 16: Graph on distribution of topics raised during the XI-4 SATCM 
 
Evidence thus suggests that the fourth session of the Madrid Protocol negotiations was 
representative of the whole forum.25 During this session, the protection of the environment was the 
most important issue amongst those discussed, and, as both empirical evidence and secondary 
literature (Elliott, 1994, 179) claim, this was true of the Madrid Protocol forum as a whole. 
 
25 The author acknowledges that the evidence provided is not able to support beyond any doubt that the IV‐12 SATCM 
and  the  XI‐4  SATCM  are  representative  of  the  forums  they were  part  of,  and  that  further  investigation might  be 
necessary in order to fully assess this point. However, the evidence provided is considered sufficient for the purpose 

















































































Furthermore, as in other forum sessions – as shown by the comparison with the XI-1 SATCM – the 
incidental issues of territorial sovereignty and developing countries’ rights and principles were 
marginal. 
 
5.4: Evaluating the validity of the findings 
 
Previous sections have described the results of qualitative content analysis which examined two 
different rounds of negotiations of the two different Antarctic forums which were chosen as most-
similar case studies: the IV-12 and the XI-4 SATCMs. The findings showed, with a high degree of 
inter-coder reliability, that the latter had a significantly higher frequency of collectivist interactions 
than the former. Further analysis indicated that the IV-12 and the XI-4 SATCMs were 
representative of the whole CRAMRA and Madrid Protocol forums respectively. Now that the 
analysis has been conducted, the reliability of the coding scheme has been established, and the 
representativeness of the chosen sampling of data has been assessed, it is necessary to address the 
question of validity.  
As outlined in chapter four, there are three types of validities to consider: context, criterion 
and construct validities. The context validity is assessed by answering the question: “to what extent 
is the chosen methodology coherent with the research question?”. The fourth chapter has already 
explained why qualitative content analysis offers the best empirical test of the theoretical 
framework. Research findings resulting from content analysis possess a good level of criterion 
validity when “[the] coding frame captures what […] set[s] out to capture” (Schreier, 2012, 35). 
Here the empirical analysis found that the Madrid Protocol negotiations were characterized by 
greater collectivism than CRAMRA negotiations. How can one establish whether the coding 
scheme underlying the empirical analysis accurately measured the levels of collectivism in each of 
the two forums and not something else? The best way to assess criterion validity is, according to the 
literature, to compare the research findings with the results of other procedures measuring the same 
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features which are generally taken to be correct. This, however, is not possible in this case, since 
there has not been another empirical model able to distinguish between different forum social 
interactions in a reliable and valid way. For this reason, this chapter evaluates the research findings’ 
criterion validity on the basis of secondary literature. It examines earlier studies of the CRAMRA 
and Madrid Protocol negotiations to establish whether the latter was characterized by more 
interactions aimed at fulfilling the forum mandate than the former. Finally, after assessing the 
criterion validity of the research findings, the dissertation considers whether the results of the 
empirical analysis are counter-intuitive, and in so doing, addresses the issue of construct validity. 
 
5.5: Criterion and construct validities 
 
The secondary literature often portrays CRAMRA as a forum where “environmental protection 
mechanisms were weakened in the search for agreement on political and legal issues” (Elliott, 1994, 
153), and in which divergent economic and political interests led to “a clear need for policy 
compromise and diplomatic accommodation” (Joyner, 1996, 160). Many argued that the Mineral 
Convention was “as much as could be agreed given conflicting interests and concerns” within the 
forum (Hendry, 1992, 67). This is because CRAMRA negotiations were, from the beginning, 
characterized by a peculiar trait: the fulfilment of the forum mandate was never the priority of 
negotiating actors. Indeed, the question that was at the centre of the arena, from the beginning to the 
end of the negotiation, was the issue of territorial sovereignty over certain portions of Antarctica 
(Joyner, 1996, 153). This seems to be confirmed by the fact that, during the 4th SATCM, 
environmental matters were discussed much less than was the amount of decision-making power to 
be granted to claimant states within the Convention’s institutional mechanisms (Elliott, 1994, 154). 
Actors participating in CRAMRA negotiations split into sub-groups. As already outlined by 
previous sections, “the major split was between claimants and non-claimants” (Elliott, 1994, 122). 
However, divisions over sovereignty issues were not the only ones. This chapter has already pointed 
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out how developing countries acted as a compact interest group, pressing for preferential treatment 
as far as mineral activities were concerned (Elliott, 1994, 123-124). There were also divisions 
between countries which already had a fully developed mining industry and those which did not, 
with the former “concerned about competition with their own industries” and seeking “non-
discriminatory access to mineral resources” (Elliott, 1994, 123). Finally, there were disagreements 
over how much to regulate mining. Chile, for example, feared potential damages to the maritime 
Antarctic ecosystem, since the Chilean fishing industry was dependent on the good health of 
Southern Ocean fisheries (Elliott, 1994, 107-109). These divisions often overlapped, generating a 
fluid and fragmented negotiating atmosphere. 
In examining the divisions amongst parties during CRAMRA negotiations, it is interesting 
that almost all these splits involved conflicts centred on particularistic intentions. Indeed, territorial 
sovereignty over Antarctica, preferential access for developing countries, redistribution of economic 
gains from mining, competition amongst different mining industries or worries over fisheries and 
fishing industries were all unrelated or just barely related to the forum mandate of the fourth 
SATCM, which was the same as every other Antarctic forum, centred on peace, science and 
environmental protection. Since incidental issues were often at the centre of the debate, 
environmental matters were systematically subordinated to the political and economic interests of 
single countries: 
 
Divisions among the parties arose on legal and political grounds – on 
sovereignty and jurisdiction – and economic grounds. It was those divisions, 
not environmental concerns, which gave rise to the key issues which 
remained unresolved until the end of the negotiations […]. Environmental 
concerns, while not dismissed, were fitted into the solutions [sic] of political 




As a result, environmental protection was often the feature most sacrificed in order to reach an 
agreement between different fronts (Elliott, 1994, 153).  
Further evidence that CRAMRA involved compromises attempting to reconcile different 
particularistic intentions can be found in the institutional and the decision-making structures of the 
Mineral Convention. The architecture of CRAMRA was the result of a complex agreement which 
attempted to balance the wishes of claimant and non-claimant states (Elliott, 1994, 135; Joyner, 
1996, 158-161). As Joyner argues: 
 
[The] effectiveness of the minerals regime came to depend on 
accommodation of sovereign interests between claimants and non-claimants, 
as well as on an operational balance between CRAMRA’s functional 
institutions. Upon its adoption, CRAMRA was seen as having successfully 
accommodated the sovereignty problem among the Consultative Parties, 
while furnishing an acceptable institutional equilibrium (Joyner, 1996, 161). 
 
The composition of CRAMRA’s Regulatory Committees and the rules shaping decision-
making procedures offer a clear example of how CRAMRA negotiations aimed to reach a 
compromise between the two opposing fronts of claimant and non-claimant states. During the 
forum, pro-developmental and non-claimant states argued that decisions should not require 
consensus because they wanted to facilitate mining and weaken the position of claimant states. On 
the contrary, most claimant states staunchly supported consensus rule, because it allowed them to 
stop mineral activities that were taking place in their territory. Negotiations led to a compromise 
that saw the consensus rule applied to the Commission – which had the power to allow or to veto 
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exploratory mining actions – while the Regulatory Committees, which had to approve development, 
followed a two-thirds majority rule (Joyner, 1996, 160).26 
This review of the existing secondary literature shows that countries participating in 
CRAMRA negotiations pursued mostly particularistic intentions, usually related to sovereignty and 
economic goals, while the collective intention of environmental protection was often obscured. This 
indicates that particularistic statements predominated during CRAMRA negotiations, consistent 
with this research findings, which identified particularism as the most recurrent interaction within 
the fourth SATCM. Further confirmation comes from archival sources, which, as previously 
pointed out, described divisions between claimants/non-claimants and clashes between developing 
and developed countries as crucial in almost every session of the forum. 
The literature paints a very different picture of the negotiations which led to the elaboration of 
the Madrid Protocol. Many have highlighted how “the agenda was dominated by environmental 
issues” (Elliott, 1994, 179), from the pre-negotiations onwards (Elliott, 1994, 178). An effective 
way to establish the preponderance of collectivism within the eleventh SATCM is to examine the 
strategy of single countries which played a key role during the negotiations. Indeed, in contrast to 
CRAMRA negotiations (Elliott, 1994, 110-111), the forum which led to the elaboration of the 
Madrid Protocol was much less secretive (Elliott, 1994, 182-183), and authors were able to examine 
different countries’ negotiating strategies in detail.  
As previously outlined, the Madrid Protocol negotiations started in a climate of fierce 
opposition between two different camps: those who believed mining activities should not be 
allowed in Antarctica and those who defended the countries’ rights to conduct mineral exploitation 
in the continent. The former group was led by Australia and France (Joyner, 1996, 162-164; 
Verhoeven, 1992, 12) and was later joined by many other developed and developing countries 






representatives of the latter were the United States and the United Kingdom (Elliott, 1994, 175). 
Thus, before looking at Madrid Protocol negotiations in general, this dissertation looks at the 
strategy adopted by four key actors: Australia, France, the UK and the US. This is to assess whether 
the behaviour, both in and outside the forum, of these four key actors in the Madrid Protocol 
negotiations, confirms that the forum was characterized by a higher presence of collectivist 
interactions, focused on the fulfilment of the forum mandate. This review starts with the first 
country which refused to ratify CRAMRA: Australia. 
Environmental concerns were central to the development of Canberra’s discourse during the 
Madrid Protocol negotiations (Joyner, 1996, 163-164). This suggests that Australia negotiated 
making mainly statements aiming to fulfil the environmentalist pillar of the forum mandate – thus, 
making collectivist statements. Some authors have argued that these environmentalist concerns 
masked more prosaic, selfish interests, such as, for example, the desire to defend the integrity of the 
Australian territorial claim. 27  However, that Canberra relied mostly on collectivist overtures 
promoting environmental protection during the eleventh SATCM does not imply that Australia was 
not concerned with the integrity of its territorial claim. What it can be argued is that the Australian 
delegation interacted with other forum participants mostly through the display of collectivist 
statements, whatever Canberra’s “true” objectives were. Furthermore, while other concerns may 
have played a role in the government’s decision to reject CRAMRA, historically Australia has 
always been amongst the ACPs which were more mindful of environmental concerns (Elliott, 1994, 
166-167), and even during CRAMRA meetings adopted a more environmentalist stance (Elliott, 
1994, 169). 
Australia’s advocacy of a ban on mining in Antarctica was strongly supported by NGOs and 
the scientific community (Vidas, 1996, 57-57). NGOs welcomed the French-Australian proposal for 
 
27 According to Joyner, the “establishment of a multinational minerals regime was perceived by some as undermining 





a new, environmental agreement that would ban mineral activities, and they started to mobilize 
public opinion (Verhoeven, 1992, 12), while the scientific community noted the potential risks that 
mineral activities meant for the Antarctic environment (Joyner, 1996, 251). Canberra’s government 
and the Australian delegation internalized some of the statements made by NGOs and activists. This 
can be seen by looking at a speech delivered by the Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke who, in 
July 1989, soon after Canberra’s rejection of CRAMRA, declared: 
 
Antarctica is the world’s last great wilderness. It provides a habitat for many 
living species. It also constitutes an extremely valuable scientific laboratory 
for measuring the extent and effects of global climate changes and the 
thickness of the ozone layer […]. Australia does not expect to meet with 
unqualified success overnight, but […] more and more governments will be 
persuaded that mining Antarctica is a risk that should not be countenanced. 
[…] The Australian government will continue to […] promote a 
comprehensive environment protection convention and to establish an 
Antarctic Wilderness Reserve. […] Protecting Antarctica is no longer just a 
matter of making part of the globe safer for scientists – it is now a matter of 
human self-interest. […] Protecting Antarctica equals protecting ourselves 
(Hawke, quoted in Suter, 1992, 6). 
 
We can see that Hawke in his declaration takes up many points raised by NGOs and scientists 
and makes them his own. First, he acknowledges the existence of an Antarctic global common, and 
he argues by relying on reliable, scientific knowledge that protecting the Antarctic environment is 
advantageous for all – thus referring to collectivism’s material validity. Second, other than 
advocating environmental protection, he repeatedly refers to another main pillar of Antarctic 
forums’ mandate: scientific freedom. This suggests a general commitment to the forum mandate 
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and, consequently, to the forum’s collective intention. Finally, Hawke often refers to the need to 
protect Antarctica in the interest of all humankind, and this type of claim seems to rely on 
collectivism’s ethical validity. 
While Hawke’s speech does not demonstrate that the Australian delegation taking part in the 
Madrid Protocol negotiations engaged mainly in collectivist statements, it shows that the leader of 
the Australian government justified his refusal to ratify CRAMRA on the grounds of the need for 
more stringent environmental protection mechanisms, and consequently, called for greater 
fulfilment of the collective intention. Furthermore, Hawke’s speech, which is directed towards the 
fulfilment of the collective intention, relies on material and ethical validities which are often 
associated with collectivism. If this was the narrative adopted by the Australian Prime Minister, the 
eleventh SATCM Australian delegation must have adopted a negotiating strategy which was at least 
partly shaped by it. This conclusion is supported, as previously shown, by the secondary literature, 
which argues that Australia placed “environmental concerns before economic ones” (Elliott, 1994, 
173). All this suggests that Australia approached the Protocol’s negotiations by firmly advocating 
environmental protection – an approach driven by a strong commitment to the fulfilment of the 
collective intention of the forum. This, in turn, suggests that the Australian delegation frequently 
resorted to collectivist statements. 
As far as France was concerned, Paris’s refusal to sign CRAMRA was strongly influenced by 
Jacques Cousteau’s petition against the Convention (Elliott, 1994, 170), which gained enormous 
support within French public opinion (Sun, 1992, 95-96). An example of the importance played by 
Cousteau’s petition is that Michel Rocard, the Prime Minister who joined Australia in the call for a 
new environmental agreement for Antarctica, said that his government’s decision was influenced by 
the petition, and that it was taken after long talks with Jacques Cousteau himself (Elliott, 1994, 289, 
note 11). Cousteau, together with his colleague Bertrand Charrier, argued that every mining 




If the exploitation of mineral resources in the Antarctic is currently an 
economic absurdity and an ecological nonsense, why was time and effort 
spent developing a Convention to regulate the exploitation of non-
exploitable mineral resources? One can only conclude that the whole 
process was a monumental waste of time, effort and money! (Cousteau and 
Charrier, 1992, 7). 
 
The reasons why mining in the southern continent was economically absurd and ecologically 
“nonsensical” were many: to begin with, they argued, there were already enough fossil fuel deposits 
in other parts of the world, especially considering the already acknowledged need to reduce 
consumption of coal and oil (Cousteau and Charrier, 1992, 7). They also claimed that mineral 
exploitation would endanger the very delicate balance of the Antarctic, and seriously endanger 
Antarctic public goods which were fundamental for the existence of life on this planet (Cousteau 
and Charrier, 1992, 5-6). This was partly because the harsh climate conditions would make mineral 
exploitation very difficult, increasing the chance of serious and tragic industrial accidents (Cousteau 
and Charrier, 1992, 7). Finally, they advocated the protection of the Antarctic environment and the 
preservation of its current status as a “continent devoted to peace and science” (Cousteau and 
Charrier, 1992, 9). Their petition concluded that: 
 
The extraordinary beauty of its ice is a constant reminder to explorers and to 
scientists of the extreme climatic conditions which prevail in the Continent 
at the end of the world. Our own observation revealed the great fragility of 
the Antarctic ecosystem, a fact confirmed by a large number of scientific 
researches taking place from all over the world. The important role of the 
Antarctic in the maintenance of the planet’s climatic equilibrium is now 
universally recognized. From where then comes this desire to sacrifice the 
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last virgin space on our planet in the name of economic growth? (Cousteau 
and Charrier, 1992, 10) 
 
Almost all of the points raised by Cousteau and Charrier seem to rely on collectivism’s 
mechanisms of validation. First, by advocating the protection of Antarctic environment from human 
activities and the preservation of the Antarctic’s status of a “continent of peace and science”, they 
are addressing the forum mandate – and, therefore, the fulfilment of the forum’s collective 
intention. Furthermore, all their arguments attempting to justify why the ATS should implement 
stronger measures of environmental protection rely on empirical evidence and scientific knowledge 
describing the importance of Antarctica for all humankind and the dangers represented by human 
activities (Cousteau and Charrier, 1992, 5-6); their empirical assertions are therefore relying on a 
material validity aiming at the fulfilment of the collective intention of environmental protection. 
Moreover, their petition stresses the ethical imperative of protecting the Southern Continent 
ecosystem (Cousteau and Charrier, 1992, 10), thus relying on collectivism’s ethical validity, since 
the pursuit of the forum’s collective intention (environmental protection of Antarctica) is equated to 
the most ethical choice to take. Finally, Cousteau and Charrier stress the need to develop and 
respect the mandate of the Antarctic Treaty System, with this course of action depicted in their 
argument as the most coherent one (Cousteau and Charrier, 1992); in doing so, they are relying on 
collectivism’s consistency validity. 
Cousteau and Charrier were not members of the French delegation during the eleventh 
SATCM. It is, however, commonly accepted that their arguments played a fundamental role in 
France’s decision to reject CRAMRA, and in shaping France’s discourse during the negotiations 
which led to the birth of the Madrid Protocol (Joyner, 1996, 164). Thus, this should suggest that 
France’s approach to negotiations was greatly relying on collectivist statements. 
It is then possible to conclude that the French and the Australian delegation displayed, during 
the Madrid Protocol forum, a negotiating strategy heavily relying on collectivist statements. And 
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the fact that many other countries gradually came to agree with the Australian-French proposal is 
further evidence supporting the preponderance of collectivism during the eleventh SATCM. What is 
even more interesting, however, is that even those countries like the USA and UK, which were 
against a ban over mining activities in Antarctica, adopted a negotiating strategy emphasizing the 
need to protect the Antarctic environment and therefore fulfil the collective intention. London and 
Washington suggested that, since consensus on banning mineral activities was impossible, the best 
way to pursue the forum’s collective intention was to allow mining while at the same time 
providing clear and stringent measures for environmental protection (Hendry, 1992, 63-64). This 
claim can be confirmed by looking, for instance, at a speech delivered by John Heap, leader of the 
British delegation, during the first session of the 11th SATCM. Heap defined the issue of mineral 
exploitation as “the toughest nut to crack” (Heap, 1990, 73), and, while addressing all other forum 
participants, he argued that: 
 
We need the comprehensive system for the protection of Antarctica now. 
[…] My delegation is therefore strongly of the view that, for the sake of the 
Antarctic, if for no other reasons, we should concentrate first on the issue 
that brings us together rather than on the issue that divides us […]. Time is 
not on our side. If we have agreed on a system for the protection of the 
Antarctic environment […], but have not reached a consensus over the 
mineral question, we could be seen as having failed in the task we have set 
ourselves. […] My Government continues to believe that the Minerals 
Convention, which already exists, provides the only mechanism on offer 
which has the capacity both to defuse an otherwise explosive political issue, 
and to regulate mining activity in a manner which would meet all reasonable 




Heap’s speech clearly shows that the British delegation justified its opposition to a mineral 
ban by depicting it as the most rational and effective way to pursue the fulfilment of Antarctic 
environmental protection – and, consequently, the fulfilment of the forum’s mandate. This 
conclusion confirms what the secondary literature suggested – namely, that even those actors who 
opposed Paris and Canberra adopted an approach to negotiations which mainly relied on collectivist 
statements. 
Further validation of the assumption according to which Madrid Protocol negotiations were 
mostly characterized by collectivism can be found if one examines in greater depth the proposals 
which were presented in front of all forum participants. Indeed, forum participants split into 
different groups, arguing for different drafts of the Protocol (Joyner, 1996, 176). This might suggest 
that, like CRAMRA negotiations, Madrid Protocol ones were characterized by factionalism, by 
clashes of different groups openly pursuing particularistic intentions. However, while the drafts 
presented by these groups differed, all “shared the common purpose of elaborating a complete 
system of environmental protection, strengthening existing measures, and filling in the lacunae and 
additional necessities that could be detected” (Vicuña, 1996, 176). 
Thus, while – as in the CRAMRA negotiations – participants in the eleventh SATCM split 
into groups, these groups – in contrast to those in CRAMRA – were not claiming to differ on the 
basis of particularistic intentions, but on the basis of disagreements about how to best pursue the 
collective intention of Antarctic environmental protection. All the drafts which were presented 
during the first session of the eleventh SATCM advocated a strengthening of environmental 
protection measures and, consequently, greater fulfilment of the forum’s mandate. In contrast to 
CRAMRA negotiations, drafts were not backed by compact interest groups: each draft was 
supported by some developed countries jointly with developing ones, and by claimant states 
together with non-claimant ones, and each of these drafts claimed to aim at the best possible way to 
realize the collective intention (Vicuña, 1996, 176). 
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The research findings thus seem to confirm the conclusions of the secondary literature. 
Although this cannot be a definitive proof of a satisfactory level of criterion validity, it can be 
considered as circumstantial evidence indicating that, with a good level of probability, the coding 
scheme was able to capture the frequency of different types of statement in the two selected forum 
negotiations. 
Once the criterion validity of the research has been examined, it is necessary to assess the 
level of construct validity retained by the findings. As already noted, research findings are 
considered to hold a satisfactory level of construct validity when they are plausible and not counter-
intuitive. Empirical evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the Madrid Protocol 
negotiations were characterized by a higher level of collectivism than the CRAMRA ones. This, in 
turn, means that, during the former, actors made more statements aiming at fulfilling the forum 
mandate and, consequently, the forum’s collective intention. 
The third chapter of this dissertation outlined how the Madrid Protocol enjoyed greater 
legitimacy than CRAMRA, because it was thought to fulfil the forum mandate to a greater extent. 
This means that the forum with more collectivism resulted in an output with greater legitimacy, 
because it was thought to better fulfil the forum mandate. Not surprisingly, the forum which 
registered a higher frequency of statements aiming at the fulfilment of the forum mandate led to an 
output which was thought to meet that mandate, while the forum which registered lower levels of 
collectivism delivered a less legitimate output because it was not thought to be sufficiently 
committed to the realization of the forum’s mandate. Since these findings are intuitively plausible, 
they enjoy a high level of construct validity. 
 
5.6: Implications of the findings 
 
This chapter examined the results of the qualitative content analysis which unitized and coded all 
official speeches and statements delivered during the IV-12 and the XI-4 SATCMs, two sessions of 
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the forums which led to CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol respectively. The analysis indicated 
that the Madrid Protocol forum session (XI-4 SATCM) was characterized by a higher frequency of 
collectivist statements than the CRAMRA forum session (IV-12 SATCM), and these results are 
supported by a good level of inter-coder reliability, with a Krippendorff αcoefficient of 0.912. 
Furthermore, the chapter argued that the two forum sessions examined were representative of 
the two wider forums of which they were part. This claim was supported by secondary sources, 
archival material and by some more in-detail analysis of Antarctic forum sessions. It concluded that 
content analysis of two forum sessions shows, with a high level of reliability, that the 11th SATCM 
– which resulted in the Madrid Protocol – was characterized by a higher frequency of collectivist 
statements than the 4th SATCM – which led to the elaboration of the Mineral Convention. 
Finally, this chapter addressed the issue of the validity of the research findings. Since the 
fourth chapter already answered the questions related to context validity, by explaining why the 
method of qualitative content analysis was most appropriate given the theoretical framework, it 
mainly examined the criterion and construct validities of the findings. In the absence of reliable 
methods for distinguishing and categorizing forum types of statement, it reviewed secondary 
sources, which confirmed that the Madrid Protocol was characterized by a greater number of 
statements orientated towards the fulfilment of the forum’s mandate – and therefore, by a higher 
number of collectivist statements. Finally, the chapter has shown that the forum perceived to deliver 
a more legitimate output because it did more to fulfil the forum’s mandate was characterized by a 
higher level of collectivism. This in turn meant that, of the two negotiations, the one with a greater 
number of statements advocating the realization of the forum mandate led to a greater realization of 
that mandate. These conclusions being intuitively plausible, the chapter also claims that the findings 
retain a satisfactory degree of construct validity. 
All this leads to the conclusion that the theoretical model elaborated in this paper is able 
empirically to distinguish amongst the different types of forum statements with a good level of 
reliability and validity. The examination of official speeches delivered during a forum, through the 
242 
 
lens of qualitative content analysis driven by the categories elaborated of this paper’s theoretical 
























This thesis is based on one fundamental premise: a better understanding of the dynamics regulating 
international forums can lead to greater comprehension of international politics in general. Greater 
understanding of how inter-state negotiations work would not only be useful for the development of 
academic research, but for policymakers as well. Reaching agreements able to address global 
concerns in an unstable and anarchic world has always been a difficult task, but now, more than 
ever, it is also necessary. Climate change, desertification, the acidification of oceans and the 
dangers of mass extinction, together with new threats to global health such as the current COVID-
19 pandemic and the risks presented by to antibiotic resistance, are just some examples of new, 
unprecedented issues that the international community has to address, and that it can address only 
by concerted action and collective commitment. A wider knowledge of the different factors that 
help parties engaging in negotiations to reach an effective agreement could be fundamental for 
developing future strategies of global politics. 
Some questions, however, can be addressed only if researchers are able systematically to 
compare inter-state negotiations. Do delegations act differently when deliberating on the basis of 
consensus than when they decide by majority? Does diplomats’ demeanour change when they are 
granted more freedom of action by their governments? Do democracies generally tend to behave 
differently in diplomatic meetings than authoritarian states? These are all questions that need to be 
addressed if the discipline wants to understand the functioning of international forums, and the only 
way to address them is to compare different forums. The only way, for instance, to assess whether 
different decision-making mechanisms can change how states’ representatives interact is to 
compare forums which reach decisions on the basis of consensus with others which decide by 
majority. Only by weighing situations where delegates are tightly controlled by their governments 
against others where they are freer can one understand whether this is a variable influencing how 
diplomats interact. Only by comparing how democratic and authoritarian countries acted while 
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attending the same forum can one test whether these two regime types tend to behave differently 
when engaging in inter-state negotiations. 
Many works have tried to compare international forums, but they often have focused on the 
structural features of inter-state negotiations (Barrett, 2003, 300). Approaches of this sort try, for 
instance, to compare forums with different decision-making procedures, or with different 
mechanisms for implementing agreed measures, in order to assess which procedure is best 
(Keohane, 1996). This type of approach, however, neglects the contributions of agency to the output 
of international forums, and it is also unable to explain situations in which two structurally similar 
forums delivered radically different outputs, as in the case of the two Antarctic meetings examined 
in this thesis. These two forums were in fact regulated by the same membership, debate and 
decision-making procedures, were attended by almost the same participants, were driven by the 
same mandate and held under the same diplomatic framework, and delegations attending them 
discussed very similar issues. Yet they produced radically different outputs in terms of legitimacy: 
while the CRAMRA was rejected by key members of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and led to 
a legitimacy crisis of the whole system of governance of the southern continent, the Madrid 
Protocol was quickly ratified and restored international confidence in the ATS. 
To understand what happened during these two Antarctic meetings – and to better examine 
similar situations in international politics – it is not enough to compare forums only by their 
structure. We must examine features which are related to the agency of forum participants: in 
addiction to examining differences in the contexts in which delegates were negotiating, researchers 
need to analyze differences in what delegates did while negotiating. One way to examine how 
different participants behaved is to examine what they said. To compare what delegates said in two 
different forums, however, it is first necessary to classify all the different statements used in forums 
into distinct categories, each describing a particular type of behaviour. 
An example is Alastair Johnston’s claim that forums with a restricted number of participants 
are more likely to involve persuasive types of actions (Johnston, 2001, 509-510). The only way to 
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test this hypothesis is to clearly define “persuasive type of interaction”, and to develop a method for 
examining everything said during a forum in order to recognize, isolate and categorize all the types 
of statement which correspond to the definition of “persuasive action”. Only by doing this could 
one measure the frequency with which persuasive interactions recurred during a forum. This would 
in turn allow researchers to compare forums attended by a great number of participants with 
meetings attended by a more restricted number of delegations, and to assess whether the latter are 
characterized by greater frequency of persuasive interactions than the former. 
There have been previous works focusing on “what delegates say”, which tried to classify the 
statements made by diplomatic delegations into different types of forum behaviour (Krebs and 
Jackson, 2007; Ulbert and Risse, 2005; Saretzki, 2009). However, when researchers tried to test 
these models empirically, by examining real-world negotiations, they encountered many theoretical 
and methodological obstacles. This thesis has claimed that the way the literature has hitherto 
defined the different types of statement that can be made during international forums is flawed, and 
it cannot lead to the elaboration of empirically testable theories because it is based on false 
assumptions. The objective of this research was to provide new definitions of the different types of 
behaviour that can be displayed during inter-state negotiations, which would allow researchers 
examining real-world negotiations to categorize forum statements in a more systematic and reliable 
way. To do so, this thesis has built a theoretical model distinguishing international forum social 
interactions into collectivist, particularistic and procedural types of behaviour. The implication of 
this model is that a forum with a higher frequency of collectivist types of statement is likely to 
deliver a more legitimate output. 
This hypothesis was tested by examining two Antarctic forums: the 4th and the 11th Special 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (SATCMs), which led respectively to the Convention on 
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA) and the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (better known as the Madrid Protocol). As already 
explained, these two forums are structurally most-similar cases, but they produced two very 
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different outputs as far as their legitimacy was concerned, with the Madrid Protocol negotiations 
delivering a much more legitimate output than the CRAMRA one. These two meetings were 
analysed in order to assess whether the former had a higher frequency of collectivist types of 
statement than the latter. 
Testing the dissertation’s hypothesis on two structurally most-similar forums had two main 
objectives. First, to assess whether the theoretical model hereby provided could produce coherent 
and plausible hypotheses. Second, to examine whether the process of re-definition of the different 
types of forum statement in this model would allow one type of forum statement to be distinguished 
from another when applied to real-world negotiations. Empirical analysis showed that the Madrid 
Protocol negotiations involved more frequent collectivist statements than the CRAMRA ones, 
bearing out the dissertation’s hypothesis. Furthermore, evidence has been given that the procedures 
through which the hypothesis-testing has been conducted were reliable and valid were provided. 
This highlights how the dissertation’s hypothesis-testing procedures are replicable and provide a 
plausible portrait of reality, and from this it is possible to conclude that the model was able to 
provides a systematic categorization of forum statements while analysing real-world negotiations. 
While the empirical analysis concluded that the Madrid Protocol negotiations were 
characterized to a greater extent by collectivist type of statements than the CRAMRA ones, no 
explanation of why this was the case has been provided: this was not the objective of the research. 
Lorraine Elliott attempts to explain the differences between the CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol 
negotiations in her 1994 book International Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic. A 
brief overview can help understand how this thesis’s theoretical model can be useful for the study of 
international forums. 
Elliott’s hypothesis was that the Madrid Protocol was able to protect the Antarctic ecosystem 
better than the CRAMRA because, during negotiations before its adoption, environmentalist NGOs 
carried on a powerful public relations campaign, and managed to ally with some key members of 
the Antarctic Treaty System: Australia and France (Elliott, 1994, 163-164). Indeed, Elliott writes 
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that this alliance between non-governmental organizations and national governments, together with 
the public’s warm reception of the environmentalist campaign launched by NGOs amongst the 
public opinion prompted the Australian and French delegations, soon followed by other parties, to 
justify their claims by referring to some of the NGO’s main arguments. As a result, the Madrid 
Protocol negotiations were more centred on environmental matters than previous Antarctic forums 
(Elliott, 1994, 209-210). 
Empirical tests conducted in this research seem to confirm Elliott’s theory: the NGOs’ 
environmentalist positions were echoed by states’ delegations participating in the Madrid Protocol 
to a greater extent than in previous Antarctic meetings, and this translated into more frequent 
appeals for protection of the southern continent’s environment.1 In other words, NGOs which were 
active in Antarctica during both CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol negotiations developed a 
discourse aiming at the protection of the Antarctic environment, one of the main pillars of the 
ATS’s mandate. That, in the course of the Madrid Protocol negotiations, certain states used some of 
the NGOs’ arguments to justify their positions meant that they delivered more statements 
advocating environmental protection – i.e., more statements focused on the fulfilment of the forum 
mandate and, consequently, of the forum’s collective intention. Since it is plausible that more 
collectivism translates into greater legitimacy in the forum output, we can infer that greater 




during  the  Madrid  Protocol  negotiations  than  in  CRAMRA  ones  means  that  there  were  significant  structural 
differences between the two forums, which should not, at this point, be considered as structurally most‐similar. This 











The model presented in this thesis is a useful instrument with which to test the plausibility of 
Elliott’s theory – and of many other theories attempting to study the dynamics of inter-state 
negotiations. Moreover, while Elliott’s work offers a possible explanation of how two structurally 
similar forums can deliver outputs of varying legitimacy, this theoretical model can further 
illuminate the causal logic of Elliott’s theory, and to explain exactly how greater involvement of 
NGOs could influence the output of Antarctic forums. The model presented in this thesis could also 
be useful to explore under which conditions Elliott’s claim that, in order to secure environmental 
protection within the realm of international negotiations, NGOs should be “more strongly 
incorporated into environmental decision making” (Elliott, 2004, 212) would not be justified. 
Indeed, during the CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol negotiations, NGOs which were active in 
Antarctica were almost exclusively environmentalist ones (Herr, 1996, 98-100). Would greater 
involvement of NGOs lead to greater environmental protection even in the presence, together with 
environmentalist organizations, of others representing corporate, industrial and touristic interests? 
Would the use of NGOs’ arguments by some delegates be effective even when directed at 
authoritarian countries, which might be expected to be less sensitive to efforts to mobilize public 
opinion? This last question is important to understand some recent developments of Antarctic 
politics as well. In autumn 2019, member states of the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) met in Hobart, Australia, to discuss the possibility 
of creating a one-million square kilometre marine park in the Eastern Antarctic Ocean (Hayes, 
2019). In contrast to the Madrid Protocol negotiations, where the USA and the UK – two 
democracies – opposed the mining ban (Elliott, 1994, 192), this time the countries opposing the 
establishment of the marine park were two authoritarian states: Russia and China (Hayes, 2019). 
These negotiations saw the significant involvement of environmentalist NGOs (Readfearn, 2019), 
which tried to pressure negotiating parties into approving the creation of the natural reserve; 




To address these questions, it would be necessary to compare international forums differing, 
for instance, in the types of NGOs involved in the negotiations, or in the regime type of forum 
participants, and see whether these variables influence the role played by NGOs during 
negotiations. It has previously been shown that establishing how, why and in which cases NGOs’ 
involvement could influence the output of a forum is not the only task that could be tackled by a 
systematic comparison between different international forums, and Elliott’s theory has been used in 
this chapter to show how the theoretical model developed in this thesis could be useful in testing 
theories about international forums, and to explore their causal mechanisms and possible 
limitations. As said at the beginning of the chapter, this research project has been undertaken 
because the literature examining international forums was not able clearly to distinguish and 
categorize the different types of behaviour that delegations displayed in inter-state negotiations. The 
following sections provide a more in-depth analysis of the difficulties encountered by previous 
authors in fulfilling the task, as well as saying more about the reasoning behind this thesis’s 
theoretical model and empirical analysis. Finally, they also explain how this dissertation’s 
theoretical model can help overcome such difficulties. 
 
I: The unintelligibility of “true dispositions” and the “omnipresence of arguing” 
 
The literature has often tried to examine what delegates said and to assign statements in forums to 
clear categories, each of them describing one particular type of forum behaviour; however, it often 
did so by following interpretive processes. While there is nothing wrong with interpretive 
approaches in themselves, they are unsuitable for building a systematic process of cross-case 
comparison, following a method of analysis that can be replicated by other researchers. That is why, 
when interpretive researchers tried to produce theoretical models which could be tested empirically 
in a reliable and valid way, they encountered seemingly insuperable obstacles. 
250 
 
As already said, the most ambitious and articulate attempt of this sort was that of Nicole 
Deitelhoff and Harald Müller, who tried to isolate moments within inter-state negotiations in which 
arguing behaviour was clearly present. At first, they drew from major contributions to the literature, 
and tried to distinguish arguing from bargaining by identifying the “true dispositions” of forum 
participants, such as, for instance, their open-mindedness and their willingness to tell the truth. 
However, they soon found out that these “true dispositions” were impossible to assess while 
examining real-world negotiations (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 170-171). Thus, they tried to 
distinguish arguing from bargaining by examining the formal characteristics of these two speech 
acts: arguing was defined as a type of interaction implying “reason giving, and the search for 
reasoned consensus”, while bargaining was described as a speech act involving “search for 
compromise based on the fixed preferences of the actors” (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 172). In 
other words, they tried to shift from examining how and what delegates thought and felt during the 
forum to what delegates said, and how they said it. By following this approach, they found that 
arguing behaviour, intended as “search for reasoned consensus”, was omnipresent within 
international negotiations, and that most statements formulated by delegations had some 
characteristics belonging to the arguing ideal-type and others belonging to the bargaining one 
(Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 177). 
Despite its inability clearly to isolate arguing moments within international forums, 
Deitelhoff’s and Müller’s article is fundamental for the development of this field of study, because 
it reveals how existing attempts to categorize forum types of behaviour are unsuitable to studying 
real-world negotiations. Furthermore, it highlights how the types of forum behaviour currently 
identified by the literature are often defined by the “true dispositions” of forum participants, which 
are unobservable objects of international life. Such an excessive reliance on unobservables stems 
from the fact that the literature studying forum social types of interaction was mostly shaped by the 
debate between constructivism and rationalism. 
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The centrality of this dispute within the literature led to theoretical models which postulated 
that forum participants thought in a certain way: while constructivists claimed that actors were 
driven by their historically shaped identities and by social norms, rationalists defined interacting 
subjects as selfish and strategic units. In other words, these models assumed that the behaviour 
displayed by subjects during negotiations was derived from a certain type of logic, and that the 
types of behaviour diplomatic delegations displayed were just the empirical manifestation of a 
particular way of thinking. Consequently, rationalists argued that forum participants mostly resorted 
to bargaining because the true disposition of those attending the forum was a self-focused, strategic 
one, and the best way to act while being in such a disposition was through the strategic display of 
promises and threats. Constructivists, on the other hand, claimed that diplomatic delegations mostly 
engaged in norm-orientated behaviour because their true disposition was a norm-abiding one. They 
also thought that, in the absence of clear and pre-established social norms, forum participants would 
engage in arguing, driven by the need to build a shared normative framework, with a truth-seeking 
and open-minded disposition. 
The types of forum behaviour identified by the literature were thus considered to be the 
necessary consequence of how actors thought during international negotiations, and were defined 
on the basis on the subjects’ true dispositions. To isolate clear examples of these types of behaviour 
while analysing real-world negotiations, one had to be able to detect the true dispositions driving 
forum participants. This, however, was not possible, because, as Deitelhoff and Müller argued, 
researchers have no access to the minds of delegates or way of knowing why they are behaving in a 
certain way (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 171). Once Deitelhoff and Müller had shown the 
limitations which an excessive focus on subjects’ true dispositions entailed, many researchers 
followed their examples and started examining what delegates said during forums, looking for ways 
to distinguish different types of behaviour on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of the acts of 
speech uttered during negotiations (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). 
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These attempts, however, were still unable to overcome the main problem encountered by 
Deitelhoff and Müller: the impossibility of clearly distinguishing arguing from bargaining while 
examining real-world negotiations. This was because researchers tried to change the focus from 
what delegates thought to what they said, but they did not start from a process of redefining forum 
types of behaviour. In other words, although researchers were no longer looking for actors’ true 
dispositions, the types of forum behaviour they were trying to isolate were still those enumerated by 
previous theories. Hence, arguing was distinguished from bargaining on the assumption that the 
former took place when actors had a truth-seeking and open-minded disposition, while the latter 
stemmed from a situation where actors’ disposition was a selfish one (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005, 
172). In other words, authors who tried to categorize forum statements on the basis of their formal 
characteristics still relied on definitions based on the “true dispositions” of forum participants. The 
inability to solve this theoretical contradiction led to the impossibility of clearly isolating one type 
of statement from another while examining real-world negotiations. 
 
II: The need to redefine forum types of behaviour 
 
Currently, the literature distinguishes arguing and bargaining types of behaviour on the basis of 
certain modal, structural and procedural characteristics. Modal characteristics refer to the intrinsic 
properties of a particular speech act, structural ones describe the number and the features of the 
subjects involved in the speech act, and procedural hallmarks describe how the speech act is 
practised, the steps it has to follow in order to be carried out. Modally, arguing relies, according to 
the literature, on mechanisms of material, ethical and consistency validation: in an arguing situation, 
a speaker A will try to convince a listener B that a certain choice X is the most advantageous, 
ethical and coherent in absolute terms. This is possible only if A proves to B that X is the best 
possible thing to do by providing reliable evidence, and this in turn can be done only if A appeals to 
some kind of external authority accepted by both the speaker and the listener. This external 
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authority is identified, in international negotiations, as “agreed-upon treaties, universally held 
norms, scientific evidence, and other forms of consensual knowledge” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 
353). Thus, arguing is a type of interaction that requires a speaker, a listener and a certain type of 
external authority, and that is why it is structurally a triadic type of behaviour. The shared external 
authority functions, in arguing, as a “common frame of reference” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353) 
through which both speaker and listener try to assess whether the policy proposed by the speaker is 
the best possible choice. This means that arguing interactions are procedurally reflexive, since they 
are characterized by a constant exchange of arguments aiming at establishing the material, ethical 
and consistency validities of a claim. 
Bargaining behaviour, on the other hand, is defined as the display of promises and threats. For 
this reason, it is seen by the current literature as a speech act that, modally, does not need to be 
validated materially, ethically or on the basis of its coherence; in other words, bargaining claims 
base their effectiveness uniquely on the credibility of the speaker and the likelihood that those 
promises and threats will be enacted in the future. Since bargaining speech acts do not rely on 
mechanisms of validation, they do not require the presence of a mutually accepted external 
authority through which to assess its validity; this means that bargaining is a structurally dyadic 
type of interaction, characterized only by a speaker and a listener. Finally, bargaining being a 
dyadic speech act, interlocutors lack the common frame of reference needed to exchange arguments 
establishing the validity of a claim; for this reason, bargaining is procedurally sequential, rather 
than reflexive (Ulbert and Risse, 2005, 353). 
This way of distinguishing arguing from bargaining is deeply problematic. In fact, promises 
or threats made during a forum can only be convincing if the speaker is able to show that the 
promises made are advantageous to the listener, or if the threats displayed are ominous to him/her. 
This, however, can only be done by resorting to mechanisms of material, ethical and consistency 
validation, and this entails that bargaining is an act of speech modally characterized by such 
mechanisms, exactly like arguing. Validation, however, can only succeed if interlocutors appeal to 
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some type of mutually accepted external authority through which to assess the validity of their 
claims: in case of a bargaining speech act, the speaker A could try to convince B to accept the 
proposed deal by, for example, providing scientific knowledge in support of the claim that the 
promise made is a convenient and credible one. This means that arguing and bargaining are both 
structurally triadic. Finally, bargaining being a triadic speech act, it is possible to claim that it is a 
type of interaction in which actors exchange arguments aiming at establishing the attractiveness of a 
promise or the danger posed by a threat, by using a mutually accepted external authority as a 
common frame of reference; bargaining is, then, a procedurally reflexive type of interaction, as 
much as arguing is. That arguing and bargaining are modally, structurally and procedurally similar 
explains why, when authors tried to isolate the former from the latter, they found that arguing was 
“omnipresent”: the characteristics that were considered to be arguing’s hallmarks were also key 
features of bargaining, and, since it is impossible to distinguish one object from another by 
examining features they both have, the two acts of speech looked almost indistinguishable in the 
empirical realm. 
This last passage leads to a critical juncture: either one argues that there is no significant 
difference between arguing and bargaining, and that it is therefore useless try to distinguish between 
them; or one maintains that a difference exists, but that the current way of defining the two speech 
acts is not effective. This thesis takes the latter path. It claims that statements arguing, for instance, 
that a certain strategy is in the common interest of humankind because it is the most ethical choice 
in absolute terms, is very different from a statement urging someone to give in to a threat for the 
sake of the national interest. It also argues that being able systematically to differentiate one type of 
statement from another would significantly help cross-case comparison, and thus would help 
address fundamental questions concerning international forums. The necessary conclusion is that, 
although arguing and bargaining differ, the way they have currently been defined and distinguished 
is problematic. Thus, if one wants to clearly distinguish one from another, it is necessary to 




III: Re-defining forum types of behaviour on the basis of the type of intention they address 
 
Previous sections have outlined how current classifications of forum speech acts are problematic 
and often based on unobservable features of international life, and how it is therefore necessary to 
build new definitions of the types of statement that actors can make during negotiations. At the 
same time, it has already been pointed out that this thesis wanted to build a theoretical model able 
clearly and systematically to categorize the different types of behaviour occurring in international 
forums, and that the empirical applicability of the model was therefore a priority. Hence, the re-
definition of forum types of interaction needed to be based on features related, at least indirectly, to 
empirically observable phenomena. The concept of “intention” was the ideal foundation such a 
process of re-definition. 
The term “intention” is generally used in the literature to indicate something influencing 
actors’ behaviour and implying commitment to clear objectives. These are objectives that, to be 
achieved, must be pursued consistently through time, and intentions are the motivational force 
driving subjects towards them (Mitzen, 2013, 35-36). This research started from a revised version 
of the work of Jennifer Mitzen, who uses the concept of intention to analyze the processes of global 
governance, and it envisioned international forums as situations in which interacting subjects are 
driven both by collective and particularistic types of intention. On the one hand, the collective 
intention is shared by all forum participants, it needs their concerted effort to be fulfilled and it 
commits them to its realization. On the other hand, particularistic intentions are held by one or more 
subjects amongst forum participants, but not by the whole forum. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
collective intention, actors are individually committed to particularistic intentions, and the pursuit of 
the latter can sometimes hinder the realization of the former. 
In other words, the theoretical framework of this thesis argued that a diplomatic delegation 
can, within the same forum, pursue both the collective intention shared with all other delegations 
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and the particularistic intentions that it holds individually. Although intentions are, similarly to 
actors’ “true dispositions”, unobservable objects of international life, they also are, unlike the latter, 
detectable entities: they can in fact be indirectly detected by analysing some empirically observable 
features of inter-state negotiations. For this reason, they can be used to build an empirically testable 
model. 
This last claim is justified by the definition of inter-state negotiations as meetings regulated 
by pre-established norms and characterized by a public type of debate, in which every delegation 
argues its point in front of all other participants. The forum is legitimized by the presence of a clear 
mandate which needs to be fulfilled during the debate, however much participants may also address 
incidental issues unrelated to the mandate. From these premises, it has been argued that the 
existence of a forum mandate is the consequence of the existence of a collective intention: indeed, 
delegations would gather in a meeting and establish an official mandate legitimizing its very 
existence only in the presence of a collective commitment. Similarly, particularistic intentions are 
the reason why incidental issues are raised during negotiations: only in the presence of other types 
of intentions differing from the collective one and not shared by all forum participants, would a 
delegation address topics unrelated to the forum mandate. 
Collective and particularistic intentions were thus defined as unobservable objects which can 
be detected by examining the empirical phenomena to which they give rise – respectively, the 
forum mandate and the incidental issues addressed in the course of the negotiation. Since both types 
of intention are, at least indirectly, related to empirically observable phenomena, they are theoretical 
constructs which can produce a model that can be applied to the study of real-world negotiations. It 
is however important to note once again that this research adopted an agnostic and instrumentalist 
take on the concept of intentions, and it claimed that they are a useful concept through which to 
examine forum dynamics, independent of their objective existence in the “real world”. 
The theoretical construct of intention is not only a useful concept by which to formulate an 
empirically testable model; it is also fundamental in building a process of systematic categorization 
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of forum types of behaviour. While, in fact, both arguing and bargaining are reflexive and triadic 
acts of speech, both relying on material, ethical and consistency validations, bargaining is a type of 
behaviour directed towards the realization of one or more particularistic intentions, while arguing is 
an act of speech focused on the achievement of the collective intention shared by all forum 
participants. Indeed, an arguing type of statement can claim that a certain choice is the most 
convenient, the most ethical and the most coherent for all people involved only by claiming that 
such a choice is the best way to address the forum mandate. Similarly, a speaker engaging in 
bargaining can convince the listener to accept the proposed deal only by showing that the deal is a 
credible one, that it is advantageous for the listener to accept it and, consequently, that it is in the 
listener’s national interest; this in turn can be done only if the speaker convinces the listener that the 
proposed deal is the best way to realize the latter’s particularistic intentions. 
To sum up, the theoretical model presented in this thesis claimed that arguing and bargaining 
can be distinguished by the types of intentions they pursue. By developing this process of 
redefinition even further, it is claimed that arguing and bargaining are not types of forum behaviour, 
but rather subtypes of broader categories. Arguing is a subtype of collectivism, which is a category 
indicating all statements characterized by material, ethical and consistency validities aiming at the 
realization of the collective intention, and which includes other type of statements like, for instance, 
rhetorical ones.2 Bargaining is instead defined as a subtype of particularism, which is a category 
encompassing all statements relying on material, ethical and consistency validities pursuing one or 
more particularistic intentions, and that also includes, for example, advocacy types of statement.3 
These two categories – together with that of proceduralism, including all statements which advocate 
the observance of the forum pre-established norms – are the ideal-types at the base of this model’s 
process of categorization of forum statements. 
 







IV: Hypothesis drawn from the model and selection of a case for empirical testing 
 
A forum characterized by greater frequency of collectivist types of statement means that it is 
characterized by a greater number of statements focused on the achievement of the forum’s 
collective intention. A greater presence of these statements should lead to an output which fulfils 
the forum’s collective intention to a greater extent. This, in turn, translates into greater fulfilment of 
the forum mandate, since the latter is the empirical manifestation of the collective intention. 
Furthermore, the fulfilment of the forum mandate is generally considered a fundamental 
determinant of both the internal and external legitimacy of a forum output (Stokke and Vidas, 
1996a, 20-25): an output which effectively fulfils the forum mandate is in fact more likely to be 
perceived as legitimate both by forum participants (internal legitimacy) and by the international 
community as a whole (external legitimacy). By following this reasoning, it is possible to formulate 
the hypothesis that a higher frequency of collectivist statements should lead towards greater 
legitimacy in the forum output. 
Testing this hypothesis allows us to assess the plausibility of the theoretical model, and, since 
the main objective was to test whether there was a correlation between higher frequencies of 
collectivism and greater legitimacy in the forum output, it was necessary to find two forums which 
produced two very different outputs in terms of legitimacy. Once the cases were selected, it must be 
assessed whether the forum producing the most legitimate output was characterized by a higher 
frequency of collectivist statements. This, however, was not sufficient to test the hypothesis. Indeed, 
the model looked at what delegates said during the forum – i.e., at the acts of speech uttered during 
negotiations – which is an agency-related variable. There are, however, also structural factors that 




To better explain how the structure of a forum can influence the legitimacy of its output, one 
could consider a hypothetical case in which the Republic of San Marino, Vatican City and the 
Principalities of Andorra and Liechtenstein gather in a forum driven by the mandate of reducing the 
number of nuclear weapons in the world and in which, after some time, these countries deliver an 
output in the form of a Treaty on Universal Nuclear Disarmament. None of these four countries has 
nuclear weapons, nor do they have the authority to impose nuclear disarmament on other states; this 
means that the output of such a forum would have very few chances of fulfilling the forum mandate. 
Hence, it is highly unlikely that other states would accept such a treaty as the legitimate source of 
international law regulating how nuclear disarmament should be conducted. 
In other words, this example shows how a structural feature of the forum – i.e., the countries 
participating in the negotiation – can result in a lack of external legitimacy of the forum output, 
independently from the agency participants exercised. That is why, for a plausibility probe of the 
research hypothesis, it was necessary to select cases which were most-similar as far as their 
structural features were concerned, and that were as different as possible in terms of the legitimacy 
of their outputs. These two forums were then analysed in order to test whether the forum 
characterized by higher frequency of collectivism delivered the most legitimate output. This would 
allow us to be confident that the hypothesis is a plausible one, supported by initial empirical 
findings. 
To sum up, this thesis argued that, if collectivism is described as a type of statement relying 
on material, ethical and consistency validities and aiming at the fulfilment of the forum collective 
intention, negotiations characterized by a greater frequency of collectivist statements will have 
more chance of delivering an output with a higher degree of legitimacy. This is because greater 
collectivism will most likely lead to an output able to fulfil the forum mandate to a greater extent; in 
turn, being the fulfilment of the forum mandate fundamental in determining the legitimacy of the 
forum output, an increase of the former would lead to an increase of the latter. In order to test this 
hypothesis, cases were selected: the CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol Antarctic diplomatic 
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meetings. These two forums were structurally most-similar, but the output of the Madrid Protocol 
negotiations was characterized by a significantly higher level of legitimacy than the CRAMRA one. 
The empirical analysis of this thesis aimed at assessing whether the former registered a higher 
frequency of collectivist types of statement than the latter. 
 
V: The empirical analysis 
 
It is clear from the previous section that the logic behind the case selection is that of a most-similar 
case study. As already said, the cases selected were two Antarctic forums, the 4th and the 11th 
Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (SATCMs), which generated respectively the 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA) and the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (better known as the Madrid 
Protocol). The Mineral Convention never came into force, because France and Australia, later 
joined by other countries refused to sign it and ratify it. They justified their refusal by claiming that 
the treaty did not sufficiently preserve the Antarctic environment from the harmful consequences of 
mining, and that, consequently, it did not fulfil its mandate to a sufficient extent. The decision taken 
by Paris and Canberra, two key actors in Antarctic politics, indicates that CRAMRA lacked internal 
legitimacy, while the strong criticisms that the Convention endured from countries which were not 
members of the Antarctic Treaty System suggests that the treaty lacked external legitimacy as well. 
The Madrid Protocol, on the other hand, was ratified rather quickly by all parties, and it is still in 
force; the Protocol was perceived as legitimate also by external parties, since some of the most 
violent criticisms against the ATS dissolved after its coming into force. By comparing these two 
forums, so similar at a structural level and so different in terms of legitimacy in their outputs, the 
intention was to test whether they presented differences in the frequency with which collectivist 
statements were delivered during the negotiating process, and to assess whether the 11th SATCM, 
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which resulted in the most legitimate output, registered a higher frequency of collectivist types of 
statement. 
It is now clear that the objective of this thesis’s empirical analysis was to classify the 
statements made during the two Antarctic forums into the ideal-typical categories of collectivism, 
particularism and proceduralism. Since complete transcription of the two Antarctic negotiations 
were not available, it was necessary to look for documents that could provide a reliable summary of 
the types of interaction that took place within the two forums. This thesis did this by examining the 
diplomatic speeches and declarations delivered by the diplomatic delegations participating in the 
two forums. The empirical analysis of the 4th and the 11th SATCMs carried on in this research 
considered only one session of each forum – namely, the 12th session of the 4th SATCM and the 4th 
session of the 11th SATCM. One reason for this sampling was that the thesis could rely on the work 
of just one coder, and it was therefore necessary to select a limited range of speeches and statements 
to examine. Secondly, the two selected sessions presented many similarities on a structural level. 
Furthermore, the two selected forum sessions were amongst the few in which delegations made 
official statements. Finally, it was possible to consider these samples, after analysing both 
secondary sources and archival material, as representative of the forums they were part of. 
Qualitative content analysis was judged the best methodology by which to unitize and 
systematically categorize statements formulated during the sampled forum sessions.  The coding 
scheme’s structure classified the units of examined diplomatic speeches into four categories: 
“collectivism”, “particularism”, “proceduralism” and “other”. While the conceptualization of the 
four categories was theory-driven, the process for pinpointing the empirical indicators entailing that 
a unit belonged to a certain category was data-driven, and it followed the procedure of subsumption 
described by Margit Schreier (2012, 15). The content analysis showed that the 11th SATCM, 
resulting in the most legitimate output, registered a significantly higher frequency of collectivist 
statements than the 4th SATCM. This shows that the hypothesis that there is a direct correlation 
between frequency of collectivist statements and legitimacy of the forum output is plausible. 
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There were two main problems that could emerge from this method of hypothesis-testing, the 
first concerning the reliability of the analysis and the second related to its validity. The research’s 
reliability was threatened by the fact that the analysis required a significant degree of interpretation, 
and this means that the coding would produce different results, depending on who the coder was. A 
worse risk was that the researcher could, even unconsciously, categorize units in a way that would 
support the model’s hypothesis. For these reasons, the author, together with two other coders who 
did not play any role in elaborating the research model, examined a sample of the textual material 
through the lens of the coding scheme, following the procedure of a blind pilot study. To assess the 
extent to which the three coders delivered similar results, their work was compared, and the inter-
coder reliability was measured by determining the Krippendorff α coefficient. This amounted to 
0.912, indicating that the findings could be considered reliable. Such a high level of reliability of 
the findings indicates not only that the coding had been crafted in a fashion that enabled 
replicability; it also meant that the thesis was able to produce a theoretical model whose hypotheses 
could be tested empirically in a reliable way. Furthermore, it also suggested that re-defining forum 
types of behaviour by assessing the type of intention they address could lead to a systematic 
categorization of forum statements, thus fulfilling the objective of this research. 
As far as the validity of the analysis was concerned, it was clear that the categories 
representing the different types of forum statement, as well as the empirical indicators indicated for 
each of these categories, were the consequence of certain theoretical premises. Thus, there was the 
risk that the empirical testing of the model would produce a somewhat distorted portrait of reality, 
which would force empirical phenomena into the dissertation’s theoretical cage. Such a risk was 
even greater in this case, since the frequency of forum types of behaviour had been measured 
indirectly, by examining only some official documents delivered during the last session of the two 
examined forums. To assess the validity of the findings, secondary sources which looked at the two 
Antarctic forums as case studies were examined. The review of existing literature suggested that 
results of the content analysis were in line with the findings of previous authors. This led to two 
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conclusions: first the choice to examine diplomatic speeches and declarations in order to measure 
the frequency of different types of statement within a forum was sensible; second, the empirical 
analysis generated by the theoretical model was able to produce a representation of reality in 
accordance with that of previous research, and it could therefore be considered valid. 
The main conclusions of the study can finally be stated. First, the thesis’s theoretical model 
has been able to produce a hypothesis shown to be plausible and coherent by early empirical 
findings. Second, the model delivered a systematic, replicable and reliable method of categorization 
of forum statements. Third, such systematic categorization produced findings which are in line with 
previous research, and that therefore can be considered a plausible portrait of reality. 
 
VI: The need for further testing and avenues for future research 
 
This thesis represents the first step towards a broader research project. The plausibility of the 
model’s hypothesis and of the model’s theoretical framework justifies the undertaking of further 
empirical testing. Current findings have in fact only supported the plausibility of the model, and this 
plausibility probe was conducted by examining two Antarctic forums: the 4th and the 11th SATCMs. 
In order to test the inference potential of the hypothesis of direct correlation between collectivism 
and legitimacy of the forum output, more structurally similar cases should be taken into 
consideration. Further empirical testing should assess not only the inference potential of the thesis’s 
hypothesis, but also the scope of the theory. The following questions should therefore be asked: is 
the model applicable only to natural global commons international forums4 or it can be used to 
study other types of inter-state negotiations? Is the model applicable only to international forums, or 
 
4 As already pointed out during  this  thesis’s  third chapter, Antarctica cannot be considered an  ideal‐typical natural 
global  common,  because  of  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  international  regime  administering  it.  It  has  been 
extensively  argued  in  this  thesis  that  the  similarities  between  Antarctica  and  other  natural  global  commons  are 
greater than their differences, and that Antarctica should therefore be considered a global common. This conclusion 
was  in  line with much of  the  literature examining  this subject  (for example, among others,  Joyner 1998 and Vogler 
1995). It is however important to point out that Antarctica still remains “a special kind of common” (Joyner, 1998, 44‐




it can be used to study different types of negotiation as well? Global commons international forums 
are not, in fact, the only place in which actors gather while being driven by collective and 
particularistic intentions. Further research should assess whether the model can be used to study, for 
instance, peace negotiations, forums related to inter-state security, or even negotiations between 
political parties forming a government coalition, and to assess whether reliable and valid findings 
can be produced in those contexts. 
Another path that can be taken is to test the theoretical and philosophical premises of the 
thesis themselves. Indeed, the theoretical model hereby presented assumes that delegations 
participating in international forums pursue both collective and particularistic intentions. 
Furthermore, it also assumes that the collective intentions translate, in the empirical realm, into the 
forum mandate, while particularistic intentions are what trigger delegates to raise incidental issues 
during negotiations. Finally, it claims that, by analysing the official speeches delivered by 
delegations during diplomatic meetings, one can assess the intentions held by such delegations and 
the way they interacted in the course of the negotiations. To what extent can these premises be 
validated? To what extent it is possible to say that the mandate and the incidental issues raised in 
the forum are the empirical manifestation respectively of collective and particularistic intentions? 
To what extent does the existence of a mandate permit the inference that all delegations 
participating in a forum share a collective commitment? To what extent are the official speeches 
delivered in a forum representative of the intentions and priorities of a diplomatic delegation? 
To address these types of question, one could examine negotiations which took place in the 
past, and test whether official statements delivered during the forum reflected the concern delegates 
expressed in private. Examining private correspondence between delegates participating in the same 
forum, or even letters exchanged between delegates and, for instance, their foreign ministers, could 
help to assess whether the existence of a mandate pre-supposes the fact that all delegations share a 
collective intention. By examining what diplomats said in private, one could further assess whether 
statements they made publicly during the official forum negotiations reflected the intentions of the 
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countries they represented. Obviously, private correspondence is not necessarily more reliable than 
public statements, as has already been discussed in previous chapters, and this type of study would 
not therefore provide conclusive answers to the questions listed above. However, this type of study 
would further test the validity of some key assumptions behind the research theoretical framework, 
and it would allow us to study in greater depth the nature of international forums and the link 
between intentions and actors’ behaviour.  
 
VII: Contributions to the literature 
 
The objective of this work was to build a theoretical model studying social interactions occurring 
within international forums; a model through which to formulate empirically-testable hypotheses 
and to classify the different statements uttered during negotiations in a systematic way. Early 
empirical tests, illustrated in this thesis, supported the hypothesis drawn from the model’s 
theoretical premises and highlighted how the procedure of categorization adopted is replicable and, 
therefore, reliable and systematic. This research has been undertaken in the firm belief that it can 
bring significant contributions to the study of international forums. Although further, more stringent 
empirical testing is required, it is possible to say that the thesis has contributed to the existing 
literature on a conceptual, empirical and methodological level. 
Conceptually, this thesis sheds light on the contradictions within the traditional distinction of 
forum types of behaviour – contradictions which often undermined attempts to isolate certain types 
of forum behaviour from others in empirical analyses. Furthermore, this research linked a revised 
version of Jennifer Mitzen’s theory of collective intention with the literature examining inter-state 
negotiations, and by doing so it redefined forum social interactions. This process of redefinition of 
forum types of behaviour transcended the traditional dichotomy between arguing and bargaining, 
and led to a model that is able to include a broader spectrum of social interactions. The model was 
based on the theoretical construct of “intention”, which is considered to be a detectable 
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unobservable of international forums, since the collective intention can be linked with the forum 
mandate, and particularistic ones can be identified by identifying the incidental issues raised during 
the negotiations. This link, although indirect, between the model’s theoretical construct and the 
empirical world made it possible to formulate empirically testable hypotheses, in contrast to the 
works of previous authors. Another difference from earlier works is that the method of 
categorization of different types of forum statements is, in this research, systematic and replicable. 
By being able to produce empirically testable hypotheses, and by elaborating a systematic and 
reliable method of categorization of forum statements, this thesis provides the conceptual tools 
essential for a more effective and thorough comparison of different inter-state negotiations. This 
comparison is in turn necessary in order to answer fundamental questions concerning international 
forums. 
Empirically, by comparing two most-similar Antarctic negotiations, this thesis demonstrates 
that there is a plausible correlation between the frequency of collectivist statements and the 
legitimacy of the forum output. Furthermore, the empirical analysis conducted on the two selected 
Antarctic forums seems to confirm that greater legitimacy of the forum output can translate into 
greater effectiveness of the regime it produced. This means that researchers could in the foreseeable 
future try to identify which are the variables encouraging collectivism in a forum, and at the same 
time helping researchers and policymakers in elaborating policies, strategies and decisions that 
could encourage the achievement of effective, concerted actions in vital matters of global 
governance. The hypothesis presented in this thesis must be tested further, but these findings can be 
considered additional evidence that the official, public debate that goes on during a forum is much 
more than a mere display of rhetoric and “empty words”. Indeed, by examining what delegates say, 
a researcher can examine some fundamental features of inter-state negotiations, and grasp some of 
the main dynamics of international forums. 
So far as methodology is concerned, this thesis measures the frequency of forum types of 
behaviour through the lens of qualitative content analysis, and it examines official speeches and 
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declarations released by delegates during a forum. The fact that empirical findings reveal patterns 
which are already accepted by the existing literature highlights how the analysis of forum official 
speeches can provide a reasonable portrait of the main forum dynamics, and a plausible assessment 
of the frequency with which types of behaviour were displayed during negotiations.5 
This methodological innovation can significantly contribute to the study of international 
forums, and can help overcome the obstacles represented by the inaccessibility of forum transcripts 
and the impossibility of observing rounds of negotiations: fundamental information related to the 
agency of forum participants could be gathered by systematically analysing official speeches. The 
way this research approached the study of the CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol negotiations can 
provide a model. Both these forums were characterized by a certain degree of secrecy (Elliott, 1994, 
110-111), and by informal meetings in which interactions between diplomatic delegations were not 
recorded (Elliott, 1994, 120). While it was not possible to examine everything that delegates said, 
the analysis of the official diplomatic speeches has enabled this research to provide a reliable and 
valid summary of the types of behaviour states’ representatives engaged in during the forum. If this 
method worked for Antarctic negotiations, it can also be applied to other forums in which 
researchers cannot be present to witness negotiations, whether in the distant past or in most recent 
times. Finally, the fact that this thesis’s empirical findings show such a high degree of reliability 
demonstrates how qualitative content analysis can be a feasible method through which to attempt a 
process of categorization of different forum statements. 
The hypothesis drawn from the dissertation’s theoretical model was that greater presence of 
collectivism in international negotiations would be reflected in greater fulfilment of the forum 
mandate. While further research is necessary, the empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation 
has shown that this hypothesis is plausible, and that, at least in the case of the two examined 
 
5 As  already  said,  this  claim  does  not  imply  that  the  systematic  analysis  of  forum  official  statements  can  lead 
researchers  to discover all  the  important  information  they need  to know about  international  forums. However,  the 
fact that the conclusions reached by examining forum official statements  in this thesis were validated by secondary 
literature  to  a quite  convincing  extent  supports  the  claim  that  such  a method of  analysis  can  lead  to  grasp  some 




Antarctic negotiations, a higher frequency of collectivist statements is associated with more 
legitimate forum outputs and greater fulfilment of the collective mandate. However, the objective of 
this research was not to establish what causes actors to engage more frequently in collectivist 
statements, nor was it to understand what are the variables that lead forum participants to pursue the 
forum mandate as opposed to their particularistic goals. The goal of this dissertation was to develop 
a method for distinguishing collectivist statements from procedural and particularistic ones, so that 
future researchers could try to identify the variables encouraging certain types of behaviour in a 
forum. 
Ultimately, this thesis argues that the mandates of international forums are more than mere 
bureaucratic and shallow formulations: they are elements that can deeply influence the way 
negotiations are conducted, that can determine the legitimacy of a forum output and, consequently, 
its effectiveness. It also argues that the statements and the declarations formulated by delegations 
are much more than “empty words”: they are the very fabric of international relations, and if 
analysed can lead to elaborate reliable and clear portraits of types of negotiating behaviour, and to 
greater understanding of the internal dynamics regulating international negotiations. The empirical 
analysis conducted in this research provides strong evidence that what people say at the negotiating 
table matters, that it can influence the way international actors address the issues in front of them, 
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